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1(^1  IMiM... 


UK 


POSITIVE    PHILOSOPHY 


AUGUSTE    COMTE. 


JOHN  STUART  MILL, 


NEW  YORK 

UEXRV    HOLT   AND   COMPtVXY 

1873. 


->i^^i?^    HI 


• 


^A  ^mo,S4.  6^ 


(  HA;<V/Af;D  '\ 

UNIVERSlIY 

LlQRARY 


B> 


THE 


POSITIVE  PHILOSOPHY  OF^UGUSTE  COMTE. 


Fou  some  time  much  has  been  said,  in  England  and 
on  the  Continent,  concerning  " Positivism "  and  "the 
Positive  Philosopliy."  Those  plu-ascs,  wliich  during 
tlie  hf'e  of  tlic  eminent  thinker  who  introduced  tlicm  had 
ia:i(le  their  way  into  no  writings  or  discussions  but  those 
of  his  very  few  direct  discipk\<,  have  emerged  from 
the  depths"  and  manifested  tliemselves  on  the  surface 
of  tlie  philosophy  of  the  age.  It  is  not  very  widely 
knowii  whfit  they  represent,  but  it  is  understood  that 
they  rei)rescut  something.  They  arc  symbols  of  a  rec- 
oiiuizcd  mode  of  thought,  and  one  of  sufficient  import- 
ance to  induce  almost  all  who  now  discuss  the  great 
jiroI)lcms  of  philosophy,  or  survey  from  any  elevated 
point  of  view  the  opinions  of  the  age,  to  take  what  is 
termed  the  Posltivist  view  of  things  into  serious  con- 
?i<lcrntion,  and  define  their  own  position,  more  or  less 
friendly  or  hostile,  in  regard  to  it.     Indeed,  though  the 

*  1.  Coiirs  de  Plnloiophie  Positive.  Par  Auguste  Cosite,  Kt-petitcur  U'- 
Aimlyse  traiiscciulante  ct  de  ^Iccaiiiquc  rationnelle  ii  I'Ecole  Polytechniqiie, 
vt  F.xaininatcur  dos  Candidats  qui  se  dcstinent  a  cctte  Ecole.  Deuxieme 
ICdiiioii,  aufimcnti'C  d'linc  rieface  par  K.  LiUre,  et  d'une  Tublo  alphab<5t- 
iqiu^  dos  innticrts.     Paris:  1SC4. 

2.  Anrjiittc  C'limtc  cl  It  Phihsophie  PosUlce.  Par  E.  LittuA.  Paris: 
li-G.3. 

Westminster  Review,  April,  1865. 

131 


4  TIIE   POSITIVE    PIIILOSOPirr 

mode  of  thought  expressed  by  the  terms  Positive  and 
Positivism  is  widely  spread,  the  words  themselves  are, 
as  usual,  better  known  tlirough  the  enemies  (;i'  that 
mode  of  thinkin"-  than  through  its  friends  ;  and  more 
than  one  thinker  who  never  called  himself  or  his  o[)i!i- 
ions  by  those  appelhvtions,  and  carefully  guarded 
himself  ai^ainst  beinr/  confounded  with  tliuse  who  did, 
finds  himself,  sometimes  to  his  displeasure,  tiiough  gen- 
erally by  a  tolerably  correct  instinct,  chisscd  with 
Positivists,  and  assailed  as  a  Positivist.  This  change 
in  the  bearings  of  philosophic  opinion  commenced  in 
England  earlier  than  in  France,  where  a  philosophy  oi' 
a  contrary  kind  had  been  more  widely  cultivated,  and 
had  taken  a  firmer  hold  on  the  speculative  minds  of  a 
generation  formed  by  IJoyer-Collard,  Cousin,  JouH^roy, 
and  their  compeers.  The  great  treatise  of  \M.  Comte 
was  scarcely  mentioned  in  Frencii  literature  or  criticism, 
when  it  was  already  working  powerfully  on  the  minds 
of  many  British  students  and  thiidvcrs.  But,  agreeably 
to  the  usual  course  of  things  in  France,  the  new  ten- 
dency, Avhcn  it  set  in,  set  in  more  strongly.  Those 
who  call  themselves  Positivists  are  indeed  not  numer- 
ous ;  but  all  French  writers  who  adhere  to  the  common 
philosophy,  now  feel  it  necessary  to  begin  by  fortifying 
their  position  against  "the  Positivist  school."  And 
the  mode  of  thinking  thus  deslc^nated  is  alreadv  mani- 
testing  its  importance  by  one  of  the  most  unequivocal 
signs,  the  appearance  of  thinkers  who  attempt  a  com- 
promise or  juste  niilien  between  it  and  its  o[)posite. 
The  acute  critic  and  metaphysician  M.  Tainc,  and  the 
distinguished  chemist  M.  Berthelot,.  are  the  authors  of 
the  two  most  conspicuous  of  these  attcm{)ts. 


OF   AUGUSTE    COMTE.  d 

The  time,  therefore,  seems  to  have  come,  when  every 
philosophic  thinker  not  only  ought  to  form,  but  m.ay 
usefully  express,  u  judgment  respecting  this  intellectual 
movement;    endeavoring    to    understand    wh.it    it    is, 
whether  it  is  essentially  a  wholesome  movement,  and 
if  so,  what  is  to  be  accepted  and  wUut  rejected  of  the 
direction    given  to  it    by  its    most  important  movers. 
There  cannot  be  a  more  appropriate  form  for  the  dis- 
cussion of  these  points  than  a  critical  examination  of 
the  2)hilosophy  of  Auguste  Comte  ;    for  which  the  ap- 
pearance of  a  new  edition  of  his  fundamental  treatise, 
with  a  preface  by  the  most   eminent,  in  every  point  of 
view,  of  his  professed   disciples,    ^I.    Littro,  atiords   a 
good  opportunity.     The  name  of  M.   Comtc  is  more 
identified  than  any  other  witli  this  mode  of  thought. 
He  is  the  first  who  has  attempted  its  con)plete  systema- 
tlzation,  and  the  scientific  extension  of  it  to  all  objects  of 
human  knowledge.     And  in  doing  this  he  has  displayed 
a  quantity  and  cpiallty  of  mental  power,  and  achieved 
an  anujunt  of  success,  which  have  not  only  won  but  re- 
taine<l  the  high  admiration  of  thinkers  as  radically  and 
strenuously  o[)posed  as  it  is  possible  to  be,  to  nearly  the 
whole  of  his  later  tendencies,  and  to  many  of  his  earlier 
opinions.      It  would    have    been  a  mistake    had    such 
thinkers  busied    themselves  in  the  first   instance  with 
drawing  attention  to  what  they  regarded  as  errors  in 
his  great  work.     Until  it  had  taken  the  place  in  the 
world  of  thought  whicli  belonged  to  it,  the  important 
matter  was  not  to  criticise  it,  but  to  help  in  making  it 
known.     To  ha^c  put  those  who  neither  knew  nor  were 
capable  of  appreciating  the  greatness  of  the  book,  in 
jiossession  of  its  vulnerable  points,  would  have  indefi- 


6  THE    rQSITIVE   PHILOSOPHY 

nitely  retarded  its  progi'css  to  a  just  estimation,  and  was 
not  needful  for  guarding  against  any  serious  incon- 
venience. AViiile  a  writer  has  few  voiuli-rs,  :uul  no  in- 
fluence except  on  iiulc[»cii.K  at  tlilnkci-s,  the  only  thing 
worth  considering  in  him  is  what  he  can  tcix-li  us  :  if 
there  be  any  thing  in  wliich  ho  Is  lr->  ,\  !-,■  tliau  we  arc 
already,  it  may  be  left  unnoticed  until  the  time  comes 
wjicn  his  errors  can  do  harm.  But  the  high  place 
whicli  M.  Comtc  has  now  assumed  among  European 
thinkers,  and  the  Increasing  intlmiico  of  his  principal 
work,  while  they  make  it  a  more  hopeful  task  than  be- 
fore to  impress  and  enforce  the  strong  points  of  his 
philosophy,  have  rendered  it,  i'ov  the  first  time,  not  in- 
opportune to  discuss  his  mistakes.  Wiiatcver  ei-rors  he 
may  have  fallen  into  are  now  in  a  position  to  be  inju- 
rious, while  the  free  exposure  of  them  can  no  longer 
be  so. 

We  propose,  then,  to  puss  in  review  the  main  prin- 
ciples of  M.  Comtc's  philosophy  ;  confining  ourselves 
for  the  present  to  tlic  great  treatise  by  which,  in  this 
country,  he  is  chiefly  known,  and  leaving  out  of  con- 
sideration the  writings  of  the  last  ten  years  of  his  life, 
except  for  the  occasional  Illustration  of  detached  points. 
When  we  extend  our  examination  to  these  later  produc- 
tions, as  we  hope  hereafter  to  do,  we  shall  have,  in  the 
main,  to  reverse  our  judgment.  Instead  of  recognizing, 
as  in  the  "  Cours  de  Philosophic  Positive,"  an  essentially 
sound  view  of  phIloso[)hy,  with  a  few  capital  errors,  it 
is  in  their  general  character  that  we  deem  the  subse- 
quent speculations  false  and  nusleading,  while  in  the 
midst  of  this  wrong  general  tendency,  we  find  a  crowd 
of  valuable  thoughts,  and  suggestions  of  tliought,  in 


OF  AUGUSTE   COMTE.  • 

detail.  For  tlic  present  we  put  out  of  the  question  this 
sl"-nal  anomaly  in  M.  Comte's  intellectual  career.  .  We 
shall  consider  only  the  principal  gift  which  he  has  left 
to  the  world,  his  clear,  full,  and  comprehensive  exposi- 
tion, and  in  part  creation,  of  what  he  terms  the  Positive 
Philosopliy :  endeavoring  to  sever  what  in  our  estima- 
tion is  true,  from  the  nuich  less  which  is  erroneous,  in 
that  philosophy  as  he  conceived  it,  and  distinguishing, 
as  we  proceed,  the  part  which  is  specially  his,  from  that 
whicli  hclongs  to  the  phIlo60[)]jy  of  the  age,  and  is  tlie 
common  inheritance  of  thinkers.  This  last  discrimina- 
tion has  been  partially  made  in  a  late  pamphlet,  by  Mr. 
Herbert  Spencer,  in  vindication  of  his  own  indcpcud- 
cnce  of  thought ;  but  this  does  not  diminish  the  utility 
of  doing  it,  with  a  less  limited  purpose,  here  ;  especially 
as  j\Ir.  Spencer  rejects  .nearly  all  which  properly  belongs 
to  M.  Comte,  and  in  his  abridged  mode  of  statement 
does  scanty  justice  to  what  he  rejects.  The  separation 
is  not  difficult,  even  on  the  direct  evidence  given  by  ^^. 
Comte  himself,  who,  far  from  claiming  any  originality 
not  really  belonging  to  him,  was  eager  to  connect  his 
own  most  original  thoughts  with  every  germ  of  any 
thing  similar  which  he  observed  in  previous  thinkers^ 

The  fundamental  docti'ine  of  a  true  philosophy,  ac- 
cording to  ]\I.  Comte,  and  the  character  by  which  he 
defines  Positive  Philosophy,  is  the  following  :  —  "We 
have  no  knowledge  of  any  thing  but  Phenomena ;  and 
our  knoAvledge  of  phenomena  is  relative,  not  absolute. 
AVe  know  not  the  essence,  nor  the  real  mode  of  produc- 
tion, of  aiiy  fact,  but  only  its  relations  to  otiicr  facts  in 
the  way  of  succession  or  of  similitude.  These  relations 
are    constant ;  that    is,  always  the  same  in    the   same 


8  THE    POSITIVE    rillLOSOPHY 

circumstances.  The  constant  resemblances  wliich  link 
phenomena  together,  and  the  constant  sequences  which 
unite  them  as  antecedent  and  consequent,  are  termed 
their  laws.  The  laws  of  phenomena  are  all  we  know 
resi)ecting  them.  Their  essential  nature,  and  their  ulti- 
mate causes,  either  efficient  or  final,  arc  unknown  and 
inscrutable  to  us. 

M.  Comtc  claims  no  originality  for  this  conception  of 
human  knowledge.  He  avows  that  it  has  been  virtually 
acted  on  from  the  earliest  period  by  all  mIio  have  made 
any  real  contribution  to  science,  and  became  distinctly 
present  to  the  minds  of  speculative  men  from  the  time 
of  Bacon,  Descartes,  and  Galileo,  whom  he  regards  as 
collectively  the  founders  of  the  Positive  Philosoj)hy.  As 
he  says,  the  knowledge  which  mankind,  even  in  the  ear- 
liest ages,  chieHy  [)ursued,  being  that  which  they  most 
needed,  was  foreknowledge  :  "savoir,  pour  prevoir." 
When  they  sought  for  the  cause  it  was  mainly  in  order 
to  control  the  effect,  or  if  it  was  uncontrollable,  to  fore- 
know and  adapt  their  conduct  to  it.  Now,  all  foresight 
of  phenomena,  and  power  over  (hem,  depend  on 
knowledge  of  their  sequences,  and  not  upon  any  no- 
tion we  may  have  formed  respecting  their  origin  or 
inmost  nature.  We  foresee  a  fact  or  event  by  means 
of  facts  which  are  signs  of  it,  because  experience  has 
shown  them  to  be  its  antecedents.  We  bring  about  any 
fact,  other  than  our  own  muscular  contractions,  by 
means  of  some  fact  which  experience  has  siiown  to  be 
followed  by  it.  All  foresight,  therefore,  and  all  intelli- 
gent action,  have  only  been  possible  in  proportion  as 
men  have  successfully  attempted  to  ascertain  the  suc- 
cessions of  phenomena.      Neither  foreknowledge,  nor 


OP  AUGUSTE   COMTE.  51 

the  knowledge  which  is  practical  power,  can  be  acquired 
by  any  other  means. 

The  conviction,  however,  that  knowledge  of  the  suc- 
cessions and  co-existences  of  phenomena  is  the  sole 
knowledge  accessible  to  us,  could  not  be  ai-rived  at  in  a 
very  early  stage  of  the  progress  of  thought.  Men  have 
not  even  now  left  off  hoping  for  other  knowledge,  nor 
believing  that  they  have  attained  it ;  and  tliat,  when  at- 
tained, it  is,  in  some  undcfinablc  manner,  greatly  more 
precious  than  mere  knowledge  of  sequences  and  co-cxist- 
cnccs.  The  true  doctrine  was  not  seen  in  its  full  clear- 
ness even  by  Bacon,  though  it  is  the  result  to  which  all 
his  speculations  tend  :  still  less  by  Descartes.  It  was, 
however,  correctly  apprehended  by  Newton.*  But  it 
was  probably  first  conceived  in  its  entire  generality  by 
Hume,  who  carries  it  a  step  further  than  Comte,  main- 
taining not  merely  tiiat  tiie  only  causes  of  phenomena 
which  can  be  known  to  us  are  other  phenomena,  their 
invariable  antecedents,  but  that  tiiere  is  no  other  kind 
of  causes :  cause,  as  he  interprets  it,  means  the  in- 
variable antecedent.  "J'his  is  the  only  part  of  Hume's 
doctrine  which  was  contested  by  his  great  adversary, 
Kant ;  who  inalntnining  as  strenuously  as  Comte  that 
we  know  nothing  of  things  in  themselves,  of  Noumena, 
of  real  Substances  and  real  Causes,  yet  peremptorily 
asserted  their  existence.  But  neither  does  Comte  ques- 
tion this :  on  the  contrary,  all  his  language  implies  it. 
Among  the  direct  successors  of  Hume,  the  writer  wlio 
has  best  stated  and  defended  Couite's  fundamental  doc- 
trine is  Dr.  Thomas  Brown.     The  doctrine  and  spirit 

•  See  tlie  Chapter  on  EfRcient  Causes  in  Eeid's  "  Essays  on  the  Activa 
Powers,"  which  is  avowedly  grounded  on  Newton's  ideas. 


10  THE    rOSITIVE    nilLOSOPHY 

of  Brown's  philosophy  arc  entirely  Positivist,  aiul  no 
better  introduction  to  Positivism  than  the  early  part  of 
his  "Lectures  "  has  yet  been  produced-  Of  living  tliink- 
ers  wc  do  not  speak  ;  but  the  same  great  truth  formed 
the  groundwork  of  all  the  speculative  philosophy  of 
Bentham,  and  pre-eminently  of  James  ]Mill  :  and  Sir 
V.'iiliam  Hamilton's  famous  doctrine  of  the  Relativity  of 
I'.uman  knowledge  has  guided  many  to  it,  though  wc 
cannot  credit  Sir  William  Hamilton  himself  with  having 
understood  the  principle,  or  been  willing  to  assent  to  it 
if  he  had. 

The  foundation  of  ]M.  Comte's  philosophy  is  thus  in 
no  way  peculiar  to  him,  but  the  general  j)roperty  of  the 
age,  however  far  as  yet  from  being  universally  accei)ted 
even  by  thoughtful  minds.  The  philosophy  called  Posi- 
tive is  not  a  recent  invention  of  M.  Comte,  but  a  simple 
adherence  to  the  traditions  of  all  the  great  scientific 
minds  whose  discoveries  have  made  the  hiunan  race  what 
it  is.  M.  Comte  has  never  presented  it  in  any  otiier 
light.  But  he  has  made  the  doctrine  his  own  by  his 
manner  of  treating  it.  To  know  rightly  what  a  thing 
is,  Ave  require  to  know,  with  eijual  distinctness,  what  it 
is  not.  To  enter  into  the  real  character  of  onv  mode 
of  thought,  we  must  imderstand  what  other  modes  of 
thought  compote  with  it.  M.  Comte  lias  taken  care 
that  we  should  do  so.  The  modes  of  philosophizing 
which,  according  to  him,  dispute  ascendancy  with  the 
Positive,  arc  two  in  number,  both  of  them  anterior  to  it 
in  date;  the  Theological,  and  the  Metaphysical. 

We  use  the  words  Theological,  iMetaphysical,  and 
Positive,  because  they  are  chosen  by  M.  Comte  as  a 
vehicle  for  M.  Comte's  ideas.     Any  philosopher  whose 


OF   AUOUSTE   COJITE.  11 

thoughts  another  person  undertakes  to  set  forth,  has  a 
right  to  rcquu'e  that  it  should  be  done  by  means  of  liis 
own  nomencLiture,  Tliey  arc  not,  however,  the  terms 
we  should  ourselves  choose.  In  all  languages,  but 
especially  in  English,  they  excite  ideas  other  than  those 
intended.  The  words  Positive  and  Positivism,  in  the 
mcaninir  assiu'ncd  to  them,  are  ill  fitted  to  take  root  in 
Englisli  soil ;  while  Metaphysical  suggests,  and  suggest- 
ed even  to  ]M.  Comte,  much  that  in  no  way  deserves  to 
be  included  in  his  denunciation.  The  term  Theological 
is  less  wide  of  the  mark,  though  the  use  of  it  as  a  term 
of  condemnation  implies,  as  we  shall  see,  a  greater  reach 
of  ne'^xtion  than  need  be  included  in  the  Positive  creed. 
Instead  of  the  Theological  we  should  prefer  to  speak  of 
the  Personal,  or  Volitional  explanation  of  nature;  in- 
stead of  INIetaphysical,  the  Abstractional  or  Ontological : 
and  the  meaning  of  Positive  would  be  less  ambiguously 
expressed  in  the  objective  aspect  by  Phenomenal,  in  the 
subjective  by  Experiential.  But  ]\I.  Comte's  o[)inions 
are  best  stated  in  his  own  phraseology  ;  several  of  them, 
indeed,  can  scarcely  be  presented  in  some  of  their  bear- 
ings without  it. 

The  Theological,  which  is  the  original  and  sponta- 
neous form  of  thought,  regards  the  facts  of  the  universe 
as  governed  not  by  invariable  laws  of  sequence,  but  by 
single  and  direct  volitions  of  beings,  real  or  imaginary, 
possest^ed  of  life  and  intelligence.  In  the  infantile  state 
of  reason  and  experience,  individual  objects  are  looked 
upon  as  animated.  The  next  step  is  the  conception  of 
invisible  beings,  each  of  whom  superintends  and  governs 
an  entire  class  of  objects  or  events.  The  last  merges 
this  multitude  of  divinities  in  a  single  God,  who  made 


12  THE  POSITIVE  riiiLosoi'iiy 

the  Avlmlc  universe  in  the  beginning,  and  guides  and 
carries  on  its  phenomena  by  his  continued  action,  or,  as 
others  think,  only  modifies  them  from  time  to  time  by 
special  interferences. 

The  mode  of  thought  which  M.  Comte  terms  Meta- 
physicrd,  accounts  for  phenomena  by  ascribing  them, 
not  to  volitions  either  sublunary  or  celestial,  but  to  real- 
ized abstractions.  In  this  stage  it  is  no  longer  a  god 
that  causes  and  directs  each  of  the  various  agencies  of 
nature  :  it  is  a  power,  or  a  force,  or  an  occult  quality, 
considered  as  real  existences,  inherent  in  but  distinct 
from  the  concrete  bodies  in  which  they  reside,  and  which 
they  in  a  manner  animate.  Instead  of  Dryads  presiding 
over  trees,  producing  and  regulating  their  phenomena, 
every  ])]ant  or  animal  has  now  a  Vegetative  Soul,  the 
Ppf— <M7Vn^  of  Aristotle.  At  a  later  period  the  Vegeta- 
tive Soul  has  become  a  Plastic  Force,  and  still  later, 
a  Vital  Principle.  01)jects  now  do  all  that  they  do 
because  it  is  their  Essence  to  do  so,  or  by  reason  of 
an  inherent  Virtue.  Phenomena  are  accounted  for  by 
supposed  tendencies  and  [)ropcnsitics  of  the  al)straction 
Xaturc ;  which,  though  regarded  as  impersonal,  is  fig- 
ured as  actinjjr  on  a  sort  of  motives,  and  in  a  manner 
more  or  less  analagous  to  that  of  conscious  beings. 
Aristotle  affirms  a  tendency  of  Nature  towards  the  best, 
which  helps  him  to  a  th(?ory  of  many  natural  phenomena. 
The  lisc  of  water  in  a  pump  is  attributed  to  Nature's 
horror  of  a  vacuum.  The  fall  of  heavy  bodies,  and  the 
ascent  of  flame  and  smoke,  are  construed  as  attempts  of 
each  to  get  to  its  natural  place,  ^inny  important  con- 
sequences are  deduced  from  the  doctrine  that  Natui'C  has 
no  breaks  (non  habet  saltum).     In  medicine  the  cura- 


OF    AUGUSTS    COMTE.  13 

tlvc  force  (vis  mcdicatrix)  of  Nature  furnishes  tlie  ex- 
planation of  the  reparative  processes  which  modern 
physiologists  refer  cacli  to  its  own  particular  af^encies 
and  laws. 

Ex;ani)lcs  are  not  necessary  to  prove  to  those  who  are 
acquainted  with  the  [)ast  phases  of  human  thought,  how 
great  a  place  both  the  theological  and  the  metaphysical 
intcrj)rctations  of  phenomena  have  historically  occupied, 
as  well  in  the  speculations  of  thinkers  as  in  the  familiar 
conceptions  of  the  multitude.  ^Many  had  perceived  be- 
fore M.  Comte  that  neither  of  these  modes  of  explana- 
tion was  final :  the  warfare  against  both  of  them  could 
scarcely  be  carried  on  more  vigorously  than  it  already 
was,  early  in  the  seventeenth  century,  by  Hobbes-  Nor 
is  it  unknown  to  any  one  who  has  followed  the  history 
of  the  various  physical  sciences,  that  the  positive  expla- 
nation of  facts  has  substituted  itself,  step  by  step,  for 
the  theological  and  metaphysical,  as  the  pi'ogrcss  of 
inquiry  brought  to  light  an  increasing  number  of  the 
invariable  laws  of  phenomena.  In  these  respects  M. 
Comte  has  not  originated  any  thing,  but  has  taken  his 
place  in  a  fight  long  since  engaged,  and  on  the  side  al- 
ready in  the  main  victorious.  The  generalization  which 
belongs  to  himself,  and  in  which  he  had  not,  to  the  best 
of  our  knowledge,  been  at  all  anticipated,  is,  that  every 
distinct  class  of  human  conceptions  passes  necessarily 
through  all  these  stages,  beginning  with  the  theological, 
and  proceeding  through  the  metaphysical  to  the  posi- 
tive ;  the  metapliysical  being  a  mere  state  of  transition, 
but  an  indispensable  one,  from  the  theological  mode  of 
thought  to  the  positive,  which  is  destined  finally  to  pre- 
vail, by  the  universal  recognition   that  all  phenomena 


14  THE  POSITIVE  niiLosoriiY 

without  exception  arc  governed  by  invariable  laws,  witli 
which  no  volitions,  cither  natural  or  supernatural,  inter- 
fere. This  general  theorem  is  coni])lcted  by  the  addi- 
tion, that  the  theological  mode  of  thought  has  three 
stages,  Fetichisni,  Polytheism,  and  iNIonothcism  :  the 
successive  transitions  being  prepared,  and  indeed  caused, 
by  the  gi-adual  uprising  of  the  two  rival  modes  of 
thought,  the  metaphysical  and  the  positive,  and  in  their 
turn  preparing  the  way  for  the  ascendancy  of  these ; 
first  and  temporarily  of  the  metaphysical,  finally  of  the 
positive. 

This  generalization  is  the  most  fundamental  of  the 
doctrines  which  originated  with  M.  Comte ;  and  the 
survey  of  history,  which  occupies  the  two  largest  vol- 
umes of  the  six  composing  his  work,  is  a  continuous 
exemplification  and  verification  of  the  law.  IIow  well 
it  accords  with  the  facts,  and  how  vast  a  number  of  the 
greater  historical  phenomena  it  explains,  is  known  only 
to  those  who  have  studied  its  exposition,  wlicro  alone 
it  can  be  found  —  in  these  most  striking  and  instructive 
volumes.  As  this  theory  is  the  key  to  ^L  Comtc's  other 
generalizations,  all  of  which  are  more  or  less  dependent 
on  it ;  as  it  forms  the  backbone,  if  we  may  so  sjieak,  of 
hil  philosophy,  and,  unless  it  be  true,  he  has  accom- 
plished little ;  we  cannot  better  employ  part  of  our 
space  than  in  clearing  it  from  misconception,  and  giv- 
ing the  explanations  necessary  to  remove  the  obstacles 
which  prevent  many  competent  persons  from  assenting 
to  it. 

It  is  proper  to  begin  by  relieving  the  doctrine  from  a 
religious  prejudice.  The  doctrine  condemns  all  theo- 
logical explanations,  and  replaces  them,  or  thinks  them 


OF  AUGUSTE   COMTE.  15 

destined  to  be  replaced,  by  theories  vvliich  take  no 
account  of  any  thing  but  an  ascertained  order  of  phe- 
nomena. It  is  inferred  that  if  this  change  were  com- 
pletely accomplished,  mankind  would  cease  to  refer  the 
constitution  of  Nature  to  an  intelligent  will,  or  to  be- 
lieve at  all  in  a  Creator  and  supreme  Governor  of  the 
world.  This  supposition  is  tlie  more  natural,  as  ^I. 
Conitc  was  avowedly  of  that  opinion.  lie  indeed  dis- 
claimed, with  some  acrimony,  dogmatic  atheism,  and 
even  says  (in  a  later  work,  but  the  earliest  contains  noth- 
ing at  variance  with  it)  that  the  hypothesis  of  design 
has  much  greater  verisimilitude  than  that  of  a  blind 
mechanism.  But  conjecture,  founded  on  analogy,  did 
not  seem  to  him  a  basis  to  rest  a  theory  on,  in  a  mature 
state  of  human  intelligence.  lie  deemed  all  real  knowl- 
cd'-'C  of  a  commencement  inaccessible  to  us,  and  the 
inquiry  into  it  an  overpassing  of  the  essential  limits  of 
our  mental  faculties.  To  this  point,  however,  those 
who  accept  his  theory  of  the  progressive  stages  of  opin- 
ion are  not  obliged  to  follow  him.  The  Positive  mode 
of  thought  is  not  necessarily  a  denial  of  the  supernatural ; 
it  merely  throws  back  that  question  to  the  origin  of  all 
thinjrs.  If  the  universe  had  a  beginning,  its  beginning, 
by  the  very  conditions  of  the  case,  was  supernatural; 
the  laws  of  nature  cannot  account  for  their  own  origin. 
Tlie  Positive  philosopher  is  free  to  form  his  opinion  on 
the  subject,  according  to  the  weight  he  attaches  to^the 
analogies  which  are  called  marks  of  design,  and  to  the 
general  traditions  of  the  human  race.  The  value  of 
these  evidences  is  indeed  a  question  for  Positive  philos- 
ophy, but  it  is  not  one  upon  which  positive  philosophera 
must  necessarily  be  agreed.     It  is  one  of  M.  Comte'a 


16  THE    POSITIVE    nilLOSOPIIY 

mistakes  that  he  never  allows  of  open  questions.  Posi- 
tive Philosophy  maintains  that  within  the  existing  order 
of  the  universe,  or  rather  of  the  part  of  it  known  to  us, 
the  direct  determining  cause  of  every  plionouicnon  is  not 
supernatural  but  natural.  It  is  compatihle  with  this  to 
believe,  that  the  universe  was  created,  and  even  that  it 
is  continuously  governed,  by  an  Intelligence,  provided 
we  admit  that  the  intelligent  Governor  adheres  to  fixed 
laws,  which  are  only  modified  or  counteracted  by  other 
laws  of  the  same  dispensation,  and  arc  never  ciilicr  ca- 
priciously or  providentially  dcitartcd  from.  AVhoevcr 
regards  all  events  as  parts  of  a  constant  order,  each  one 
being  the  invariable  consequent  of  some  antecedent  con- 
dition, or  combination  of  conditions,  accepts  fully  the 
Positive  mode  of  thoujcht :  whether  he  acknowledc^cs  or 
not  an  universal  antecedent  on  whi(;h  the  whole  system 
of  nature  was  originally  consequent,  and  whether  that 
universal  antecedent  is  conceived  as  an  Intelligence 
or  not. 

There  is  a  corresponding  misconception  to  be  cor- 
rected respecting  the  Metaphysical  mode  of  thought. 
In  repudiating  metaphysics,  M.  Comte  did  not  interdict 
himself  from  analyzing  or  criticising  any  of  the  abstrnct 
conceptions  of  the  mind.  He  was  not  ignorant  (though 
he  sometimes  seemed  to  forget)  that  such  analysis  and 
criticism  arc  a  necessary  part  of  the  scientific  process, 
and  accompany  the  scientific  mind  in  all  its  operations. 
What  he  condemned  was  the  habit  of  conceiving:  these 
mental  abstractions  as  real  entities,  which  could  exert 
power,  produce  phenomena,  and  the  enunciation  of 
which  could  be  regarded  as  a  theory  or  explanation 
of  facts.     Men  of  the  present  day  with  difficulty  believo 


OF    AUGUSTE    COMTE.  17 

that  SO  absurd  a  notion  was  ever  really  entertained,  so 
repugnant  is  it  to  the  mental  habits  formed  by  long  and 
assiduous  cultivation  of  the  positive  sciences.     But  those 
sciences,  however  widely  cultivated,  have  never  formed 
the  basis  of  intellectual  education  in  any  society.     It  is 
with   philosophy  as  with  religion  :    men  marvel  at  the 
al)surdity  of  other  people's  tenets,  while  exactly  parallel 
absurdities  remain  in  their  own,  and  the  same  man  i.^ 
unaffectedly  astonished  that  words  can  be  mistaken  for 
things,  who   is   treating  other  Avoids   as   if  they   were 
things  every  time  he  opens  his  mouth  to  discuss.      Xo 
one,  unless  entirely  ignorant  of  the  history  of  thought, 
will  deny  that  tiic  mistaking  of  abstractions  for  realities 
pervaded  speculation  all  through  antiquity  and  the  middle 
ages.     Tiic  mistake  was  generalized  and  systematized  in 
the  famous  Ideas  of  Plato.     The  Aristotelians  carried  it 
on.       Essences,  fpiidditics,  virtues  residing  in   things, 
were  accepted  as  a  hond  fide  explanation  of  j)henomcna. 
Xot  only  abstract  qualities,  but  the  concrete  names  of 
genera  and  species,  were  mistaken  for  objective  exist- 
ences.    It  was  believed  that  there  were  General   Sub- 
stances   corresponding    to    all    tlic    familiar    classes    of 
concrete  things  :  a  substance  ]\Ian,  a  substance  Tree,  a 
substance  Anlmnl,  which,  and  not  the  individual  objects 
so  called,  were  directly  denoted  by  those  names.      The 
real  existence  of  Universal  Substances  was  the  question 
at  issue  iu  the  famous  controversy  of  the  later  middle 
ages  between  Xominalism  and  Kealism,  which  is  one  of 
the  turning  points  in  the  history  of  thought,  being  its 
first  struggle  to  emancipate  itself  from  the  dominion  of 
verbal  abstractions.      The  Realists  were  the   stronger 
j)arty,  but  though  the  Nominalists  for  a  time  succumbed, 

2 


18  THE    rOSITIVE    nilLOSOPIIY 

tlic  doctrine  tlicy  rebelled  apiinst  Cell,  after  a  .«hort  in- 
terval, with  the  re.-^t  of  the  t^cliolastic  philosophy.  IJut 
while  universal  suk-«tanccs  and  siihs-tantial  fornis,  hcing 
the  frosees^t  kind  of  realized  abstractions,  wcne  the 
soonest  discarded,  Pls^jcnccs,  Virtues,  and  Occidt  (Qual- 
ities, long  survived  them,  and  were  first  completely  ex- 
truded Ironi  real  existence  by  the  Cartesians.  Jn 
Descartes' conception  of  sci(!nce,  ail  physical  phenoiiiena 
were  to  be  ex[>lained  by  matter  and  motion,  that  is,  not 
by  abstractions  but  by  invariable  physical  laws  :  though 
his  own  explanations  were  many  of  them  hypothetical, 
and  turned  out  to  be  erroneous.  Long  after  him,  how- 
ever, fictitious  entities  (as  they  arc  happily  termed  by 
IJentliam)  continued  to  be  imagined  as  means  of  ac- 
counting for  the  more  mysteri(»us  phenomena  ;  above 
all,  in  phvsiology,  wherv-,  under  great  varieties  of 
phrase,  mysterious  forc'^  and  priDclplas  were  the  ex- 
planation, or  sid)stitutc  for  ex[)lanation,  of  the  phenom- 
ena of  organized  beings.  To  modern  philosophers,  these 
a  fictions  sire  merely  the  abstract  names  of  the  das.-es  of 
phenomena  which  correspond  to  them  ;  and  it  is  one 
of  the  puzzles  of  [diilosophy,  how  mankind,  after  invent- 
ing a  set  of  njerc  names  to  keej)  tctgether  certain  com- 
binations of  ideas  or  images,  could  have  so  far  foi-gotten 
their  own  act  as  to  invest  these  creations  of  their  will 
with  objective  reality,  and  mistake  the  name  of  a  phe- 
nomenon for  its  ctKcient  cause.  A\'hat  was  a  mystery 
from  the  purely  dogmatic  point  of  view,  is  cleared  up 
by  the  historical.  These  abstract  words  are  indeed  now 
mere  names  of  phenomena,  but  were  not  .="0  in  their 
origin.  To  us  they  denote  only  the  phenomena,  be- 
cause we  have  ceased  to  believe  in  w  hat  else  they  once 


OF   AUGUSTE    COMTE.  19 

(Icsi^Kitcd  ;  aiul  (lie  cinployincnt  of  tlicin  in  explanation 
is  to  us  evidently,  as  i\r,  Conitc  says,  the  na'if  repro- 
duction of  tiic  phenomenon  as  the  reason  for  itself: 
but  it  was  not  so  in  the  beginning-.  The  nietaphysieal 
point  of  view  was  not  a  perversion  of  the  positive, 
but  fi  transformation  of  the  theological.  The  human 
niind,  in  framing  a  class  of  objects,  did  not  set  out 
frcnn  the  notion  of  a  name,  but  from  that  of  :i 
divinity.  The  realization  of  abstractions  Avas  not  th/ 
embodiment  of  a  word,  but  the  gradual  disembodimeii- 
of  a  Fetish. 

The  primiti\e  tendency  or  instinct  of  mankind  is  ti! 
assimilate  all  the  ageneies  which  they  perceive  in  Xa- 
turc,  to  the  only  one  of  which  they  are  directly  conscious, 
their  own  voluntary  activity.  Every  object  wliich  seems 
to  originate  power,  that  is,  to  act  without  being  first 
visiblv  acted  upon,  to  connnunicatc  motion  without  hav- 
ing first  icceivcd  it,  they  suppose  to  possess  life,  con- 
sciousness, will.  This  first  rude  conception  of  nature 
can  scarcely,  however,  have  been  at  any  time  extended 
to  all  phenomena.  The  siin[)lest  observation,  withoui 
which  the  [ircservation  of  life  would  have  been  impos- 
sible, nnist  have  pointed  out  many  uniformities  in  na- 
ture, many  objects  which,  under  given  circumstances, 
acted  exactly  like  one  another  :  and  whenever  this  was 
observed,  men's  natiu-al  and  untutored  faculties  led  them 
to  form  the  similar  objects  into  a  class,  and  to  think  of 
them  togetlicr :  of  which  it  was  a  natural  consequence 
to  refer  effects,  Avhich  were  exactly  alike,  to  a  single  will, 
rather  than  to  a  number  of  wills  precisely  accordant. 
But  this  single  will  could  not  be  the  will  of  the  objcct.s 
thenisclvca,  since  they  were  many  :  it  must  be  the  will  ot 


20  THE  rosiTivE  niiLOSOPiir 

an  invisible  bcinu,  apart  from  tlic  objects,  and  ruling  tlicni 
from  an  iniknown  (li.stancc.  Tbis  is  Polytlici^ni.  AA'e 
are  not  aware  tbat  in  any  tribe  ot't;avagcs  or  negroes  who 
have  been  oI).serve(l,  Fetichisin  has  been  found  totally 
unmixed  with  Polytheism,  and  it  is  probable  that  the 
tw.»  co-existed  from  the  earliest  period  at  whleh  the  hu- 
man mind  was  capable  of  forming  objects  into  classes. 
Fetichisin  proper  gradually  becomes  limited  to  objects 
i'lOsscssing  a  marked  individuality.  A  particular  moun- 
tain or  river  is  Avorshippcd  bodily  (as  it  is  even  now  by 
the  Hindoos  and  the  South-Sea  Islan<lcrs)  as  a  divinity 
in  itself,  not  the  mere  residence  of  one,  long  after  invis- 
ible ;rods  have  been  imairined  as  rnlcrs  of  all  the  jireat 
classes  of  phenomena,  even  intellectual  and  moral,  as 
war,  love,  wisdom,  beauty,  t*cc.  The  worship  of  the 
earth  (Tellus  or  Pales)  and  of  the  various  hcaveidy 
b<x]ies,  was  prolonged  into  the  heart  of  Polytheism. 
Kvery  scholar  knows,  though  UHcratrars  and  men  of 
the  world  do  not,  that  in  the  full  vigor  of  the  Gi'cek 
religion,  the  Sun  and  ^Nloon,  not  a  god  and  god<lcss 
thereof,  were  sacrificed  to  as  deities  —  older  deities  than 
Zeus  and  his  descendants,  belonging  to  the  earlier  dy- 
nasty of  the  Titans  (which  was  the  mythical  version  of 
llie  f;ict  that  their  worship  was  older)  and  these  deities 
hud  a  distinct  set  of  fables  or  legends  connected  with 
tliem.  The  father  of  Phaeton  and  the  lover  of  Kndym- 
ion  were  not  Apollo  and  Diana,  whose  identification 
with  the  Sunifod  and  the  Moon^'oddcss  was  a  late  in- 
vention.  Astrolatry,  which,  as  ^NI.  Comtc  observes,  i;^ 
the  last  form  of  Fetichism,  survived  the  other  forms, 
partly  because  its  objects,  being  inacccssil)le,  were  not 
ao  soon  discovered  to  be  in  themselves  inanimate,  and 


OF   AUGUSTE    COMTE.  21 

'  partly  because  of  the  persistent  f^pontancousness  of  their 
apparent  motions. 

As  far  as  Fctichisni  readied,  and  as  long  as  it  lasted, 
there  Nvas  no  abstraction,  or  elassilication  of  objects, 
and  no  room,  consequently,  lor  tlie  nicta[)hysical  mode 
of  thouglit.  But  as  soon  as  the.  voluntary  agent,  wliosc 
will  go\erncd  the  pheudincnon,  ceased  to  be  the  phys- 
ical object  itself,  and  was  removed  to  an  invisible 
position,  from  which  he  or  she  superintended  an  entire 
class  of  natural  agencies,  it  began  to  seem  impossible 
tiiat  this  being  should  exert  liis  powerful  activity  from 
a  distance,  unless  tlu'ough  the  medium  of  something 
present  on  the  spot.  Through  the  same  Natural  Prej- 
udice which  made  Xewton  unable  to  conceive  the 
possibility  of  his  own  law  of  gravitation  without  a 
subtle  ether  fdling  up  the  intervening  space,  and 
through  which  the  attraction  could  be  conununicatcd 
—  from  this  same  natural  infirmity  of  the  human  mind, 
it  seemed  indispensable  that  tlic  god,  at  a  distance  from 
tlie  o])ject,  must  act  through  something  residing  In  it, 
which  was  the  immediate  a^ont,  the  e.od  havincf  im- 
parted  to  the  intermediate  Something  the  power  whereby 
it  influenced  and  directed  the  object.  AVhen  mankind 
felt  a  need  for  naming  these  imaginary  entitles,  they 
called  them  the  nature  of  the  olyect,  or  its  essence^  or 
virtues  residing  in  it,  or  by  many  other  dKieront  names. 
These  metaphysical  conceptions  were  regarded  as  in- 
tensely real,  and  at  first  as  mere  instruments  In  the 
iiands  of  the  appropriate  deities.  ]^>ut  the  halilt  being 
acquired  of  ascribing  not  only  substantive  existence,  but 
real  and  efficacious  agency,  to  the  abstract  entities,  the 
consequence  was  that  when  belief  in  the  deities  declined 


22  THE  rosiTivE  riiiLOSoriir 

and  faded  away,  the  entities  were  left  standing,  and  a 
semblance  of  explanation  of  phenomena,  equal  to  what 
existed  before,  was  furnislied  by  tiic  entities  alone,  with- 
out referring  them  to  any  volitions,  AVhen  things  had 
reached  this  point,  the  metaphysical  mode  of  thought 
had  completely  substituted  itself  for  the  theological. 

Thus  did  the  difl'ercnt  successive  states  of  the  human 
intellect,  even  at  an  early  stage  of  its  progress,  overlap 
one  another,  the  Fetichistic,  the  Polytheistic,  and  the 
^Ieta[)hysical  modes  of  thought  co-existing  e\eu  in  the 
same  minds,  while  the  belief  in  invariable  laws,  which 
constitutes  the  Positive  mode  of  thought,  was  slowly 
winning  its  way  beneath  them  all,  as  observation  and 
experience  disclosed  in  one  chiss  of  phenomena  after 
another  the  laws  to  which  they  arc  really  subject.  It 
was  this  growth  of  positive  knowledge  which  princi- 
pally determined  the  next  transition  in  the  tlicological 
conception  of  the  universe,  iVoni  Polytheism  Lo  I\l()nu- 
theism. 

It  cannot  be  doubted  that  this  transition  took  }ilace 
very  tardily.  Tiic  conception  of  a  unity  in  Nature, 
which  would  admit  of  attrii)uting  it  to  a  single  will,  is 
far  from  being  natural  to  man,  and  only  finds  admit- 
tance after  a  long  period  of  discipline  and  i)rcparation, 
the  obvious  appearances  all  pointing  to  the  idea  of  a 
government  by  many  conflicting  principles.  AVe  know 
how  high  a  degree  both  of  material  civilization  and  of 
moral  and  intellectual  develo{)mcnt  jn-occded  the  con- 
version of  the  leading  populations  of  the  world  to  the 
belief  in  one  God.  The  superficial  observations  by 
whicli  Christian  travellers  have  iicrsuadcd  themselves 
that  they  found  their  own  ^Monotheistic  belief  in  some 


OF    AUGU8TE    COMTE.  23 

tribes  of  savages,  liavc  always    been    contradicted  by 
more  accurate  knowledge  :  those  who  have  read,  tor  in- 
stance, INIr.  Kohl's  "  Kitchiganii,"  know  what  to  think  of 
the  Great  Spirit  vf  tlie  American  Indians,  who  belongs 
to   a   well-defined  SA'stcm   of  l\)ly theism,    interspersed 
with  large  remains  of  an  original  Fetichisni.      AVe  have 
no  wisii  to  dispute  the  matter  with  those  Avho  believe 
that  ^Monotheism  was  the  primitive  religion,  transmitted 
to  our  race  from  its  first  parents  in  uninterrupted  tradi- 
tion.    By  their  own  acknowledgment,  the  tradition  was 
lost  by  all  the  nations  of  the  world  except  a  small  and 
peculiar  pcojile,  in  whom  it  was  miraculously  kept  alive, 
but  who  were  themschcs   contiiuially  la[)sing   from   it, 
and  in  all  the  earlier  parts  of  their  history  did  not  hold 
it  at  all  in  its  full  meaning,  but  admitted  the  real  exist- 
ence of  otlier  gods,  though  believing  tiieir  own  to  be  the 
most  powerful,  and  to  be  the  Creator  of  the  world.      A 
greater  proof  of  the  unnaturaluess  of  i\ronotheism  to  the 
human  mind  before  a  certain  i)eriod  in  its  develo[)iucnt, 
could  not  well  be  required.     The  highest  form  of  Mono- 
theism, Ciivi-^^<i;in!'y.   ];:!-:  ]i(n\-isted  to  the  present  time 
in  giving  [iariial  satistiiction  to  the  mental  dispositions 
that  lead  to  Polytheism,  by  admitting  into  lt<  t!"-  ^><  y 
the  l!ii>roug!;;y  po]yl]i'.':>(;e  c.');K\''pl!?)ii  of  n  (kMil,    \\'hcn 
]Monotiieism,  after  many  ecnlurlc-;,  made  its  way  to  the 
Greeks  and  Komans  from  the  small  corner  of  the  world 
where  it  existed,  we  know  how  the  notion  of  demons 
facilitated  its  reception,  by  making  it  unnecessary  for 
Chrislians  to  deny  the  existence  of  the  gods  jjrcviously 
Relieved  in,  it  being  sufficient  to  place  them  under  the 
absolute  power  of  the  new  God,  as  the  gods  of  Olympus 
were  already  under  that  of  Zeus,  and  as  the  local  deities 


24  THE  POSITIVE  riiiLosoriiY 

of  all  the  subjugated  nations  liad  been  subordinated  by 
conquest  to  the  divine  patrons  of  the  Jvoinan  State. 

In  wliatever  mode,  natural  or  supernatural,  we  choose 
to  account  for  the  early  monotheism  of  the  Hebrews, 
there  can  be  no  question  that  its  rece[)tion  by  tlie  Ci en- 
tiles was  only  rendered  possible  by  tlie  slow  preparation 
which  the  human  mind  had  undergone  IVom  the  philoso- 
phers. In  the  age  of  the  Gcsars,  nearly  the  whole  edu- 
cated and  cultivated  class  had  outgrown  the  polytheistic 
creed,  and  though  individually  liable  to  returns  of  the 
superstition  of  tlieir  childhood,  were  predisposed  (such 
of  them  as  did  not  reject  all  religion  whatever)  to  the 
acknowledgment  of  one  Supreme  Providence.  It  is 
vain  to  object  that  Christianity  did  not  find  the  majority 
of  its  early  proselytes  among  the  educated  class  :  since, 
except  in  Palestine,  its  teachers  and  propagators  were 
mainly  of  that  class  —  many  of  them,  like  St.  Paul, 
well  versed  in  the  mental  culture  of  their  time ;  and 
they  had  evidently  found  no  intellectual  obstacle  to  the 
new  doctrine  in  their  own  minds.  AVe  must  not  be  de- 
ceived by  the  recrudescence,  at  a  nmch  later  date,  of  a 
metaphysical  Paganism  in  the  Alexandrian  and  other 
philosophical  schools,  provoked  not  by  attachment  to 
polytheism,  but  by  distaste  for  the  political  and  social 
ascendency  of  the  Christian  teachers.  The  fact  was, 
that  Monotheism  had  become  congenial  to  the  cultivat- 
ed mind  :  and  a  belief  which  has  gained  the  cultivated 
minds  of  any  society,  unless  put  down  by  force,  is  cer- 
tain, sooner  or  later,  to  reach  the  multitude.  Indeed 
the  nmltitude  itself  had  been  prepared  for  it,  as  already 
hinted,  by  the  more  and  more  complete  subordination 
of  all   other  deities  to  the  supremacy  of  Zeus ;    from 


OF   AUGUSTE    C03ITE.  25 

wliicli  tlic  Step  to  a  single  Deity,  suiToundcd  by  a  host 
of  angels,  and  keeping  in  recalcitrant  subjection  an 
army  of  devils,  was  by  no  means  difficult. 

By  Avhat  means,  then,  had  the  cultivated  minds  of 
the  Roman  Empire  been  educated  for  Monotheism?  By 
the  growth  of  a  jiractical  feeling  of  the  invariability  of 
mitural  laws,  Monotheism  had  a  natural  adaptation  to 
this  belief,  while  Polytheism  naturally  and  necessarily 
conliicled  with  it.  As  men  could  not  easily,  and  in 
fact  never  did,  suj>pose  that  beings  so  powerful  had 
their  power  absolutely  restricted,  each  to  its  special  de- 
partment, the  will  of  any  divinity  might  always  be  frus- 
trated by  another  :  and  unless  all  their  wills  were  in 
complete  harmony  (which  would  itself  be  the  most  dif- 
ficult to  credit  of  all  cases  of  invariability,  and  would 
rcfpiire  beyond  any  thing  else  the  ascendency  of  a 
Supreme  Deity)  it  was  imp(jssible  that  the  course  of 
any  of  the  phenomena  under  their  government  could  be 
invariable.  But  if,  on  the  contrary,  all  the  phenomena 
of  the  universe  were  under  the  exclusive  and  uncontrol- 
lable inrtuenee  of  a  single  will,  it  was  an  admissible  sup- 
jiosition  that  this  will  might  be  always  consistent  with 
itself,  and  might  choose  to  conduct  each  class  of  it- 
operations  in  an  invariable  manner.  In  proportion. 
tlicrefore,  as  the  invariable  laws  of  phenomena  revealed 
themselves  to  observers,  the  tlieory  which  ascribed  them 
all  to  one  will  began  to  grow  plausible ;  but  must  still 
have  aj)peared  improbable  until  it  had  come  to  seem 
likely  that  invariability  was  the  common  rule  of  all  na- 
ture. The  Greeks  and  Romans  at  the  Christian  era  had 
leached  a  point  of  advancement  at  which  this  suppo- 
sition had  become  probable.     The  admirable  height  to 


26  THE    POSITIVE    nilLOSOrilY 

\vl)Icli  geometry  had  already  been  carried,  liad  familiar- 
ized the   educated  mind   with   the  conception   of  laws 
absolutely  invariahle.      The  logical  analysi.s  ol"  the  intel- 
lectual i)r()ce.<:?cs  oy  Aristotle  had  r^hown  ii  similar  luii- 
formit}'  of  law  in   the  realm  of  mind.      In  the  concrete 
external  world,  the  luost  iniposing  [)hcnomena,  those  of 
the  heavenly  bodies,  which  by  their  power  over  the  im- 
ngination  had  done  most  to  l<(;c])  uj)  the  whole  system 
of  ideas  connected  with  supeinatural  agency,  had  been 
ascertained  to  take  place  in  so  regular  an  order  as  to 
admit  of  being  predicted  with  a  precision  which  to  the 
notions  of  those  d;!ys  nmst  have  appeared  perfect.     .Vnd 
though  an  ecpial  degree  of  regularity  had  not  bcendis- 
ccrned  in  natural  phenomena  generally,  e\en  the  most 
enipirical  observation  had  ascertained  so  many  cases  of 
an  uniformity  almost   complete,   that   inquiring  minds 
■were  eagerly  on  the  lookout  for  f'urther  indications  point- 
ing in  the  same  direction  ;  and  vied  with  one  another  in 
the  formation  of  theories  which,  though  hypothetical  and 
essentially  premature,  it  was   hoped  would  turn  out    to 
be  correct  represcjitations  of  in\arial»le  laws  governing 
large  classes  of  phenomena.      AVhcn  this  hope  and  ex- 
pectation   became    general,  they  were  already  a  great 
encroachment  on  the  original  domain  of  the  theoloLiical 
principle.      Instead   of  the   old  conception,   of  events 
regulated  from  day  to  day  by  the  unforseen  and  changc- 
able  volitions  of  a  legion  oj'  deities,  it  seemed  more  and 
more  i)robable  that  all   the  phenomena  of  the  universe 
t(Mjk  place  according  to   rules,  which  must   have   been 
planned  from  the  beginning ;   by  which  coucei)tion  the 
function  of  the  gods  seemed  to  be  limited  to  forming 
the  plans,  and  setting  the  machinery   in  motion  :  their 


OF    AUGUSTE    CO.'MTE.  27 

subsequent  office  appeared  to  be  reduced  to  a  sinecure,  or 
if  they  continued  to  reii^n,  it  was  in  the  manner  of  con- 
stitutional kings,  bound  by  the  laws  to  wliicli  they  had 
previniisly  given  their  assent.  Accordingly,  the  [)rcte!!- 
sion  of  philosophers  to  explain  phy.-icul  plicnoniena  ])y 
plivsical  causes,  or  to  predict  tlieir  occurrence,  was,  up 
t<»  a  Ncry  late  period  of  polytheism,  rcLiJirded  as  a  sacri- 
legious insult  to  the  gods.  Anaxagcn-as  was  banished 
for  it,  Aristotle  had  to  Hy  lor  his  iile,  and  tiic  mere 
imfoimded  suspicion  of  it  contributed  greatly  to  the  con- 
demnation of  Socrates.  "Wc  arc  too  well  ncquainte  I 
with  this  form  of  the  religious  sentiment  even  now,  {■■ 
have  any  difficulty  in  comprehending  what  must  have 
been  its  violence  then.  It  was  inevitable  that  philoso- 
phers should  be  anxious  to  get  rid  of  at  least  l/icsc 
gods,  and  so  escape  from  the  particular  fables  which 
stood  immediately  in  their  way  ;  acce})ting  a  notion  of 
divine  iiovernmcnt  which  harmonized  better  witii  the 
lessons  tliey  learnt  from  the  study  of  nature,  and  a  God 
conccrninii;  whom  no  mvthos,  as  far  as  they  knew,  had 
vet  been  invented. 

Again,  when  the  idea  became  prevalent  that  the  con- 
stitution of  every  part  of  Nature  had  been  ])lanned  from 
the  beginning,  and  continued  to  take  place  as  it  had 
been  planned,  this  was  itself  a  striking  feature  of  reseui- 
blance  extendins;  through  all  Xatiu'C,  and  affordinu'  i\ 
l)resumption  that  the  whole  was  the  work,  not  of  m:;ny, 
l>ut  of  the  same  hand.  It  must  have  appeared  vaslly 
more  probable  that  tiicre  should  be  one  indefinitely  foio- 
sceing  Intelligence  and  immovable  Will,  than  iumdrcds 
and  thousands  of  such.  The  philoso[)hers  had  not  .u 
that  time  the  arguments  which  micfht  have  been  ground- 


28  THE  rosrnvE  philosophy 

cd  on  universal  laws,  not  yet  suspected,  such  as  tlie  law 
of  gravitation  and  tlic  laws  of  licat ;  tlicro  wat?  a  nuilti- 
tiidc,  obvious  even  to  lliciu,  of  analogies  and  houiolo- 
gics  in  natural  plicnomcna,  wliicii  suggested  unity  of 
plan;  and  a  still  greater  number  were  raided  up  by  their 
active  fancy,  aided  by  tlxMr  pr(Mr.ature  scientific  theories, 
all  of  which  aimed  at  interpreting  some  plieuoinenon  by 
the  analogy  of  others  sui)posed  to  be  better  known  ; 
assuming,  indeed,  a  much  greater  simihu'ity  among  the 
vaiuous  process  of  Xaturc,  tlian  ampler  e.\[)erience  lias 
since  shown  to  exist.  The  tlieological  mode  of  tliought 
thus  advanced  from  Polytheism  to  Monotheisni  througli 
the  direct  influence  of  tlie  l\)*itivc  mode  of  thought,  not 
yet  aspiring  to  complete  specidativc  ascendency.  But, 
inasmuch  as  the  belief  in  the  invariability  of  natural 
laws  was  still  imperfect  e\en  in  highly  cultivated  minds, 
and  in  the  merest  infancy  in  the  uncultivated,  it  gave  rise 
to  the  belief  in  one  God,  but  not  in  an  immovable  one. 
For  many  centuries  the  God  believed  in  was  flexible  by 
entreaty,  was  incessantly  ordering  the  affairs  of  mankind 
l)y  direct  volitions,  and  continually  reversing  the  course 
of  nature  by  nu'raculous  interpositions  ;  and  this  is  be- 
lieved still,  wherever  the  invariability  of  law  has  cstal)- 
llslied  Itself  in  men's  convictions  as  a  general,  but  not 
as  an  universal  truth. 

In  the  change  from  Polytheism  to  ]\[onollieism,  the 
^letaphysical  mode  of  thought  contributed  Ifs  i)art, 
affording  great  aid  to  the  up-hill  struggle  which  the 
Positive  spirit  had  to  maintain  against  the  prevailing 
form  of  the  Theological.  M.  Comte,  indeed,  has  con- 
siderably exaggerated  the  share  of  the  Metaphysical 
spmt  in  this  mental  revolution,  since  by  a  lax  use  of 


OF   AUGUSTE    COMTE,  29 

terms  he  credits  the  Metaphysical  mode  of  thouglit  with 
all  that  is  due  to  dialectics  and  negative  criticism  —  to 
the  exposure  of  inconsistencies  and  absiu"ditic.s   in   tlic 
received  religions.     But  this  operation  is  quite  independ- 
ent of  tlie  ]\reta[)liy8ical  mode  (tf  thought,  and  was  no 
otherwise  connected  witli  it  tiian  in  being  very  generally 
carried  on  by  the  same  minds  (Plato  is  a  brilliant  ex- 
ample),.since  the  most  eminent  efficiency  in  it  docs  not. 
necessarily  depend  on  the  possession  of  positive  scieu- 
tific  knowledge.     But  the  iNIetaphysical  spirit,  strictly  so 
called,  did  contribute  largely  to  the  advent  of  Monothe- 
ism.    The  conception  of  impersonal  entities,  interposed 
l)etween  the  governing  deity  and   the  ])henoniena,  and 
forming  the  machinery  through  which  these  are  imme- 
diately produced,  is  not  repugnant,  as  the  theory  of  di- 
rect supernatural  volitions  is,  to  the  belief  in  invariable 
laws.     The  entities   not  being,   like  the  gods,  framed 
after  the  exemplar  of  men  —  being  neither,  like  them, 
invested  with  human  passions,  nor  supposed,  like  tliem, 
to  have  power  beyond   the    plicnomcna  which  are  the 
special  department  of  each,  there  was  no  fear  of  offend- 
ing them  by  the  attempt  to  foresee  and  define  their  ac- 
tion, or  by  the  sujiposilion  that  it  took  place  according 
to  fixed  laws.     The  popular  tribunal  which  condemned 
Anaxagoras  had  evidently  not  risen  to  the  metaphysical 
point  of  view.     Hippocrates,  who  was  concerned  only 
with  a  select  and  instructed  class,  coidd  say  with  impu- 
nity,   speaking  of  what  were   called   the    god-inflicted 
diseases,  that  to  his  mind  they  were  neither  more  nor 
less  god-inflicted  than  all  others.     The  doctrine  of  ab- 
stract  entities    Avas    a   kind    of  instinctive  conciliation 
between  the  observed  uniformity  of  the  facts  of  nature, 


30  TiiE  POSITIVE  rniLOSornr 

and  their  dependence  on  arbitrary  volition ;  since  it  was 
ca^^icr  to  conceive  a  single  volition  as  setting  a  niacliin- 
crv  to  work,  which  afterwards  went  on  of  itself,  than 
to  suppose  an  inflexible  constancy  in  so  capricious  and 
changeahle  a  thing  as  volition  nui.^t  then  have  appeared. 
Jjut  though  the  regime  of  abstractions  was  in  strictness 
compatible  with  Polytheism,  it  demanded  ^fonothcism 
as  the  condition  of  its  free  development.  The  received 
Polytheism  being  only  the  first  remove  from  Fetichism, 
its  gods  were  too  closely  mixed  up  in  the  daily  details 
of  phenomena,  and  (he  habit  of  propitiating  them  and 
ascertaining  their  will  before  any  important  action  of 
life  was  too  in\cterate  to  admit  withont  the  strongest 
shock  t<»  the  received  system,  tlie  notion  that  tlicy  did 
not  habitually  rule  by  special  intei'[)ositi(»ns,  but  left 
{>henomena  in  all  ordinary  eases  to  the  o[)cration  of  the 
Essences  or  jteculiar  Natures  wliich  tiicy  had  first  im- 
planted in  them.  Any  modification  of  Polytheism  which 
would  have  made  it  fully  compatible  with  the  ^Metaphys- 
ical  conception  of  the  world,  would  have  been  more  dif- 
ficidt  to  eflcct  tb.an  the  transltictn  to  ^Monotheism,  as 
MohoilKiUiii  wiia  Hi  Ib'pl  i'uncciMMl. 

We  have  given,  in  our  own  way,  and  at  some  length, 
this  important  portion  of  M.  Comte's  view  of  the  evolu- 
tion of  human  thought,  as  a  sam[>lc  of  the  manner  in 
which  his  theory  corresponds  with  and  intcr[)rcts  histor- 
ical facts,  and  also  to  obviate  some  objections  to  it, 
grounded  on  an  imperfect  comjtrehension,  or  rather  on 
a  mere  first  glance.  Some,  for  c.\anii)le,  think  the  doc- 
trine of  the  three  successive  stages  of  speculation  and 
belief,  inconsistent  with  the  fact  that  they  all  three  ex- 
isted contemporaneously ;  much  as  if  the  natural  sue- 


OF   AUGUSTE    C03ITE.  31 

cession  of  the  hunting,  the  nomad,  and  the  agricultural 
state  could  be  i-efuted  by  the  fact  that  there  arc  still 
iiunters  and  nomads.  That  the  three  states  were  con- 
tcm[)orancous,  that  they  all  began  before  authentic 
history,  and  still  co-exi.-^t,  is  ^I.  Comte's  express  state- 
ment :  as  well  as  that  the  advent  of  the  two  later 
modes  of  thought  was  the  very  cause  which  disorgan- 
ized and  is  gradually  destroying  the  primitive  one.  The 
Theological  mode  of  ex[)laining  phenomena  was  once 
universal,  with  tlie  exception,  doubtless,  of  the  familiar 
facts  which,  being  even  then  seen  to  be  controllable  by 
humanVill,  belonged  already  to  the  Positive  mode  of 
thought.  The  first  ;uid  easiest  generalizations  of  com- 
mon observation,  anterior  to  the  first  traces  of  the  scien- 
tific .'Spirit,  determined  the  birth  of  the  Metaphysical 
mode  of  thought ;  and  every  further  advance  in  the  ob- 
servation of  nature,  gradually  l)ringing  to  light  its  in- 
variable laws,  determined  a  further  development  of  the 
^Metaphysical  spirit  at  the  expense  of  the  Theological, 
this  being  the  only  medium  through  which  the  conclu- 
sions of  the  Positive  mode  of  thought  and  the  premises 
of  the  Theohtgical  could  l)e  temporarily  ma<l('  coinpat- 
il)le.  At  a  later  pciiod,  whi'U  ihe  real  I'harui'ttr  of  tho 
jxtsitive  laws  of  nature  had  come  to  be  in  n  certain 
degree  understood,  and  the  theological  idea  had  as- 
sumed, in  scientific  minds,  its  final  character,  that  of  a 
God  governing  by  general  laws,  the  Positive  spirit,  iiav- 
ing  now  no  longer  need  of  the  fictitious  medium  of 
imaginary  entities,  set  itself  to  the  easy  t.ask  of  demol- 
ishing the  instrument  by  which  it  had  risen.  But  though 
it  destroyed  the  actual  belief  in  the  objective  reality  of 
these  abstractions,  that  belief  has  left  behind  it  vicious 


32  THE   POSITIVE   PHILOSOPHY 

tcndincics  of  the  liuiTian  mind,  wliicli  are  still  far 
cnougli  from  being  extinguished,  and  wliicli  we  shall 
presently  have  occasion  to  characterize. 

The  next  point  on  which  we  have  to  toucli  is  one  of 
p'catcr  imjiortance  than  it  seems.  If  all  human  specu- 
lation had  to  pass  through  the  three  stages,  we  may  pre- 
sume that  its  different  branches,  having  always  been 
very  unequally  advanced,  could  not  pass  i'rom  one  stage 
to  another  at  the  same  time.  There  uuist  have  l)een  a 
certain  order  of  sncccssion  in  which  the  different  sciences 
would  enter,  first  into  the  meta[>hysical,  and  afterwards 
into  the  {)in-cly  positive  stage;  and  this  order  ^I.  Comte 
proceeds  to  investigate,  jflie  result  is  his  rem:;r1;al)le 
conception  of  a  scale  of  sulxn'dliiation  of  the  sciences, 
being  the  order  of  the  logical  dependence  of  those  whicli 
follow  on  those  Avliich  jirccede.  It  is  not  at  first  obvious 
how  :i  mere  classification  of  the  sciences  can  be  not 
merely  a  help  to  their  study,  but  itself  an  important 
part  of  a  body  of  doctrine  ;  the  classification,  however, 
is  a  very  important  part  of  M.  Comte's  philosoj)hy. 

lie  first  distinguishes  between  the  Abstract  and  the 
Concrete  sciences.  The  abstract  sciences  have  to  do 
with  the  laws  which  govern  the  cleiuentary  facts  of 
Nature ;  laws  on  which  all  phenomena  actually  icalized 
must  of  course  depend,  but  which  would  have  been 
equally  compatible  with  many  other  combination.)  than 
those  which  actually  come  to  pass.  The  concntc 
sciences,  on  the  contrary,  concern  themselves  only  with 
the  particular  condjinations  of  phenomena  which  arc 
found  in  existence.  For  example  ;  the  minerals  which 
compose  our  planet,  or  are  found  in  it,  have  been  ])ro- 
duccd  and  arc  held  together  by  the  laws  of  mechanical 


OF    AUGUSTE    C05ITE,  33 

aggregation  and  by  those  of  chemical  union.  It  \s  the 
business  of  the  abstract  sciences,  Physics  and  Chemistiy, 
to  ascertain  these  laws  :  to  discover  how  and  under 
wliat  conditions  bodies  may  become  aggregated,  and 
wliat  arc  the  j)Ossiblc  modes  and  results  of  chemical 
c()ml)ination.  Tlie  groat  majority  of  these  aggregations 
and  combinations  take  place,  so  far  as  we  are  aware, 
only  in  our  laboratories  ;  with  these  the  concrete  science, 
^Mineralogy,  has  nothing  to  do.  Its  business  is  with 
those  aggregates,  and  those  chemical  compounds,  which 
form  themselves,  or  liave  at  some  period  been  formed, 
in  the  natur.il  world.  Again,  Physiolog}',  the  abstract 
science,  investigates,  by  such  means  as  are  available  to 
it,  the  general  laws  of  organization  and  life.  Those 
laws  determine  wliat  living  beings  arc  possible,  and 
maintain  the  existence  and  determine  the  phenomena 
of  those  which  actually  exist :  but  they  would  be  equally 
capable  of  maintaining  in  existence  plants  and  animals 
very  diflerent  from  these.  The  concrete  sciences, 
Zoology  and  Botany,  confine  themselves  to  species 
which  really  exist,  or  can  be  shown  to  have  really 
existed  :  and  do  not  concern  themselves  with  the  mode 
in  which  even  these  would  comport  themselves  under 
all  circumstances,  but  only  under  those  which  really 
take  place.  They  set  forth  the  actual  mode  of  existence 
of  plants  and  animals,  the  phenomena  which  they  in 
fact  present :  but  they  set  forth  all  of  these,  and  take 
into  simultaneous  consideration  the  whole  real  existence 
of  each  species,  however  various  the  ultimate  laws  on 
which  it  depends,  and  to  whatever  number  of  different 
abstract  sciences  these  laws  may  belong.  The  existence 
of  a  date-tree,  or  of  a  lion,  is  the  joint  result  of  many 

« 


34  THE   rOSITIVE    nilLOSOPIIY 

natural  laws,  physical,  clicmlcal,  biological,  and  even 
astronomical.  Abstract  t^cicncc  deals  with  these  laws 
gcparatcly,  but  considers  each  of  them  in  all  its  aspects, 
all  its  possibilities  of  opeiation  :  concrete  science  con- 
siders them  only  in  coml)ination,  and  so  i'ar  as  they 
exist  and  manifest  themselves  in  the  animals  or  phmts 
of  which  we  have  ex[)cricnce.  Tlie  distinctive  attril)utes 
of  the  two  arc  sunnned  up  by  ]\[.  Comte  in  the  ex[)res- 
sion,  that  concrete  science  relates  to  Beings,  or  Objects, 
abstract  science  to  Events.* 

The   concrete   sciences   are   inevitably  later  in   their 
development  than  the  abstract  sciences  ou  which  they 

*  Mr.  ITorbcrf  Spencer,  who  also  (lisliiij;iiislirs  bctwocn  nbs^tract  nnil  Cdn- 
crefn  f  <i('tu'C!s,  rini)l(p_vs  the  tiTiiis  in  a  (iiflVrcnt  soiiso  frnin  that  oxphiined 
ahove.  He  calls  a  science  abstract  when  its  trutlis  arc  merely  ideal;  when, 
like  the  truths  (if  f^eonictrv,  they  are  iKtt  exactly  true  of  re;il  things — or, 
like  the  so-called  law  of  inertia  (the  persistence  in  direction  and  velocity  of 
a  motion  once  impressed)  arc  ''  involveil"  in  experience  but  never  actually 
seen  in  it.  beiii^'  always  more  or  less  completely  frustrated.  Chemisfry  and 
biolfij;y  he  induiles,  on  the  contrary,  anion.;^  concrete  sciences,  because 
chemical  combinations  and  decompositions,  and  the  pliysiolof,'ical  action  of 
tis.sues,  do  actually  take  place  (as  our  senses  testily)  in  the  manner  in  which 
Cic  seientidc  propositions  state  them  to  take  pi.ice.  We  will  not  discuss  the 
lo;ricaI  or  [)hiloloi;ical  propriety  of  either  use  of  the  terms  abstract  and  con- 
crete, in  which  twofold  ]ioiut  of  view  very  fifW  of  the  numerous  ncceptation.s 
of  the-c  words  are  entirely  defensible:  but  of  ihe  two  distinctions  M.  Comte's 
answers  to  by  far  the  deepest  and  most  vital  didercnce.  Jfr.  Spencer's  is 
0|)en  to  the  radical  objecti<m,  that  it  classifies  truths  not  nccordin;,'  to  their 
subject-matter  or  their  niuliial  reljilions,  but  according;  to  an  unimportant 
(litlerence  in  the  manner  in  which  we  come  to  know  them.  Of  wliat  com- 
.seqiienee  is  it  that  Ihe  law  of  inertia  (considered  ns  nn  e.xact  truth)  is  not 
jreneralized  fr<nn  our  <lirect  perceptions,  but  inferred  by  combining;  with  the 
in'ivenn  Ills  which  we  see,  those  which  we  siiould  see  if  it  were  not  for  the 
disfurbin;;  causesV  In  either  case  we  are  e(|ually  certain  that  it  i'.<  an  exact 
truth:  for  ever}' dynamical  law  is  perfectly  fultilled  even  when  it  seems  to 
be  counteracted.  There  must,  we  should  think,  be  many  trutha  in  physiol- 
opy  (for  example)  which  are  only  known  by  a  similar  indirect  process;  and 
Mr.  Spencer  would  hardly  detach  these  from  the  body  of  the  science,  and 
call  them  altstmct  and  the  remainder  concrete. 


OF   AUGUSTE    COMTE.  35 

depend.  Not  that  tliey  begin  later  to  be  studied  ;  on  the 
contrary,  they  are  the  earliest  cultivated,  since  in  our 
abstract  investigations  wc  necessarily  set  out  from  spon- 
liUK'ous  facts.  But  though  wc  may  make  cm[)irical 
generalizations,  we  can  form  no  scientific  theory  of 
concrete  phenomena  until  the  laws  which  govern  and 
explain  them  are  first  known;  and  those  laws  are  the 
subject  of  the  abstract  sciences.  In  consequence,  there 
is  not  one  of  the  concrete  studies  (milcss  wc  count  as-, 
rronomy  among  them)  which  has  received,  up  to  the 
present  time,  its  final  scientific  constitution,  or  can  be 
accounted  a  science,  except  in  a  very  loose  sense,  but 
only  materials  for  science  :  partly  from  insufficiency  of 
facts,  but  more,  because  the  abstract  sciences,  except 
those  at  the  \cry  beginning  of  the  scale,  have  not  at- 
tained tiie  degree  of  perfection  necessary  to  render  real 
concrete  sciences  possible. 

Postponing,  therefore,  the  concrete  sciences,  as  not 
yet  formed,  but  only  tending  towards  formation,  the 
abstract  sciences  remain  to  be  classed.  These,  as 
marked  out  by  M.  Comte,  are  six  in  number;  and  the 
principle  which  he  pro{)osos  for  their  classification  is 
admirably  in  accordance  with  the  conditions  of  our 
study  of  Nature.  It  might  have  happened  that  the 
diftcrent  classes  of  phenomena  had  depended  on  laws 
altofTcthor  distinct ;  that  in  chan2,infj  from  one  to  an- 
other  subject  of  scientific  study,  the  student  left  behind 
all  the  laws  he  previously  knew,  and  passed  under  the 
dominion  of  a  totally  new  set  of  uniformities.  The 
sciences  would  then  have  been  wholly  independent  of 
one  another ;  each  would  have  rested  entirely  on  its 
own  inductions,   and  if  deductive  at  all,  would  have 


36  THE    POSITIVE    I'lIIlAJSOrilV 

drawn  its  deductions  from  promises  oxcl naively  furnisliod 
by  itself.  The  fact,  however,  is  otherwise.  The  rc- 
Intion  wliich  really  suhsistv-*  between  dift'crcnt  kinds  oi' 
plioncmcna,  cnal^les  the  science?  to  be  arranged  in  such 
:in  order,  that  in  travelling  throngli  tliem  we  do  not  pass 
out  of  the  sphere  of  any  Liavs,  but  merely  take  up  addi- 
tio!ial  ones  at  each  step.  In  this  order  ^f.  Comte  pro- 
jKxes  to  arrange  them.  He  classes  the  sciences  in  an 
.'uscending  series,  according  to  the  degree  of  complexity 
of  their  phenomena  ;  so  each  science  depends  on  the 
truths  of  all  those  which  precede  it,  with  the  addition 
of  peculiar  truths  of  its  own. 

Thus,  the  truths  of  munbrr  are  true  of  all  things, 
and  dej)end  only  on  their  own  laws  :  the  science,  there- 
fore, of  Ts'^imiber,  consisting  of  Arithmetic  and  Algebra, 
may  be  studied  without  reference  to  any  other  science. 
The  truths  of  Geometry  prcstipposc  tlie  k'nvs  of  nnmhcr, 
and  a  more  special  class  of  laws  peeidiar  to  extended^ 
bodies,  but  require  no  others  :  CJcomotry,  therefore, 
can  be  studied  independently  of  all  sciences  exce])t  that 
of  number.  Kational  Mechanics  presupposes,  and  do 
pends  on,  the  laws  of  number  and  those  of  extension, 
and  alo!)g  with  them  another  set  of  laws,  those  of 
Equilibrium  and  ^lotion.  The  truths  of  Algebra  and 
(reometry  nowise  depend  on  these  lust,  and  would  have 
been  true  if  these  had  happened  to  be  the  reverse  of  what 
we  find  them  :  but  the  {)henomena  of  equilibrium  and 
motion  cannot  be  understood,  nor  even  stated,  without 
assuming  the  laws  of  nun)ber  and  extension,  such  as 
they  actually  are.  The  j)henomena  of  Astronomy  de- 
pend on  these  three  classes  of  laws,  and  on  the  law  of 
gravitation  besides  ;  which  last  has  no  influence  on  the 


OF   AUGUSTE    COMTi-:.  37 

truths  of  number,  geometry,  or  mechanics.  Physics 
(badly  named  in  comuiou  Englisii  [)arlancc  Natural 
Philosoi)hy)  presupposes  the  three  matliematical  sciences 
and  also  astronomy  ;  since  all  terrcstiial  phenomena  are 
afiected  by  influences  derived  from  the  motions  of  the 
eartii  and  of  llie  heavenly  bodies.  Chemical  plienuineua 
<lcpend  (besides  tlicir  own  lav.s)  on  all  the  preceding, 
those  of  physics  among  the  rest,  especially  on  the  laws 
of  lieat  and  electricity  ;  ph>'siological  phenomena,  oa 
the  laws  of  physics  and  chemistry,  and  their  own  la.vs 
ill  addition.  The  phenoriiena  of  human  society  oh^iy 
laws  of  their  own,  but  do  riOt  depend  solely  upon  these  : 
tlicy  depend  ii[)on  all  the  laws  of  organic  and  anim:  i 
life,  together  with  those  of  inorganic  nature,  these  hv-t 
iuiluencing  society  not  only  through  tlicir  influence  0:1 
life,  but  by  determining  the  physical  conditions  uiuh  r 
which  society  has  to  be  carried  on.  "  Chacun  dc  ct  6 
degres  succcssifs  cxigc  des  inductions  qui  lui  sont  pvo- 
[)rcs ;  niais  elles  ne  peuvent  jamais  dcvenir  syst(ima- 
tiqucs  que  sous  I'impulsion  deductive  rcsultcc  de  tous 
les  ordres  moins  compllques."  * 

Thus  arranged  by  ]M.  Comte  in  a  series,  of  which 
each  term  represents  an  advance  in  speciality  beyond 
the  term  preceding  it,  and  (what  necessarily  accom- 
panies increased  speciality)  an  increase  of  complexity  — 
a  set  of  phenomena  determined  by  a  more  munerous 
combination  of  laws  ;  the  sciences  stand  in  the  following 
order ;  1st,  jNIathematics ;  its  three  branches  following- 
one  another  on  the  same  principle,  Number,  Geome- 
try, Mechanics.  2d,  Astronomy.  3d,  Physics.  4th, 
Chemistry,    oih,  Biology.    Gth,  Sociology,  or  the  Social 

•  "  Systiimc  de  Politique  Positive,"  ii.  36. 


38  TirE    POSITIVE    nilLOSOPHY 

Science,  the  plicnomcna  of  winch  depend  on,  and  can- 
not be  understood  without,  the  i)rii)cipal  truths  of  all 
the  other  sciences.  The  suhject-niattcr  and  contents 
of  these  various  sciences  arc  obvious  of  themselves, 
M-ith  the  exception  of  Physics,  which  is  a  group  of 
sciences  rather  than  a  single  science,  and  is  again 
divided  by  I\I.  Conite  into  five  departments  :  Barology, 
or  the  science  of  weight ;  Thermology,  or  that  of  heat ; 
Acoustics,  Optica,  and  Elcctrology.  These  he  attemj)tH 
to  arrange;  on  the  same  jirinciple  of  increMsing  spt'cinlily 
and  complexity,  but  they  hardly  admit  of  such  a  scalo, 
and  ]M.  Comte's  mode  of  j)lacing  them  varied  at  differ- 
ent periods.  All  the  five  being  essentially  independent 
of  one  anotlier,  he  attached  little  importance  to  their 
order,  excei)t  that  barology  ought  to  come  fnvt,  as  the 
connecting  link  with  astronomy,  and  elcctrology  last, 
as  the  transition  to  chemistry. 

If  the  best  elassification  is  that  which  is  grounded  on 
the  properties  njost  important  for  our  purposes,  this 
classification  will  stand  the  test,  liy  placing  the  sciences 
in  the  order  of  the  complexity  of  their  subject-matter,  it 
presents  them  in  the  order  of  their  difticulty.  ICach 
science  proposes  to  itself  a  more  arduous  inrpiiry  than 
those  which  precede  it  in  the  series  :  it  is  therefore  likely 
to  be  su8CC[)tible,  even  finally,  of  a  less  degree  of  per- 
fection, nn<l  will  certainly  arrive  later  at  the  degree 
attainable  by  it.  In  addition  to  this,  ejich  science,  to 
establish  its  own  truths,  needs  those  of  all  the  sciences 
anterior  to  it.  The  only  means,  for  example,  by  which 
the  physiological  laws  of  life  could  have  been  ascertained, 
was  by  distinguishing,  among  the  nuiltifiirious  and  com- 
plicated  facts  of  life,   the  portion    which  physical  and 


OF    AUGUSTE    COMTE.  39 

chemical  laws  cannot  account  for.  Only  by  thus  iso- 
lating tlic  effects  of  the  peculiar  organic  laws,  did  it 
become  possible  to  discover  what  these  are.  It  follows 
that  the  order  in  which  the  sciences  succeed  one  an(;thcr 
.in  the  series,  cannot  but  be,  in  the  main,  tiic  historical 
order  of  their  development ;  and  is  tlic  only  order  in 
wliich  they  can  rationally  be  studied.  For  this  hist 
there  is  an  additional  reason  :  since  the  more  special 
and  complete  sciences  require  not  only  the  truths  of  the 
sim|>l('r  and  more  general  ones,  but  still  more,  their 
methndsi.  The  scieutilic  intellect,  both  in  the  individunl 
and  in  the  race,  must  learn  in  the  more  clenientar\ 
studies  that  art  of  investigation  and  those  canons  of 
proof  which  arc  to  be  })ut  in  practice  in  the  more 
elevated.  Xo  intellect  is  properly  qualified  for  the 
higher  part  of  the  scale,  without  due  practice  in  the 
lower. 

]\Ir.  Herbert  Spencer,  in  his  essay  entitled  "  The 
Genesis  of  Sciences,"  and  more  recently  in  a  pamphlet 
on  "  The  Classification  of  the  Sciences,"  has  criticised 
and  condemned  ^f.  Comtc's  classification,  and  pi-oposcd 
a  more  elaborate  one  of  his  own  :  and  ]M.  Littre,  in  his 
valuable  biographical  and  philosophical  work  on  M. 
Comte  ("Augustc  Conite  et  la  Philosophic  Positive"), 
lias  at  some  length  criticised  the  criticism.  ]\Ir.  Spencer 
is  one  of  the  small  ninnbcf  of  persons  who  by  the  soli- 
dity and.cncyclopedica!  character  of  their  knowledge,  and 
their  [)owcr  of  co-ordination  and  concatenation,  may 
claim  to  be  the  peers  of  M.  Comte,  and  entitled  to  u 
vote  in  the  estimation  of  him.  But  after  srivintr  to  his 
animadversions  the  respectful  attention  due  to  all  that 
comes  from  Mr.   Si)encer,  we  cannot  find  that  he  has 


40  THE    rOSITIVE    I'lIILOSOrilV 

made  out  Jiny  case.  It  is  always  easy  to  find  fault  with 
i\  classification.  There  arc  a  hundred  possible  ways  of 
arranging  any  set  of  objects,  and  something  may  almost 
always  be  said  against  the  best,  and  in  favor  of  the 
worst  of  them.  But  the  merits  ol"  a  classification  de- 
pend on  the  purposes  to  which  it  is  instrumental.  We 
have  shown  the  jjurposes  for  which  ^I.  Comte's  classi- 
fication is  intended.  ]Mr.  Spencer  has  not  shown  that 
it  is  ill  adapted  to  those  purpo.'^cs  ;  and  we  cannot  per- 
ceive that  his  own  answers  any  ends  cqu;dly  important. 
His  chief  ol)jcction  is  that  if  the  more  special  sciences 
need  the  truths  of  the  more  general  ones,  the  latter  also 
need  some  of  those  of  the  former,  and  have  at  times 
been  stopped  in  their  progress  by  the  imperfect  state  of 
sciences  which  follow  long  after  them  in  M.  Comte's 
ticale  ;  so  that,  the  dependence  lieing  mutual,  there  is  a 
conscufni'^',  but  not  an  ascending  scale  or  hierarchy  of 
the  sciences.  That  tlie  earlier  sciences  derive  lie][)  from 
the  later  is  undoubtedly  true  ;  it  is  part  of  M.  Comte's 
theory,  and  aniply  exemplified  in  the  details  of  his  work. 
When  ho  affirms  that  one  science  historically  precedes 
another,  he  does  not  mean  that  the  perfection  of  the 
first  precedes  the  humblest  commencement  oi'  those 
which  follow.  Mr  vSpencer  docs  not  distinguish  be- 
tween the  empirical  stage  of  the  cultivation  of  a  branch 
of  knowledge,  and  the  scientific  sta^rc.  The  commence- 
ment  of  every  studv  consists  in  f]^athering  together  un- 
analyzed  facts,  and  treasuring  up  such  spontanccMis 
generalizations  as  present  themselves  to  natural  sagacity. 
In  this  stage  any  branch  of  inquiry  can  be  carried  on 
independently  of  every  other ;  and  it  is  one  of  M. 
Comte's    own    remarks    that    the    most  complex,   in  a 


OF    AL'GUSXE    C03ITE.  41 

scientific  point  of  view,  of  all  studies,  the  latest  in  his 
scries,  the  ^tiuly  of  man  as  a  moral  and  social  being, 
since  from  its  ahsorbing  interest  it  is  cultivated  more 
or  less  I)y  every  one,  and  pre-eminently  by  the  great 
practical  minds,  acquired  at  an  early  period  a  greater 
stock  of  just  liiough  unscientific  observations  than  the 
more  elementary  sciences.  It  is  tliesc  cnipirical  truths 
that  the  later  and  more  special  sciences  lend  to  tin; 
earlier  :  or,  at  most,  some  extrcaicly  elementary  scienti- 
fic truth,  which  Iwtppening  to  be  easily  ascertainable  by 
direct  experiment,  could  be  made  available  for  carrying 
a  previous  science  already  founded,  to  a  higher  stage  of 
development ;  a  rc-aetlon  of  the  later  sciences  on  the 
earlier  which  ^I.  Comtc  not  only  fully  recognized,  but 
attached  great  importance  to  systematizing.* 

•  The  struii;»cst  case  wliiih  yiv.  Spvuccr  i>rotUiccs  of  a  scicntificully 
a.'sccrtaiiicd  law,  wliicli,  ihoii^'li  bclonijinf^  to  a  later  science,  was  lu-ccssarj' 
to  the  fcicntinc  roniiatioii  of  one  occupviii^  an  earlier  place  in  "SI.  Coiiite's 
scries,  is  the  law  of  the  accelerating  force  of  ^'ravity;  which  JI.  Cor.ite  . 
places  in  Thysics,  hut  without  wiiich  the  Newtonian  theory  of  the  celestial 
motions  couM  not  have  been  discovered,  nor  could  even  now  he  proved. 
This  fact,  as  is  judicionsly  roniarkcd  by  M.  Littre,  is  not  valid  aj^ainst  the 
plan  of  .M.  Comic's  classification,  but  discloses  .1  slight  error  in  the  detail. 
y{.  Comic  should  not  liavc  placed  the  laws  of  fersestrial  i^ravity  under 
I'hysics.  They  are  part  of  the  fjcneral  fheory  of  gravitation,  and  belong  to 
H>lroiiomy.  Jlr.  Spencer  has  hit  one  of  the  weak  points  in  ^^.  Comte's 
scientific  scale;  weak,  however,  only  because  left  unguarded,  .\stronomy, 
the  second  of  M.  Comte's  abstract  sci.-nccs,  answers  to  his  own  definition  of 
a  I  (increte  science.  jI.  Comte,  however,  was  only  wrong  in  overlooking  a 
ilisiinition.  There  is  an  abstract  science  of  astronomy,  namely,  tlie  theory 
"f  ;:ravitation,  which  would  equally  agree  with  and  cNphiin  the  facts  of  a 
toialiy  diii'ereiit  solar  system  from  the  one  of  which  our  e.irtli  forms  ,1  jKin. 
The  actual  facts  of  our  own  .system,  the  (liniensions,  distances,  velocities, 
temperatures,  pln'sical  composition,  &c.,  of  the  sun,  earth,  and  planets,  are 
properly  the  subject  of  a  concrete  science,  similar  to  natural  history:  but  the 
concrete  is  more  inseparably  imited  to  the  abstract  science  than  in  any 
other  case,  (*iiicc  the  few  celestial  facts  really  .tccessible  to  us,  are  nearly 
.tII  required  for  discovering  and  proving  the  law  of  gravitation  as  an  univer- 
sal property  of  bodies,  and  have  tiierefore  an  inclisp»'i,.-ablc  place  in  the 
abstract  science  a«  its  fundantenfal  data. 


42  THE  rosiTivE  niiLOsoriiY 

But  thoujili  dctaclicd  truths  relating:  to  the  mora 
conij)lcx  order  of  jihenoniena  may  bo  einpii-ically  ob- 
ecrvcd,  and  a  few  of  thciu  even  >ci('iitiri<;iliy  c:-:ta!)lis]io(l, 
contemporaneously  with  an  early  t^taiic  of  8onie  <)f  the 
sciences  anterior  in  the  scale,  such  detacljed  truths,  as 
^I.  Littrc  justly  remarks,  do  not  constitute  a  science. 
AVhat  is  known  of  a  suitject,  oidy  becomes  .1  science 
when  it  is  made  a  connected  body  of  truth  ;  in  which 
the  relation  between  the  general  principles  and  the 
details  is  definitely  made  out,  and  each  particular  truth 
can  be  recognized  as  a  case  of  the  operation  of  widi'r 
laws.  This  point  of  progress,  at  which  the  ^t\u]y 
passes  from  a  [(relinilnary  state  of  mere  preparation, 
into  a  science,  cannot  be  reached  by  the  more  complex 
studies  until  it  has  been  attained  by  the  simpler  ones. 
A  certain  regularity  of  recurrence  in  the  celestial  ap- 
pearances was  ascertained  empirically  before  much  pro- 
gress had  been  made  in  geometry  ;  but  astronomy 
could  no  more  be  a  science  until  geometry  was  a  highly 
advanced  one,  than  the  rule  of  three  could  have  been 
practised  before  addition  and  subtraction.  The  truths 
of  the  simpler  sciences  are  a  [)art  of  the  laws  to  whicji 
the  phenomena  of  thy  more  cou)[)lcx  sciences  conform  : 
and  are  not  oidy  a  necessary  element  in  their  cxi)lana- 
tion,  but  nuist  be  so  well  understood  as  to  be  traceable 
through  complex  combinations,  before  the  special  laws 
which  co-exisl  and  co-operate  with  them  can  be  brought 
to  light.  This  is  all  that  M.  Comte  alnnns,  and 
enough  fiu*  his   purpose.*      lie   no  doubt   ocasionallv 

•  Tlic  only  point  at  wliidi  the  ;;rncral  principle  of  llip  t-i-iics  fails  in  its 
application,  is  tlio  sul)ilivision  of  riiv.-ics;  nn<l  tlion-,  us  tlit;  PiilHinliMatinu 
of  the  ditTerent  l)ranchos  scarctly  pxi<ts,  tlicir  onli-r  is  of  ii(tli>  <'iiMsc(|iicnri>. 
Thennolo{jy,  iudced,  is  nltoijetiicr  an  exception  to  t!ic  principle  of  decreasing; 


OF    AUGUSTE    COMTK.  43 

indulijcs  in  more  unqualified  expressions  than  can  be 
completely  jii^tlHed,  regard  in  j^  the  logical  perfection  of 
the  conf^truction  of  his  sci-ies,  and  its  exact  corre3])ond- 
encc  with  tlie  hi.storical  evolution  of  the  bcienccs  :  exag- 
gerations confined  to  language,  and  which  the  details  of 
his  cx[)osition  ui'ten  correct.  Uut  he  is  sufHcicntly  near 
the  truth,  in  both  res[»ects,  for  every  pi-actical  purpose.* 
Elinor  inaccuracies  must  often  be  forgiven  even  to  great 

f^Liicrality,  heat,  as  Mr.  Sponcer  truly  says,  bcinj;  as  universal  as  gravitation. 
IJiit  lilt!  place  ol'TlKTMioidyfy  is  marked  out,  williia  certain  narrow  limits,  by 
tliu  ends  of  the  classilication,  though  not  l>y  its  principle.  The  desideratum 
i.-,  that  every  science  .-iiould  ]irecede  thusc  which  cannot  be  scientilically 
constituted  or  rationally  studied  until  it  is  known.  It  is  as  a  means  to  this 
end  tliat  the  arrangement  ot'the  phenomena  in  (he  order  of  their  dependonro 
on  one  another  is  inip<jrtant.  Xow,  though  heat  is  as  universal  a  ]ihenoui- 
enon  as  any  which  external  nature  prc.-ents,  its  laws  do  not  afi'ect,  in  any 
manner  important  tn  us,  the  |ihenonieni»  of  Astronomy,  and  operate  in  the 
other  branches  ot"  I'hysics  only  as  slight  niodilying  agencTes,  tlie  considera- 
tion of*  which  may  be  po>tpoued  to  a  raiher  advanced  stage.  IJiit  the 
phenomena  of  Chemistry  and  IJiology  de])end  on  them  orteu  lor  their  very 
existence.  The  ends  of  the  elassilicjition  require  theretbre  that  Thermology 
bhould  precede  Chemistry  and  iJiology,  but  do  not  demand  that  it  should  bo 
tiirown  farther  back.  Cbi  the  other  hand,  those  same  ends,  in  another  point 
of  view,  require  that  it  sliotdd  be  subsequent  to  Astronomy,  for  reasons 
not  of  doctrine  but  of  method:  .\stronomy  being  the  best  school  of  the  true 
art  of  interpreting  Xature,  by  which  Thermology  prolits  like  other  sciences, 
but  which  it  was  ill-ada)>ted  to  firiginate. 

*  The  philosophy  of  the  subject  is  perhaps  nowlierc  so  well  expressed 
as  in  the  ".Systi'me  de  r<>li!ique  I'ositive,"  (iii.  41).  "Coufu  liigique- 
nient,  Tordre  suivant  lequel  nos  ]n-incipales  theories  nccomplissent  I't'volu- 
tion  fondamcntalc  resultc  necessairement  de  leur  dependance  mutuellc. 
Toutcs  les  sciences  peuvent,  sans  doute  el  re  ebauchees  a  la  fois:  Icui 
usage  pratique  exige  niC'uic  cette  culture  siniultani'e.  Ifais  elle  ne  pout 
conceiner  que  les  inductions  proprcs  a  cliaque  classc  de  speculatioji*. 
( )r  cet  essor  inductif  ne  saurait  iburnir  de.s  principes  sullisants  qu'cnvei-s  Ich 
plus  simples  (^tudcs.  Parlout  aillcurs,  ils  ne  peuvent  ctre  I'tahlis  qu'en 
subordonnnnt  chnque  genre  d'inductions  scientiliques  h  renscmble  des  de- 
ductions <'nian<^es  des  domaincs  moins  compliijut's,  et  di's-lors  moiiis  di'peud- 
unts.  Ainsi  nos  divcrscs  theories  reposent  dogmaticiucment  les  iines  sur  les 
autres,  Suivant  un  ordre  invariable,  qui  <loit  reglcr  Iiistoriqueinont  leur 
avenement  decisif,  les  plus  independnntes  ayaat  toujours  dd  se  developpcr 
plus  tot." 


44  THE  I'osiTivi-:  riiiLosoniY 

tlilnkcrd.  Mr.  Spencer,  in  tlie  \evy  writings  in  which 
he  criticises  M.  Comtc,  afiordd  s-ignal  instances  of 
thciii.* 

Combining  the  doctrines,  that  every  science  is  in  a 
less  advanced  t-tatc  as  it  occupies  a  higher  phico  in  the 
ascending  scale,  and  that  ail  the  sciences  pass  throiigli 
ihc  three  stages,  theological,  metaphysical,  and  })f>slfi\e, 

*  "  Sciciii-c,"  (s.'iys  ;\Ir.  Spcncir  in  liis  "  Gi'iicsis,"  "while  jiuivly  in- 
ductive is  purely  qualitative. ...  Ail  quniilitativo  prevision  is  rcaciied  ilctiuc- 
tivciy;  inductiiin  ran  aeliievc  only  (inalitalivc  prevision."  Now,  i('  \\f 
rcmenilnr  fliat  tlic  very  first  accurate  (inanlilative  law  of  pliy.-ical  iilicnoni- 
eiia  ever  e.-tal.-li.-heJ,  tlic  law  of  tlie  iicceK'raliu'j;  force  of  j;ravily,  was 
discovered  an'l  jjrovcd  l>y  Galileo  strictly  l)y  experiment ;  that  the  iiiianli- 
ta'tivc  laws  on  whkh  tiic  wlioio  llicory  ol"  Ihc  celestial  motions  is  ;;roundcd, 
were  generalized  l>y  Kejilcr  from  direct  comparison  of  olwervations;  that 
the  (juantitative  law  of  thy  condensation  of  gases  by  pressure,  (lie  law  of 
Hoy lo  and  ^fariotte.  was  arrived  at  hy  direct  experiment;  that  Ihc  propor- 
tional quantities  in  which  every  Nnown  subslancc  combines  ciieinieally  with 
every  other,  were  ascertained  by  innumcralile  experiments,  from  which  the 
general  law  of  chemical  e(|uivalenls,  now  the  groun<l  of  the  mor^t  exact 
quantitative  previ-ions,  was  an  induitivc  pencralizalion;  wc  must  conclude 
that  Mr.  Spenci;r  lias  comn»itted  himself  to  ii  general  proposition,  which  u 
very  slight  consiiljralion  of  truths  perfectly  known  to  him  wouhl  have 
shown  to  be  unsusiainabie. 

Again,  in  the  very  pamphlet  in  which  .Mr.  Spencer  defends  himself 
against  the  supposition  of  being  a  disciple  of  M.  Comie  ("The  Classilieation 
of  the  Sciences,"  p.  ."57),  lie  spiil;s  of  "^I.  Comtc's  adherent,  Mr.  Huckle." 
Is'ow.  except  in  tlic  ojiinion  eomiiio:i  to  both  that  history  in.iy  be  made  a 
."ubjcet  of  science,  the  speculations  of  these  two  thinkers  are  not  only 
different,  but  run  in  different  channels,  M.  Cointe  applying  hims.df  prinei- 
jially  to  the  laws  of  evolution  common  to  all  mankind,  'Mr.  Duckl--  ahuost 
exclusively  to  the  diversities:  and  it  may  be  allirmed  without  presumpiion, 
that  they  neither  saw  the  same  truths,  nor  fell  into  the  f-ame  <  riois,  nor 
defendc<l  their  opinions,  either  true  or  erroneous,  by  the  s.Tnie  arguments. 
Indeed,  it  is  nm:  of  the  surj)rising  things  in  the  ca>'<!  of  ,Mr.  Kuekle  as  of  Mr. 
Spencer,  that  being  a  in.in  of  kindred  genius,  of  the  same  wide  range  of 
knowledge,  and  devoting  himself  to  speculations  of  the  same  kind,  he  prof- 
ited fo  little  liy  M.  rointe. 

These  oversights  prove  nothing  against  the  general  accuracy  of  Mr. 
Sponccr's  acqu'reuients.  They  arc  mere  lapses  of  inadention,  such  as 
thinkers  who  attenijit  speculations  requiring  that  vast  multitudes  of  facts 
nhould  be  kept  in  recollection  at  once,  can  scarcely  hope  always  to  avoid. 


•  OF   AUGUSTE   COMTE.  45 

it  follows  that  the  move  special  a  science  is,  the  tardier 
is  it  in  cficctlng  each  tnuiisition,  so  that  a  completely 
positive  gtatc  of  an  earlier  science  has  often  coincided 
with  the  metaphysical  state  of  the  one  next  to  it,  and 
a  purely  theological  state  of  tliosc  farther  on.  This 
statement  correctly  represents  the  general  course  of  the 
facts,  tliough  requiring  allowances  in  the  detail.  jNIath- 
eniatics,  for  example,  from  the  very  beginning  of  its 
«;uItivation,  can  hardly  at  any  time  have  been  in  the 
theological  state,  though  exhibiting  many  traces  of  the 
metaphysical.  No  one,  probably,  ever  believed  that 
the  will  of  a  god  kept  parallel  lines  from  meeting,  or 
made  two  and  two  equal  to  four ;  or  ever  i)raycd  to  the 
gods  to  make  the  square  of  tlie  hyj)othenuse  equal  to 
more  or  less  than  the  sum  of  the  squares  of  the  sides. 
The  most  devout  believers  have  recognized  in  proposi- 
tions of  this  description,  a  class  of  truths  independent 
of  the  divine  omnipotence.  Even  among  the  truths 
which  popular  philosophy  calls  by  the  misleading  name 
of  Contingent,  the  few  which  arc  at  once  exact  and 
obvious  were  probably,  from  the  very  first,  excepted 
from  the  theological  explanation.  ]M.  Comte  observes, 
after  Adam  Smith,  that  wc  are  not  told  in  any  age  or 
country  of  a  god  of  AVciglit.  It  was  otherwise  with 
Astronomy :  the  heavenly  bodies  were  believed  not 
merely  to  be  moved  by  gods,  but  to  be  gods  tiiemsehes  : 
and  when  this  theory  was  exploded,  their  movements 
were  explained  by  metaphysical  conceptions ;  such  as  a 
tendency  of  Nature  to  perfection,  in  virtue  of  which 
these  sublime  bodies,  being  left  to  themselves,  move  in 
the  most  perfect  orbit,  the  circle.  Even  Kei)ler  was 
full  of  fancies  of  this  description,  which  only  terminated 


46  THE  POSITIVE  riiiLOSoriir 

wlicn  Xcwton,  I)}'  unveiling'  tlic  real  pliysical  laws  of 
the  celestial  motions,  closed  the  metaphysical  period 
of  astronomical  science.  As  ]\1.  Comtc  remarks,  our 
power  of  foreseeing  phenomena,  and  our  [lowcr  of  con- 
trolling them,  are  tiie  two  things  which  destroy  the 
belief  of  their  being  governed  by  changeable  wills.  In 
the  case  of  phenomena  which  science  has  not  yet  taught 
us  either  to  foresee  or  to  control,  the  theological  mode 
of  thought  has  not  ceased  to  operate  :  men  still  i)ray  for 
rain,  or  for  success  in  war,  or  to  avert  a  shi[)wreck  or  a 
pestilence,  but  not  to  put  back  the  stars  in  their  courses, 
to  abridge  the  time  necessary  for  a  journey,  or  to  arrest 
the  tides.  Such  vestiges  of  the  primitive  mode  of 
thought  linger  in  the  more  intricate  departments  of 
sciences  which  have  attained  a  high  degree  of  positive 
development.  Tiie  metaphysical  mode  of  cx[)lanation, 
being  less  antagonistic  than  the  theological  to  the  idea 
of  invariable  laws,  is  still  slower  in  being  entirely  dis- 
carded. M.  Comtc  finds  remains  of  it  in  the  sciences 
which  arc  the  most  completely  positive,  with  the  single 
c.\ccj)tion  of  astronomy,  mathematics  itself  not  being, 
he  thinks,  altogctiicr  free  from  them  ;  which  is  not 
wondcrftil,  when  we  sec  at  how  very  recent  a  date 
mathematicians  have  been  able  to  give  the  really  posi- 
tive interpretation  of  their  own  symbols.*  AVc  iiave 
already,  however,  had  occasion  to  notice  M.  Comtc's 
propensity  to  use  the  term  metaphysical  in  cases  con- 
taining nothing  that  truly  answers  to  his  definition  of 
the   word.     For   instance,    he    considers    chemistry   as 

*  We  refer  particular!/  to  the  mystical  ni<;tapliysic.s  connected  willi  tlio 
negative  sign,  imaginary  quantilies,  infinity  and  infinitesimals,  &c.,  all 
cleared  up  and  put  on  n  rational  footing  in  the  highly  philosopiiical  treatisca 
of  Professor  Ue  Morgan. 


OF   AUGUSTE    COMTE.  47 

tainted  with  tlie  inct.'iplijsicul  mode  of  thoug-lit  by  the 
notion  of  clieinical  affinity^     lie  thinks  that  tlic  chemists 
who   said   tliat   bodies   combine   because   they  have   an 
affinity  for  eacli  otlicr,  believed  in   a  mysterious  entity 
residing  in  bodies  and  indiicini;-  tliem  to  combine.      On 
any  other  supposition,    lie  thinks  the  statement  could 
only  mean  that  bodies  combine   because  they  coml)inc. 
But  it  really  meant  more.     It  was  the  abstract  expres- 
sion of  the  doctrine,  that  bodies  have  an  invariable  ten- 
dency   to    combine    with    one    thing    in    preference    to 
another :    that    the    tendencies    of  different    substances 
to  combine  are  fixed  quantities,   of  which  the  greater 
always  prevails  over  the  less,  so  that  if  A  detaches  B 
from  C  in  one  case  it  will  do  so  in  every  other ;   which 
was  called  having  a  greater  attraction,  or,  more  techni- 
cally, a  greater  affinity  for  it.      Tiiis  was  not  a  meta- 
physical  theory,    but   a   positive   generalization,    which 
accounted  for  a  great  number  of  facts,  and  would  have 
kept  its  place  as  a  law  of  nature,  had  it  not  been  dis- 
proved   by  the   discovery  of  eases   in  which   th(Migh  A- 
detached  B  from  C  in  some  circumstances,  C  detached 
it  from  A  in  others,  showing  the  law  of  elective  (;hcmi- 
cal  combination  to  be  a  less  simple  one  than  had  at  first 
been   supposed.     In    this    case,    therefore,    M.    Comte 
made  a  mistake  :  and  he  will  be  found  to  have  made 
many    similar    ones.      But    in    the    science    next    after 
chemistry,  biology,  the  cnipty  mode  of  explanation  by 
scholastic  entities,  such  as  a  plastic  force,  a  vital  prin- 
ciple,  and   the   like,    has    been    kept   up    even    to    the 
[)resent  day.     The   German   physiology  of  the   school 
of  Oken,   notwithstanding  his  acknowledged  genius,  is 
almost  as  metaphysical  as  Hegel,  and  there  is  in  Franco 


48  THE  POSITIVE  rniLOsopiiv 

a  quite  recent  revival  of  the  Animism  of  Stalil.  These 
nictaphysicnl  cxphinations,  besides  their  inanity,  did 
serious  harm,  by  directini^  the  course  of  positive  scieii- 
lific  inquiry  into  wrong  clianncls.  There  was  indeed 
iiothin;i"  to  in-evcnt  invcstiiratinu"  the  mode  of  action  of 
the  sujiposed  plastic  or  vital  force  by  observation  and 
experiment ;  but  the  j>hrascs  gave  currency  and  colie- 
rcjicc  to  .1  false  abstraction  and  generalization,  setting 
inquirers  to  look  out  for  one  cau-c  of  complex  pheiu)m- 
ena  which  undoubtedly  depend  on  many. 

According  to  M.  Comte,  chemistry  entered  into  tiie 
positive  stage  with  Lavoisier,  in  the  latter  half  of  the 
last  century  (in  a  subsequent  treatise  he  })laces  the  date 
a  generation  earlier)  ;  and  biology  at  the  beginning  of 
the  present,  when  ]>ichat  drew  the  fnndamental  distinc- 
tion between  nutritive  or  vegetative  and  properly  animal 
life,  and  referred  the  properties  of  organs  to  the  general 
laws  of  the  component  tissues.  The  most  com])lex  of 
all  spiences,  the  Social,  liad  not,  he  maintained,  beeonm 
positive  at  all,  but  was  the  subject  of  an  ever-renewed 
and  barren  conJest  between  the  theological  and  tlie 
metaphysical  modes  of  thought.  To  make  tliis  highest 
of  tlie  sciences  positive,  and  thereby  conqdete  the 
j)0sitivc  character  of  ail  human  speculations,  was  the 
principal  aim  of  his  labors,  and  lie  believed  himself  to 
have  accomplished  it  in  the  last  three  volumes  of  his 
Treatise.  But  the  term  Positive  is  not,  any  more  than 
Metaphysical,  always  used  by  ]\I.  Comte  in  the  same 
meaning.  There  never  can  have  i)een  a  period  in  any 
sclcneo  when  it  wiim  not  in  Home  degree  positive,  nincc 
it  always  professed  to  draw  conclusions  from  experience 
and  observation.     M.  Comte  would  have  been  the  last 


OF   AUGUSTE   COMTE.  49 

to  deny,  that,  previous,  to  his  own  speculations,  tlie 
world  possessed  a  multitude  of  truths,  of  greater  or  less 
certainty,  on  social  subjects,  the  evidence  of  wliicli  was 
obtained  by  inductive  or  deductive  processes  from 
observed  sequences  of  ])henomena.  Nor  could  it  be 
denied  that  the  best  writers  on  subjects  upon  which 
so  many  men  of  the  higliest  mental  capacity  had  em- 
ployed tlieir  powers,  had  accepted  as  thoroughly  the 
jiositive  point  of  view,  and  rejected  the  theological  and 
metaphysical  as  decidedly,  as  M.  Comte  himself.  ^Nlon- 
tesquicu ;  even  ]Maccliiavelli ;  Adam  Smith  and  the 
political  economists  universally,  botli  in  France  and  in 
England;  Bcntliam,  and  all  thinkers  initiated  by  him, 
had  a  full  conviction  that  social  phenomena  conform  to 
invariable  laws,  the  discovery  and  iUustrati(jn  of  which 
was  their  great  object  as  speculative  thinkers.  All  that 
can  be  said  is,  that  tliose  philosophers  did  not  get  .<o  far 
as  M.  Comte  in  discovering  the  metliods  best  adapted 
to  bring  thc^o  law.s  to  liglit.  It  was  not,  therefore, 
reserved  for  M.  Comte  to  make  sociological  inquiries 
positive.  But  what  he  really  meant  by  making  a 
science  positive,  is  wliat  wc  will  call,  with  M.  Littre, 
giving  it  its  final  scientific  constitution  ;  in  otiier  words, 
discovering  or  proving,  and  pursuing  to  their  conse- 
quences, tliose  <if  its  trutiis  which  are  fit  to  form  the 
connecting  links  among  the  rest,  —  truths  which  are  to 
it  what  the  law  of  gravitation  is  to  astronomy,  what  the 
elementary  properties  of  the  tissues  are  to  physiology 
and  wc  will  add  (though  M.  Comte  did  not)  what  the 
laws  of  association  arc  to  psychology.  This  is  an 
operation  which,  wiicn  accomplishod,  puts  an  end  to  the 
empirical  period,  and  enables  the  science  to  be  conceived 

4 


50  THE    POSITIVE    nilLOSOPIIY 

as  a  co-ordinated  and  coherent  body  of  doctrine.  This 
is  what  had  not  yet  been  done  for  sociology  ;  and  the 
hope  of  effecting  it  was,  frou)  his  early  years,  the 
prompter  and  incentive  of  all  M.  Cointe's  philosophic 
labors. 

It  was  with  a  view  to  this  that  he  undertook  that 
wonderful  systematization  of  the  philosophy  of  all  the 
nntoccdont  sciences,  from  njiithcjuatics  to  physiol(»gy ; 
which,  if  he  had  done  nothing  else,  would  have  t<tani[)ed 
hliu.,  in  all  minds  com[)etcnt  to  appreciate  it,  as  one  of 
the  principal  tiiinkcrs  of  the  age.  To  make  its  nature 
intelligible  to  those  who  are  not  acfpiaintcd  with  it,  we 
must  explain  what  wc  mean  by  the  philosophy  of  a 
science,  as  distinguisiicd  from  the  science  itself.  The 
proper  meaning  of  philoso[)hy  we  take  to  be,  what 
the  ancients  understood  by  it, — the  scientific  knowledge 
of  ]Man,  as  an  intellectual,  moral,  and  social  being. 
Since  liis  intellectual  facidties  include  his  knowing 
faculty,  the  science  of  Man  includes  every  thing  that 
man  can  know,  so  far  as  rc^^ards  his  mode  of  knowing 
it ;  in  other  words,  the  whole  doctrine  of  the  conditions 
of  human  knowledge.  The  philosophy  of  a  Science 
thus  comes  to  mean  the  science  Itself,  considered  not  as 
to  its  results,  the  truths  which  it  ascertains,  but  as  to 
the  processes  by  which  the  mind  attains  them,  the  marks 
by  which  It  recogm'zcs  thcin,  and  the  co-ordinating  and 
methodizing  of  them  with  a  view  to  the  greatest  clear- 
ness of  conception  and  the  fullest  and  readiest  availa- 
bility for  use;  —  in  one  word,  the  logic  of  the  science. 
M.  Comte  has  accomplished  this  for  the  first  five  of  the 
fundamental  sciences,  with  a  success  which  can  hardly 
be  too  much  admired.    We  never  re-opcn  even  the  least 


OF   AUGUSTE    COMTE.  51 

admirable  part  of  this  survey,  the  volume  on  chemistrj 
and  biolog'y  (which  was  behind  the  actual  state  of  those 
sciences  when  first  written,  and  is  far  in  the  rear  of  them 
now),  without  a  renewed  sense  of  the  great  reach  of  its 
speculations,  and  a  conviction  that  the  way  to  a  com- 
plete rationalizing  of  those  sciences,  still  very  imperfectly 
conceived  by  most  who  cultivate  them,  has  been  shown 
nowhere  so  successfully  as  there. 

Yet,  for  a  correct  a[)prcciation  of  this  great  pliilo- 
sophlciil  achievement,  we  ought  to  take  account  of  what 
has  not  been  accomplished,  as  well  as  what  has.  Some 
of  the  chief  deficiencies  and  infirmities  of  I\I.  Comte's 
system  of  tliuught  will  be  found,  as  is  usually  the  case, 
in  close  connection  with  its  greatest  successes. 

The  philosophy  of  Science  consists  of  two  principal 
parts  ;  the  methods  of  investigation,  and  the  requisites 
of  proof.  The  one  points  out  the  roads  by  which  the 
human  intellect  arrives  at  conclusions  ;  the  other,  the 
mode  of  testing  their  evidence.  The  former,  if  com- 
plete, would  be  an  Organon  of  Discovery  ;  the  latter,  of 
Proof.  It  is  to  the  first  of  these  that  jM.  Comte  princi- 
pally confines  himself;  and  he  treats  it  Avith  a  degree 
of  perfection  hitherto  unrivalled.  Nowhere  is  there 
any  thing  comparable,  in  its  kind,  to  his  survey  of  the 
resources  which  the  mind  has  at  its  disposal  for  investi- 
gating the  laws  of  phenomena  ;  the  circumstances  which 
render  each  of  the  fundamental  modes  of  exploration 
suitable  or  unsuitable  to  each  class  of  phenomena ;  the 
extensions  and  transformations  which  the  process  of  in- 
vestigation has  to  undergo  in  adapting  itself  to  each  new 
province  of  the  field  of  study ;  and  the  especial  gifts 
with  which  every  one  of  the  fundamental  sciences  en- 


52  THE    POSITIVE   PIirLOSOPHY 

riches  tlic  nictliod  <»f  positive  Inquiry, — each  science,  in 
it5  turn,  being  tlic  best  fitted  to  bring  to  perfection  one 
process  or  another.     Tliese,  and  many  cognate  subjects, 
^ucll  as  tlie  t!\e()ry  of  Classification,  and  the  proper  use 
(f  scientific  llypotlicscs,  M.  Comte  lias  treated  with  a 
t  onipletcness  of  insight  which  leaves  little  to  be  desired. 
X(»t  less  admirable  is  his  survey  of  tiie  most  comprehen- 
sive truths  that  had  been  arrived   at  by  each  science, 
•'nneidcK'd  as  to  their  relation  to  the  general  sum  of 
luunan  kiiowlLdgc,  and  ihttir  logli'id  Siiluc  itu  iilda  in  U^ 
further  progress.     Jhit   after  all    this,  there  r(!inains  a 
further  and  distinct  question.      Wa  arc  taught  the  I'ight 
way  of  scarcliing  for  results  ;    l)ut,  when  a  result  has 
!,>cen  reached,  how  shall  wc  know  that  it  is  true?     How 
assure  ourselves  that  the  process  has   been   performed 
correctly ;  and  that  our  premises,  whether  consisting  of 
generalitic:^  or  of  particular  facts,  really  prove  tlie  con- 
clusion wc  have  grounded  on  them?     On  this  question 
M.  Comte  throws  no  light.      He  supi)]ies  no  test  of 
proof.     As  regards  deduction,  he  neither  recognizes  the 
syllogistic  system  of  Aristotle  and  his  successors  (the 
insufficiency  of  which  is  as  evident  as  its  utility  is  real), 
nor  proj»oses  any  other  in  lieu  of  it ;   and  of  induction 
he  has  no  canons  "whatever.      lie  does  not  seem  to  ad- 
mit the  ])ossibility  of  any  general  critcri(»u  by  which  to 
decide  whether  a  given  inductive  inference  is  correct  or 
not.     Yet  he  docs  not,  with  Dr.  Whewell,  regard  an 
inductive  theory  as  proved  if  it  accounts  for  the  facts  : 
on  the  contrary,  he  sets  himself  in  the  strongest  oppo- 
sition   to    those    scientific  hypotheses,    which,  like   the 
luminiferous  ether,  are  not  susceptible  of  direct  proof, 
and  are  accepted  on  the  sole  evidence  of  their  aptitude 


OF   AUGUSTE   COMTE.  53 

for  explaining  phenomena.  lie  maintains  tliat  no  hy- 
pothesis is  legitimate  unless  it  is  susceptible  of  verifica- 
tion ;  and  that  none  ought  to  be  accepted  as  true  unless 
it  can  be  shown,  not  only  that  it  accords  with  the  facts, 
but  that  its  falsehood  would  be  inconsistent  witli  theni. 
lie  therefore  needs  a  test  of  ijiductive  proof;  and,  in  as- 
signing none,  he  seems  to  give  up  as  impracticable  the 
main  problem  of  Logic  properly  so  called.  At  the  be- 
ginning of  his  treatise,  he  speaks  of  a  doctrine  of  jNIethod, 
apart  from  [lartindar  npplioations,  as  conceivable,  but 
nut  needUil :  method,  accoi'dhig  to  hhn,  Is  learnt  only 
Ijy  seeing  it  in  operation,  and  the  logic  of  a  science  can 
only  usefully  be  taught  tiu'ough  the  science  itself.  To- 
wards the  end  of  the  work,  he  assumes  a  more  deci- 
dedly negative  tone,  and  treats  the  very  conception  of 
studying  Logic  otherwise  than  in  its  applications  as 
chimerical.  He  got  on,  in  his  subsequent  writings,  to 
considering  it  as  wrong.  This  indispensable  part  of 
Positive  Philosophy  he  not  only  left  to  be  supplied  by 
others,  but  did  all  that  depended  on  him  to  discourage 
them  from  attempting  it. 

This  hiatus  in  j\I.  Comte's  system  is  not  unconnected 
with  a  defect  in  his  original  conception  of  the  subject- 
matter  of  scientiiic  investigation,  which  has  been  gener- 
ally noticed,  for  it  lies  on  the  surface,  and  is  more  apt 
to  be  exaggerated  than  overlooked.  It  is  often  said  of 
him  that  he  rejects  the  study  of  causes.  This  is  not, 
in  the  correct  acceptation,  true ;  for  it  is  only  questions 
of  ultimate  origin,  and  of  Efficient  as  distinguished  from 
what  are  called  Physical  causes,  that  he  rejects.  The 
causes  that  he  I'cgards  as  inaccessible  arc  causes  which 
ai'C  not  themselves  phenomena.     Like  other  people,  he 


54  THE   POSITIVE    rillLOSOrilY 

admits  the  study  of  causes,  in  every  sense  in  which  one 
physical  fact  can  be  tlie  cause  of  anotlicr.  But  he  has 
an  objection  to  the  tcord  cause  ;  he  will  only,  consent  to 
speak  of  Laws  of  Succession  :  and  depriving  himself  of 
the  use  of  a  word  which  has  a  Positive  meaning,  he 
"misses  the  meaning  it  expresses.  lie  sees  no  difference 
between  such  generalizations  as  Kepler's  laws,  and  such 
as  the  theory  of  gravitation.  lie  fails  to  perceive  the 
real  distinction  between  the  laws  of  succession  and  co- 
existence which  thinkers  of  a  diflcrent  school  call  Laws 
of  Phenomena,  and  those  of  what  ihey  call  the  action 
of  Causes  :  the  former  exemplified  l)y  the  succession  of 
day  and  night,  the  latter  by  the  earth's  rotation  which 
causes  it.  The  succession  of  ({ny  and  night  is  as  niudi 
an  invariable  sequence,  as  the  alternate  exposure  of  op- 
posite sides  of  the  earth  to  the  sun.  Yet  day  and  niglit 
arc  not  the  causes  of  one  another ;  why  ?  Because 
their  sequence,  though  invariable  in  our  experience,  is 
not  unconditionally  so  :  those  facts  only  succeed  eacli 
other,  provided  that  the  presence  and  absence  of  tlie  sun 
succeed  each  other  ;  and  if  this  alternation  were  to  cease, 
we  might  have  cither  day  or  night  unfollowed  by  one 
another.  There  are  thus  two  kinds  of  uniformities  of 
succession,  the  one  unconditional,  the  other  conditional 
on  the  first :  laws  of  causation,  and  other  successions 
dependent  on  those  laws.  All  ultimate  laws  are  laws 
of  causation,  and  the  only  universal  law  beyond  the  pale 
of  mathematics  is  the  law  of  universal  causation,  namely, 
that  every  phenomenon  has  a  plicnomenal  cause ;  has 
some  phenomenon  other  than  itself,  or  some  combina- 
tion of  phenomena,  on  which  it  is  invariably  and  un- 
conditionally consequent.     It  is  on  the  universality  of 


OF   AUGUSTE    COMTE.  55 

this  law  that  tlic  possibility  rests  of  establishing  a  canon 
of  Induction.  A  general  proposition  inductively  ob- 
tained is  only  then  proved  to  be  true,  when  the  instan- 
ces on  which  it  rests  arc  such  that  if  they  have  been 
correctly  observed,  the  falsity  of  the  generalization 
would  be  inconsistent  with  the  constancy  of  causa- 
tion ;  with  the  universality  of  the  fact  that  the  i)hc- 
noniena  of  nature  take  place  according  to  invariable 
laws  of  succession.*  It  is  probable,  therefore,  that  ^I. 
Conitc's  dctcrniined  abstinence  from  the  Avord  and  the 
idea  of  Cause,  had  much  to  do  with  his  inability  to  con- 
ceive an  Inductive  Logic,  by  diverting  his  attention  from 
the  only  basis  upon  which  it  could  be  founded. 

M'g  are  afraid  it  must  also  be  said,  —  though  shown 
only  by  slight  indications  in  his  fundamental  work,  and 
coming  out  in  full  evidence  only  in  his  later  writings, — 
tiiat  ]M.  Comte,  at  bottom,  was  not  so  solicitous  about 
completeness  of  proof  as  becomes  a  positive  philoso- 
pher, and  that  the  vmimpeachable  objectivity,  as  he 
would  have  called  it,  of  a  conception  —  its  exact  cor- 
respondence to  the  realities  of  outward  fact  —  was  not, 
with  him,  an  indispensable  condition  of  adopting  it,  if 
it  was  subjectively  useful,  by  affording  facilities  to  the 
mind  for  grouping  phenomena.  This  appears  very 
curiously  in  his  chapters  on  the  philosophy  of  Chemis- 
try.     He   recommends,    as   a  judicious   use   of  "  the 

•  Those  who  wish  to  sec  this  idea  followed  out  are  referred  to  "  A  Sys- 
tem of  I'Ogic,  Katiociiiativc  and  Inductive."  It  i?  not  irrelevant  to  state  that 
M.  Couite,  sodH  allor  tlic  piil)lication  of  that  worlc,  expressed,  both  in  a  let- 
ter (publislied  in  M.  l^ictre's  volume)  and  in  print,  his  high  approval  of  it 
(especially  of  the  Inductive  part)  as  a  real  contribution  to  the  construction 
of  the  I'lisitivc  Method.  Hut  wc  cannot  discover  that  ho  was  indebted  to  it 
for  a  H\\n\>.\  Idea,  or  thiit  it  iiillueneod,  in  tlio  innaHest  purtiouiur,  the  cuurMO 
of  his  Mub.tc(iuent  speculations. 


56  TiiE  rosiTivE  piiiLosoniv 

Uegree  of  liberty  left  to  our  intelligence  by  tlic  end  and 
purpose  of  positive  science,"  that  we  sljould  acec[)t  as  a 
convenient  fjcncraiization  the  doctrine  that  all  dTcniical 
composition  is  between  two  elements  only  ;  that  every 
substance  which  our  analysis  decomposes,  let  us  say  into 
four  elements,  has   for  its  immediate   constituents  two 
hypothetical  substances,  each  compounded  of  two  sim- 
pler ones.     There  would  have  been  notliing  to  object  to 
in  this   as  a  scientific   hypothesis,    assumed  tentatively 
as  a  means  of  suggesting  experiments  by  which  its  truth 
might  be  tested.      With  this  for  its  destination,  the  con- 
ception would  have  been  legitimate  and  philosophical ; 
the  more  so,  as,  if  confirmed,  it  would  have  afforded  an 
explanation   of  the   fact  that    some    substances    which 
analysis  shows  to  be  composed  of  the  same  elementary 
substances  in  the  same  proportions,  dld'er  in  their  gen- 
eral properties,  as,  for  instance,  sugar  and  gum.*     And 
if,    besides   affording  a   reason   for  diilcrence    between 
things  which  differ,  the  hypothesis  had  afforded  a  reason 
for  agreement  l)etween  thin^js  which  a^jree  ;   if  the  inter- 
mediate   Hide   by  which   the   quaternary  compoimd  was 
res(»lved    into    two    binary  ones,  could    have    been    so 
chosen  as  to  brinjf  each  of  them  within  the  analojiics  of 
some  known  class  of  binary  compounds  (which  it  is  easy 
to  suppose  possible,  and  which,  in  some  particular  in- 
stances, actually  happens)  ;  f   the  universality  of  binary 
composition  would  have  been  a  successful  example  of 

*  The  force,  Iiowevcr,  of  tliis  Inst  considcnitioii  lias  boon  imuli  wi-akciictl 
l»3'  the  prof^rcss  of  discovery  nince  >[.  Comfo  left  oil'  (itiidyiiif;  chemistry;  it 
hcing  now  probable  that  most  if  not  all  substances,  even  elementary,  are 
fuscepiible  o( allolropic  forms;  ns  in  the  case  of  oxygen  and  ozuuc,  the  two 
forms  of  phosphorus,  &c. 

\  Thus;  by  considcrftijj  jirussle  acid  as  a  compound  of  hyilrofjeii  and 
C3'anogeu  rather  than  of  hydrogen  and  the  elements  of  cyanogen  (carbon 


OF   AUGUSTE    COMTE.  57 

an  liypotlicsls  in  anticipation  of  a  positive  theory,  to 
^ive  a  direction  to  inquiry  which  might  end  in  its  being 
either  proved  or  abandoned.     But  ]\I.  Comtc  evidently 
thought  tliat  even  though  it  sliould  never  be  i)rovcd  — 
however  many  cases  of  chemical  composition  might  al- 
ways remain  in  which  tlie  theory  was  still  as  hyj)otheti- 
cal  as  at  first  —  so  long  as  it  was  not  actually  disproved 
(which  it  is  scarcely  in  the  nature  of  the  case  that  it 
should  ever  be)  it  would  deserve  to  be  retained  for  its 
mere  convenience  in  bringing  a  large  body  of  phenom- 
ena under  a  general  concc[)tion.     In  a  resume  of  the 
general  principle  of  the  positive  method  at  the  end  of 
the  work,   he   claims,   in  express  terms,   an  unlimited 
license  of  adopting  "  without  any  vain  scruple  "  hy[)o- 
thctical  conceptions  of  this  sort ;  "  in  order  to  satisfy, 
within  proper  limits,  our  just  mental  inclinations,  which 
always  turn,  with  an  instinctive   predilection,  towards 
simplicity,    continuity,   and   generality   of  conceptions, 
while  always  respecting  the  reality  of  external  hnvs  in 
so   far  as   accessible  to   us"   (vi.    639).     "The   most 
philosophic  point  of  view  leads  us  to  conceive  the  study 
of  natural  laws  as  destined   to  represent  the   external 
world  so  as  to  give  as  much  satisfaction  to  the  essential 
inclinations  of  our  intelligence,  as  is  consistent  with  the 
degree  of  exactitude  commanded  by  the  aggregate  of 
our  practical  wants"  (vi.  Q>-i2^,     Among  these  "essen- 
tial inclinations  "  he  includes  not  only  our  "  instinctive 
[M'edilcction  for  order  and  harmony,"  which  makes  us 
relish  any  conception,  even  fictitious,  that  helps  to  re- 

nnd  nitrogen)  it  is  assimilated  to  a  whole  class  of  acid  compounds,  between 
Iiyili-n;;eii  and  otlicr  substances,  and  a  reason  is  tlius  found  for  its  agreeing 
in  their  acid  properties. 


58  THE   POSITIVE    nilLOSOrilY 

duce  plienomena  to  system  ;   but  even  our  feelings  of 
taste,  "les  convenances  puremcnt  esthdtlques,"  wliicli, 
he  savs,  have  a  lenitimatc  part  in  the  cniploymcnt  of 
the  "genre  de  libcrtu  reste  facultatif  pour  notrc  intelli- 
jrencc."    After  tlie  due  satisfaction  of  our  "  most  eminent 
mental  inclinations,"  there  will  still  remain  "a  consider- 
able niaririn  of  indetermiiiateness,  which  should  be  made 
use   of  to  give  a  direct   gratification  to  our  hcsoin  of 
ideality,  by  embellishing  our  scientific   thonglits,  with- 
out  injury  to   their   essential    reality"'   (vi.    (ii7).      In 
consistency   with    all    this,    ^l.   Comtc   warns   thinkers 
against  too  severe  a  scrutiny  of  the  exact  truth  of  scien- 
tific laws,  and  stamps  with  "  severe  reprobation  "  those 
who  break  down  "  by  too  minute  an  investigation  "  gen- 
eralizations already  made,  without  being  able  to  substi- 
tute others    (vi.    031))  :   as  in   the   ease   of  Lavoisier's 
general  theory  of  chemistry,   which  would  have  made 
that  science  more  satisfactory  than  at  present  to  "  the 
instinctive  inclinations  of  our    intelligence "   if  It  had 
turned  out  true,  but  unhapi»ily  it  did  not.     These  men- 
tal dispositions  in  M.  Comtc  account  for  his  not  Iiaving 
found  or  sought  a  logical  criterion  of  proof ;  but  they  are 
scarcely  consistent  witjj   his  inveterate  hostility  to  the 
hypothesis  of   the   luminiferous   ether,  which  (rertainly 
gratifies  our  "  predilection  for  order  and  harmony,"  not 
to  sav  our  "  bcsoin   d'idcalitd,"  in  no  ordinary  de<acc. 
Tins  notion  of  the  "destination"  of  the  study  of  natural 
laws  is  to  our  minds  a  complete  dereliction  of  the  essen- 
tial  principles  which   form    the  Positive  conception  of 
ecience  ;  and  contained  the  germ  of  the  perversion  of  his 
own  philosophy  which  marked  his  later  years,  and  which 
we  propose  on  a  future  occasi<in  to  describe  and  charac- 


OF  AUGUSTE    CO.MTE.  59 

terizc.  It  iniglit  be  interesting,  but  scarcely  worth 
while,  to  attempt  to  penetrate  to  the  just  thought  which 
misled  M,  Conite,  for  there  is  almost  alwav.s  a  grain  of* 
truth  in  the  errors  of  an  original  and  powerful  mind. 

There  is  another  grave  aberration  in  M.  Comtc's  view 
of  the  method  of  positive  science,  which  though  not 
more  un^ihilosopliical  than  the  last  mentioned,  is  of 
greater  practical  importance.  He  rejects  totally,  as  an 
invalid  process,  psychological  observation  properly  so 
called,  or  in  other  words,  internal  consciousness,  at 
least  ns  regards  our  intellectual  opernti<ms.  He  gives 
no  ])lace  in  his  scries  of  the  sciences  to  Psychology,  and 
always  speaks  of  it  with  contempt.-  The  study  of  men- 
tal j)henomcna,  or,  as  he  expresses  it,  of  moral  and  in- 
tellectual limctions,  has  a  place  in  his  scheme,  under 
the  head  of  Biology,  but  only  as  a  branch  of  physiology. 
Our  knowledge  of  the  human  mind  must,  he  thinks,  be 
acquired  by  observing  other  people.  How  we  are  to 
observe  other  people's  mental  operations,  or  how  inter- 
pret the  signs  of  them  without  having  learnt  what  the 
signs  mean  by  knowledge  of  ourselves,  he  docs  not 
state.  But  it  is  clear  to  him  that  we  can  learn  very 
little  about  the  feelings,  and  nothing  at  all  about  the 
intellect,  by  self-observation.  Our  intelligence  cnn 
observe  all  other  things,  but  not  itself:  we  cannot  ob- 
serve ourselves  observing,  or  observe  ourselves  reason- 
ing :  and  if  we  could,  attention  to  this  reflex  operntion 
would  annihilate  its  object,  by  stopping  the  process 
observed. 

There  is  little  need  for  an  elaborate  refutation  of  a 
fallacy  respecting  which  the  only  wonder  Is  that  it  should 
impose  on  any  one.     Two  answers  may  be  given  to  it. 


GO  THE  rosiTivE  rjiiLosoriir 

In  the  first  place  ^I.  Comtc  might  be  refcrrccl  to  expe- 
rience, and  to  the  writings  of  his  countryman  M.  Car- 
dailhic  and  our  own  Sir  \V'illiaui  Ilaiuilt«iu,  for  [)roof 
that  the  mind  cannot  only  bo  conscious  of,  i»ut  attend 
to,  more  than  one,  and  even  a  considerable  nuuiber,  of 
impressions  at  once.*  It  is  true  tiiat  attention  is  weak- 
ened by  being  divided  ;  and  this  forms  a  sjteclal 
difficulty  in  psychological  observation,  as  psychologists 
(Sir  AVilliam  Hamilton  in  particular)  have  fully  lecog- 
nizcd  ;  but  a  difficulty  is  not  an  impossibilityo  Secondly, 
it  might  have  occurred  to  ^f.  Comtc  that  a  fact  may 
be  studied  through  the  medium  of  memory,  not  at  the 
very  moment  of  our  perceiving  it,  but  the  moment  after  : 
and  this  is  really  the  mode  in  which  our  best  knowledge 
of  our  intellectual  acts  is  generally  acquired.  AV'e  reflect 
on  what  we  have  been  doing,  not  when  the  act  is  passed, 
but  when  its  impression  in  the  memory  is  still  fresh. 
Unless  in  one  of  these  ways,  we  could  not  have  acfpiired 
the  knowledge  which  noljody  denies  us  to  have  of  what 
passes  in  our  minds.  M.  Comtc  would  scarcely  have 
affirmed  that  we  are  not  aware  of  our  own  intellectual 
operations.  We  know  of  our  observings  and  our  reason- 
ings, either  at  the  very  time,  or  by  memory  the  moment 
after  ;  in  either  case,  by  direct  knowledge,  and  not  (like 
things  done  by  us  in  a  state  of  somnambulism)  merely  by 
their  results.  This  simple  fact  destroys  the  whole  of 
M.  Comte's  argument.  Whatever  we  arc  directly  aware 
of,  we  can  directly  observe. 

And  what  Organon  for  the  study  of  "  the  moral  and 

•According  to  Sir  William  Hamilton,  as  many  n»  six;  but  numerical 
precision  in  sucii  matters  is  out  of  the  qncstion,  and  it  is  probable  that  differ- 
ent minds  have  the  power  in  different  degrees. 


OF   AUGUSTfi    COMTE.  61 

intellectual  functions  "  docs  M.  Comtc  ofTcr,  in  lieu  of 
the  direct  mental  observation  which  he  repudiates?  We 
nrc  nlniost  asliamed  to  say,  that  it  is  Phrenology  I  Xot, 
indeed,  he  says,  as  a  science  formed,  but  as  one  stili  to 
be  created ;  for  he  rejects  almost  all  the  special  organs 
imagined  by  phrenologists,  and  accepts  only  their  gen- 
eral division  of  the  brain  into  the  three  regions  of  the 
propensities,  the  sentiments,  and  the  intellect,*  and 
the  subdivision  of  the  latter  region  between  the  organs 
of  meditation  and  those  of  observation.  Yet  this  mere 
first  outline  of  an  apportionment  of  the  mental  func- 
tions among  different  organs,  he  regards  as  extricating 
the  mental  study  of  man  from  the  metaphysical  stage, 
and  elevating  it  to  the  positive.  The  conditi(»n  of  men- 
tal science  would  ])c  sad  indeed  if  this  were  its  best 
chance  of  being  positive  ;  for  the  later  course  of  phy- 
siological observation  and  speculation  has  not  tended 
to  confirm,  but  to  discredit,  the  phrenological  hypothe- 
sis. And  even  if  that  hypothesis  were  true,  psycho- 
logical observation  would  still  be  necessary  ;  for  how 
is  it  possible  to  ascertain  the  correspondence  between 
two  t])ings,  by  observation  of  only  one  of  them?  To 
establish  a  relation  between  mental  functions  and  cere- 
bral conformations,  requires  not  only  a  parallel  sys- 
tem of  observations  applied  to  each,  but  (as  M.  Comte 
himself,  with  some  inconsistency,  acknowledges)  an 
analysis  of  the  mental  faculties,  "des  diverges  faeultes 
61enientaircs,"  (iii.  573)  conducted  without  any  refer- 
ence to  the  physical  conditions,  since  the  proof  of  the 

*  Or,  as  afterwards  corrected  by  him,  the  appetites  and  emotions,  tlip 
active  capacities,  and  the  intellectual  faculties ;  "  lo  cociir,"  "  le  caractire," 
and  "I'esprit.". 


62  THE  POSITIVE  niiLosoniY 

theory  would  lie  in  the  correspon<lcncc  between  the  di- 
vision of  the  brain  into  organs  and  that  of  the  mind  into 
faculties,  each  shown  by  separate  evidence.  To  accom- 
plish this  anah^is  requires  direct  psjchological  study 
carried  to  a  high  pitch  of  perfection  ;  it  being  necessary, 
among  other  things,  to  investigate  tlic  degree  in  which 
mental  character  is  created  by  circumstances,  since  no 
one  supposes  that  cerebral  conformation  does  all,  and 
circumstances  notliing.  The  phrenological  study  of 
]\Iind  thus  supposes  as  its  necessary  prc[)aration  the 
whole  of  the  Associatirm  psychology.  Without,  then, 
rejecting  any  aid  wliich  study  of  the  brain  and  nerves 
can  aflbrd  to  psychology  (and  it  iias  afl'oided,  and  will 
yet  afford,  nuich)  we  may  affirm  that  ^l.  Comtc  has 
done  nothing  for  the  constitution  of  the  positive  method 
of  mental  science.  He  refused  to  profit  by  the  very 
valuable  connnenccmcuts  made  by  his  predecessors,  es- 
pecially by  Hartley,  Brown,  and  James  Mill  (if,  indeed, 
any  of  those  philosoplu'rs  were  known  to  him),  and  left 
the  psychological  branch  t)f  the  j)ositive  method,  as 
well  as  psych(tlogy  itsolf,  to  be  put  in  their  true  posi- 
tion as  a  [)art  of  Positive  Pliilosopliy  by  successors 
who  duly  placed  themselves  at  the  twofold  point  of  view 
of  physiology  and  |)sychology,  ]Mr.  Bain  and  Mr.  Her- 
bert Spencer.  Tliis  great  mistake  is  not  a  mere  hiatus 
in  i^I.  Comtc's  system,  but  the  parent  of  serious  errors 
in  his  attempt  to  create  a  Social  Science.  He  is  indeed 
very  skilful  in  estimating  the  elfcct  <»f  circmustanccs  in 
moulding  the  general  chiu'acter  of  the  lumian  race;  were 
he  not,  his  historical  tlicory  could  be  of  little  worth  : 
but  in  appreciating  the  influence  which  circumstances 
exercise,  through  psychological  laws,  in   producing  di- 


OF   AUGUSTE    CO.^ITE.  63 

versitics  of  character,  collective  or    individual,  he  ia 
sadly  at  fault. 

After  this  summary  view  of  M.  Comte's  conccj)tion  of 
Positive  Philosophy,  it  reuiains  to  give  some  account  of 
I  lis  more  special  and  equally  ambitious  attempt  to  create 
the  science  of  Sociology,  or,  as  he  expresses  it,  to  ele- 
vate the  study  of  social  phenomena  to  the  positive  state. 

He  regarded  all  who  profess  any  political  opinions,  as 
hitherto  divided  between  the  adherents  of  the  theologi- 
cal and  those  of  the  metaj)hysical  mode  of  thought ;  the 
former  deducing  all  tlieir  doctrines  from  divine  ordi- 
nances, the  latter  from  abstractions.  This  assertion, 
however,  cannot  be  intended  in  the  same  sense  as  when 
the  terms  are  a[)[)lied  to  the  sciences  of  inorganic  na- 
ture ;  for  it  is  impossible  that  acts  evidently  proceed- 
ing from  the  human  will  could  be  ascribed  to  the 
agency  (at  least  immediate)  of  eitlier  divinities  or  ab- 
stractions. No  one  ever  regarded  himself  or  his  fellow- 
man  as  a  mere  piece  of  machinery  worked  by  a  god,  or 
as  the  abode  of  an  entity  which  was  the  true  author  of 
what  the  man  himself  appeared  to  do.  True,  it  was 
believed  that  the  gods,  or  God,  could  move  or  change 
human  wills,  as  well  as  control  their  consequences  ;  and 
prayers  were  offered  to  them  accordingly,  rather  as  able 
to  overrule  the  spontaneous  course  of  things,  than  as  Jit 
each  instant  carrying  it  on.  On  the  whole,  however, 
tlie  theological  and  meta])hysical  conccptionsy  in  their 
a[)plication  to  sociology,  had  reference,  not  to  the  pro- 
duction of  phenomena,  but  to  the  rule  of  duty,  and 
conduct  in  life.  It  is  this  which  was  based,  either  on 
a  divine  will,  or  on  abstract  mental  conceptions,  which, 
by  an  illusion  of   the  rational  faculty,    were    invested  . 


S4  THE   POSITIVE   PHILOSOPHY 

with  objective  validity.  On  tlic  one  liand,  tlic  estab- 
lished rules  of  morality  wore  everywhere  referred  to  a 
divine  origin.  In  the  majority  of  countries,  the  entire 
civil  and  criminal  law  was  looked  upon  as  revealed  from 
above  ;  and  it  is  to  the  petty  military  communities  wliich 
escaped  this  delusion,  that  man  is  indebted  for  being 
now  a  progressive  being.  Tlie  fundamental  institutions 
of  the  state  were  almtjst  everywhere  believed  to  have 
been  divinely  established,  and  to  be  still,  in  a  greater  or 
less  degree,  of  divine  authority.  The  divine  right  of 
certain  lines  of  kings  to  rule,  and  even  to  rule  abso- 
lutcl}-,  was  but  lately  the  creed  of  the  dominant  piuty 
in  most  countries  of  Europe  ;  while  the  divine  right  of 
popes  and  bishops  to  dictate  men's  beliefs  (and  not 
respecting  the  invisil)le  world  alone)  is  still  striving, 
though  under  considerable  difficulties,  to  rule  mankind. 
When  these  opinions  began  to  be  out  of  date,  a  rival 
theory  presented  itself  to  take  their  place.  There  were, 
in  truth,  many  su<,'h  theories,  and  to  some  of  them  the 
term  metaphysical,  in  ]M.  Comte's  sense,  cannot  justly 
be  applied.  All  theories  in  which  the  ultimate  st:md- 
ard  of  institutions  and  rules  of  action  was  the  happi- 
ness of  mankind,  and  observation  and  experience  the 
guides  (and  some  such  there  have  been  in  all  [teriods 
of  free  speculation),  arc  entitled  to  the  name  Positive, 
whatever,  in  other  respects,  their  imperfections  may  be. 
But  these  were  a  small  minority.  M.  Comtc  was  right 
in  affirming,  that  the  prevailing  schools  of  moral  and 
political  speculation,  Avhen  not  theological,  have  been 
metaphysical.  They  affirmed  that  moral  rules,  and 
even  political  institutions,  were  not  means  to  an  end, 
the  general  good,  but  corollaries  evolved  from  the  con- 


OF   AUGUSTE    COMTE.  65 

ception  of  Natural  Rights.  This  was  especially  the 
case  in  all  the  countries  in  which  the  ideas  of  publicists 
were  the  offspring  of  the  Roman  Law,  The  legislators 
of  opinion  on  tliese  subjects,  when  not  tlicologians,  were 
lawyers  :  and  the  Continental  lawyers  followed  tiic  Ro- 
man jiu'ists,  wlio  followed  the  Greek  metaphysicians,  in 
acknowledging  as  the  ultimate  source  of  right  and  wrong 
in  morals,  and  consequently  in  institutions,  the  imagi- 
nary law  of  tlie  imaginary  being  Nature.  The  first  sys- 
tematizers  of  morals  in  Clu'istian  Europe,  on  any  otiier 
than  a  purely  theological  basis,  the  writers  on  Interna- 
tional Law,  reasoned  wholly  from  these  premises,  and 
transmitted  them  to  a  long  line  of  successors.  Tiiis  mode 
of  thought  reached  its  culmination  in  Rousseau,  in  whose 
hands  it  became  as  powerful  an  instrument  for  destroy- 
ing the  past,  as  it  was  impotent  for  directing  the  future. 
The  complete  victory  which  this  pliilosophy  gained  in 
speculation  over  the  old  doctrines,  was  temporarily  fol- 
lowed by  an  equally  complete  practical  triumph,  the 
French  Revolution;  when,  having  had,  for  the  first  time, 
a  full  opportunity  of  developing  its  tendencies,  and  show- 
ing what  it  could  not  do,  it  failed  so  conspicuously  as  to 
determine  a  partial  re-action  to  the  doctrines  of  feudal- 
ism and  Catholicism.  Between  these  and  the  political 
metaphysics  (metapolitlcs,  as  Coleridge  called  it)  of  the 
Revolution,  society  has  since  oscillated  ;  i-aising  up  in 
tiie  j)rocess  a  hybrid  intermediate  party,  termed  Conser- 
vative, or  the  party  of  Order,  which  has  no  doctrines  of 
its  own,  but  attempts  to  hold  the  scales  even  between 
the  two  others,  borrowing  alternately  the  arguments  of 
each  to  use  as  weapons  against  whichever  of  the  two 
seems  at  the  moment  most  likely  to  prevail. 

5 


&G  THE  POSITIVE  rjiiLosoriir 

Sucli,    io(1iicch1   to   a    very  condensed    form,    is    M. 
Conifo'!?  oxpoisition  of  the  state  of  European  opinion  on 
politics  and  society.      -Vn  En^'^lislinian's  criticism  would 
he,  that  it  dcscrihcs  well  enoui^di  the  general  division  of 
political  oj»inion  in  France  and  the  countries  which  fol- 
low her  lead,  hut  not  in  Kni^laiid,  or  the  conuuunitics 
of  Knglish   origin  ;   in  all   of  which,  dl\  ine   right    <hrd 
out   with    the    Jaeoi)ites,    and    the   law   of  nature   and 
natural  rights  have  never  heeu  favorites  even  with  the 
extreme    po[)ular    party,   who    j)referrcd    to   rest    their 
claims  on  the  historical  traditions  of  their  own  country, 
and  on   maxims  drawn   from   its   law-hooks,  and,  since 
they  outgrew  this  standard,  almost  always  hase  them  on 
general  expediency.      In  England,  the  preference  of  one 
form  of  government  to  another   seldom  turns  on  any- 
thing hut  the  practical  conserp.ienccs  which  it  produces, 
or  whicli-  arc  expected  from  it.     M.  Comtc  can  point  to 
little  of  the  nature  of  metaphysics  in  English  politics, 
except  "la  metaphysique  constitutionnelle,"  a  name  he 
chooses  to  give  to  the  conventional  fiction  by  which,  the 
oecuf)ant  of  the  throne  is  supposed  to  he  the  source  from 
'"whence  all  power  emanates,  while  nothing  can  he  fur- 
ther fioni  the  belief  or  intention  of  anybody  than  that 
such  should  really  he  the  case.     Apart  from  this,  which 
is  a  matter  of  forms  and  words,  .and  has  no  connexion 
with  any  belief  except   belief  in   the   proprieties,    the 
severest  criticism  can  find  nothing  either  worse  or  bet- 
ter, in  the  niodes  of  thiidiing  either  of  our  conservative 
or  of  our  liberal  party,  tlian  a  imrticularly  shallow  and 
flimsy  kind  of  positivism.     The  working  classes  indeed, 
or  some  portion  of  them,  perhaps  still  rest  tlieir  claim 
to  universal  suffrage  on  abstract  right,  in  addition  to 


or  AUGUSTE   COMTE,  67 

more  substantial  reasons,  and  thus  far  and  no  farther 
does  nicta[)hysics  prevail  in  the  region  of  Engli;>'h  poli- 
tic'ji.  But  [jolitics  ij?  not  tlic  whole  art  of  social  exist- 
ence :  ethics  is  still  a  dee[)cr  and  more  vital  part  of  It  j 
and  III  that,  as  much  in  EnglaJid  as  elsewhere,  the  cur- 
rent opinions  are  still  divided  between  the  theological 
mode  of  thought  and  the  metaphysical.  What  is  the 
whole  doctrine  of  Intuitive  Morality,  which  reigns  su- 
j)reme  wherever  the  idolatry  of  Scripture  texts  has 
abated  and  the  influence  of  BciUhaui's  philosophy 
lias  not  reache<l,  I)nt  the  metaphysical  state  of  ethical 
science?  AVIiat  else,  indeed,  is  the  Avholc  a  priori 
philosophy,  in  morals,  jurisj)rudcnce,  psychology,  logic, 
even  piivsical  science,  for  it  does  not  always  keep  its 
hands  off  that,  the  oldest  domain  of  observation  and 
ex})eriment?  It  has  the  universal  diagnostic  of  the 
metaphysical  mode  of  thought,  In  the  Comtean  sense  of 
the  word,  —  that  of  erecting  a  mere  creation  of  the  mind 
into  a  test  or  iiornia  of  external  truth,  and  presenting 
the  abstract  expression  of  the  beliefs  already  entertained, 
as  the  reason  and  evidence  which  justifies  them.  Of 
those  who  still  adhere  to  the  old  opinions  wc  need  not 
speak ;  but  when  one  of  the  most  vigorous  as  v.'ell  as 
boldest  thinkers  that  English  speculation  has  yet  ])ro- 
tluccd,  full  of  the  true  scientific  spirit,  !Mr.  Herbert 
Spencer,  places  in  the  front  of  his  pliiloso[)hy  the  doc- 
ti'Ine  that  the  ultimate  test  of  the  truth  of  a  proposition 
is  the  incoricelvableness  of  its  negative  ;  when,  follow- 
ing In  the  steps  of  Mr.  Spencer,  an  able  expounder  of 
positive  philosophy  like  ^Ir.  Lewes,  in  his  meritorious 
and  by  no  means  superficial  work  on  Aristotle,  after 
laying,  very  justly,  the  blame  of  almost  every  error  of 


68  THE    POSIT! VK    I'll  ILOSDI'IIY 

the  ancient  tliinkcrs  on  their  nc^lcctinp:  to  verify  their 
opinions,  announces  that  there  are  two  kinds  of  verifica- 
tion, the  Real  and  tlie  Ideal,  the  ideal  test  of  truth  being 
tliat  its  ncirativc  is  unthinkable,  and  by  the  application 
of  tliat  test  judges  that  gravitation  must  be  universal 
even  in  the  stellar  regions,  because,  in  the  absence  of 
jM-oof  to  the  contrary,  "the  idea  of  matter  without 
gravity  is  unthinkable;"  —  when  those  from  whom  it 
was  least  to  be  expected  thus  set  up  acquired  neces- 
sities of  thought  in  the  minds  of  one  or  two  genera- 
tions as  evidence  of  real  necessities  in  the  universe,  we 
nuist  admit  that  the  metaphysical  mode  of  thought 
still  rules  the  higher  philosophy,  even  in  the  depart- 
ment of  inorganic  nature,  and  far  more  in  all  that 
relates  to  man  as  a  moral,  intellectual,  and  social 
])eing. 

But,  while  M.  Comte  is  so  far  in  the  right,  we  often, 
as  already  intimated,  find  him  using  the  name  met!i- 
[)hysical  to  denote  certain  ])ractical  cotidusions,  instead 
of  a  particular  kind  of  theoretical  premises.  AVhat- 
cver  goes  by  the  different  names  of  the  revolutionary, 
the  radical,  the  democratic,  the  liberal,  the  free-think- 
ing, the  sceptical,  or  the  neg.itive  nnd  critical  school  or 
p.arty  in  religion,  politics,  or  philosophy,  all  passes  with 
l:im  under  the  designation  of  metaphysical,  and  what- 
ever he  has  to  sa}'  about  it  forms  part  of  his  description 
of  the  metaphysical  school  of  social  science.  He  passes 
in  review,  one  after  another,  what  he  deems  the  lead- 
ing doctrines  of  the  revolutionary  school  of  })olitics, 
and  dismisses  them  all  as  mere  instruments  of  attack 
upon  the  old  social  system,  with  no  permanent  validity 
as  social  truths. 


OF    AUtiUSTE    CO.MTE.  69 

He  assign.s  only  tliis  liumble  rank  to  tlie  first  of  all 
the  articles  of  the  liberal  creed, — -''the  absolute  riglit  of 
free  examination,  or  the  dogma  of  unlimited  libevty 
of  conscience."  As  far  as  tliis  doctrine  only  means  that 
opinions,  and  tiicir  expression,  should  be  exem[)t  i'roui 
Icfjal  restraint,  either  in  the  form  of  prevention  or  of 
[lenalty,  M.  Comte  is  a  firm  adherent  of  it;  but  the 
moral  right  of  every  human  being,  however  ill-pre- 
pared by  the  necessary  instruction  and  discipline,  to 
erect  himself  into  a  judge  of  the  most  intricate  as  well 
as  the  most  import.; nt  questions  that  can  occujty  the 
iunnan  intellect,  ho  resolutely  denies.  "  There  is  no 
liberty  of  conscience,"  he  said  in  an  early  work,  "  in  as- 
tronomy, in  physics,  in  chemistry,  even  in  physiology, 
in  the  sense  that  every  one  would  think  it  absurd  not  to 
accept  in  confidence  the  principles  established  in  those  ▼ 
sciences  by  the  competent  persons.  If  it  is  otherwise 
in  politics,  the  reason  is  merely  because,  the  old  doc- 
trines having  gone  by  and  the  new  ones  not  being  yet 
formed,  there  arc  not  properly,  during  the  interval,  any 
established  opinions."  When  first  mankind  outgrew 
the  old  doctrines,  an  appeal  from  doctors  and  teachers 
to  the  outside  public  was  inevitable  and  indispensable ; 
since,  without  the  toleration  and  encouragement  of  dis- 
cussion and  criticism  from  all  quarters,  it  would  have 
been  impossible  for  any  new  doctrines  to  grow  up. 
But  in  itself,  the  practice  of  carrying  the  questions 
which  more  than  all  others  require  special  knowledge 
and  preparation,  before  the  incompetent  tribunal  of  com- 
mon opinion,  is,  he  contends,  radically  irrational,  and 
will  and  ought  to  cease  when  once  mankind  have  again 
made  up  tlieir  minds  to  a  system  of  doctrine.     The  pro- 


70  TjiE  POSITIVE  riiiLOSOPnr 

longation  of  tliis  provisional  state,  pvocliiciiig  an  ever- 
increasing  divergence  of  opinions,  is  already,  according 
to  him,  extremely  dangcrons,  since  it  is  only  when  there 
is  a  tolerable  unanimity  respecting  the  rule  of  life,  that 
a  real  moral  control  can  be  established  over  the  self- 
interest  and  passions  of  individuals.  Besides  which, 
■\vhen  every  man  is  encouraged  to  believe  himself  a 
competent  judge  of  the  most  difficult  social  questions, 
he  cannot  be  prevented  from  thinking  himself  com- 
petent also  to  the  most  important  public  duties,  and 
the  baneful  competition  for  power  and  official  func- 
tions spreads  constantly  downwards  to  a  lower  and 
lower  grade  of  intelligence.  In  ]\I.  Comtc's  o2)inion, 
the  peculiarly  complicated  nature  of  sociological  studies, 
and  the  great  amount  of  previous  knowledge  and  in- 
tellectual discipline  rccpilsitc  for  them,  together  with 
the  serious  conscfiuences  that  may  be  produced  by 
even  temporary  errors  on  such  sul)jccts,  render  it  ne- 
cessary, in  the  case  of  ethics  and  politics,  still  more  than 
of  mathematics  and  physics,  that  whatever  legal  liberty 
may  exist  of  questioning  and  discussing,  the  opinions 
of  mankind  should  really  be  formed  for  them  by  an 
exceedingly  small  number  of  minds  of  the  highest  class, 
trained  to  the  task  by  the  most  thorough  and  labori- 
ous incntnl  preparation ;  and  that  the  questioning  of 
their  conclusions  by  any  one  not  of  an  equivalent 
grade  of  intellect  and  instruction,  should  be  accounted 
equally  presumptuous,  and  more  blamable,  than  the 
attempts  occasionally  made  by  sciolists  to  refute  the 
Newtonian  astronomy.  All  this  is,  in  a  sense,  true  ; 
but  we  confess  our  sympathj-  with  those  who  feel  to- 
wards it,  like  the  man  in  the  story,  who  being  asked 


OF    AUGU.-<Ti:    COMTE.  71 

wliclhcr  he  admitted  that  six  and  five  make  eleven,  re- 
fused to  give  ail  answer  until  he  knew  what  use  was  to 
be  made  of  it.  The  d(»ctnne  is  one  of  a  class  of  truths, 
which,  unless  completed  by  other  truths,  arc  so  liable  to 
perversion,  that  we  may  i'airly  decline  to  take  notice  of 
them  except  in  connexion  with  some  definite  application. 
In  justice  to  ]M.  Conite,  it  should  be  said,  that  he  does 
not  wish  this  intellectual  dominion  to  be  exercised  over 
an  ignorant  people.  Far  from  him  is  the  thought  of 
promoting  the  allegiance  of  the  mass  to  scientific  author- 
ity by  withholding  from  them  scientific  knowledge.  lie 
holds  it  tlic  duty  of  society  to  bestow  on  every  one  who 
grows  up  to  manhood  or  womanhood  as  complete  a 
course  of  instruction  in  every  department  of  science, 
from  mathematics  to  sociology,  as  can  possibly  be  made 
general ;  and  his  ideas  of  what  is  possible  in  that  re- 
spect are  carried  to  a  length  to  which  few  arc  prepared 
to  follow  him.  There  is  something  startling,  though, 
when  closely  looked  into,  not  Utopian  or  chimerical.  In 
the  amount  of  positive  knowledge  of  the  most  varied 
kind  wJiich  he  believes  may,  by  good  methods  of  teach- 
ing, be  made  the  common  inheritance  of  all  persons  with 
ordinary  faculties  who  arc  born  into  the  world;  —  not 
the  mere  knowledge  of  results,  to  which,  except  for  the 
practical  arts,  he  attaches  only  secondary  value,  but 
knowledge  also  of  the  mode  In  which  tliosc  results  were 
attained,  and  the  evidence  on  which  they  rest,  so  fixr  as 
it  can  be  known  and  understood  by  those  who  do  not 
de^  ote  their  lives  to  its  study. 

We  have  stated  thus  fully  M.  Comte's  opinion  on  the 
most  fundamental  doctrine  of  liberalism,  because  it  is 
the  clue  to  junch  of  his  general  conception  of  politics. 


72  THE    POSITIVE    PHILOSOrHY' 

If  his  object  had  only  been  to  exemplify  by  that  doctrine 
the  purely  negative  character  of  the  principal  liberal  and 
revolutionary  schools  of  thought,  he  need  not  have  gone 
so  far  :  it  would  have  been  enough  to  say,  that  the  mere 
lii)crty  to  hold  and  express  any  creed,  cannot  itself  he 
that  creed.  Every  one  is  free  to  believe  and  publish 
that  two  and  two  make  ten,  but  the  important  thing  is 
to  know  that  they  make  lour.  M.  Comte  has  no  diffi- 
culty in  making  out  an  equally  strong  case  against  the 
other  principal  tenets  of  what  he  calls  the  revolutionary 
school;  since  all  that  they  generally  amount  to,  is  that 
something  ought  not  to  be,  Avhich  cannot  possibly  be  the 
whole  truth,  and  which  ]\I.  Comte,  in  general,  will  not 
admit  to  be  even  part  of  it.  Take,  for  instance,  the  doc- 
trine which  denies  to  governments  any  initiative  in  social 
progress,  restricting  them  to  the  function  of  preserving 
order,  or,  in  other  words,  keeping  the  j)eace  :  an  opinion 
which,  so  far  as  grounded  on  so-called  rights  of  the  in- 
dividual, he  justly  regards  as  purely  mcta[)hysical ;  but 
does  not  recognise  that  it  is  also  widely  held  as  an  infer- 
ence from  the  laws  of  human  nature  and  himian  affairs, 
and  therefore,  whether  true  or  false,  as  a  Positive  doc- 
trine. Bclievinij  with  !M.  Comte  that  there  are  no  ab- 
solute  truths  in  the  political  art,  nor  indeed  in  any  art 
whatever,  we  agree  with  him  that  the  laisscr-fairc 
doctrine,  stated  without  large  qualifications,  is  both  un- 
practical and  unscientific ;  but  it  does  not  follow  that 
those  who  assert  it  arc  not,  nineteen  times  out  of 
twenty,  practically  nearer  the  truth  than  those  wlio  deny 
it.  The  doctrine  of  Equality  meets  no  better  fate  at 
M.  Comte's  hands.  He  regards  it  as  the  erection  into 
ao  absolute  dogma  of  a  mere  protest  against  the  ia- 


OF   AUGUSTE   C03ITE.  73 

equalities  wliich  came  down  from  the  middle  ages  and 
answered  no  legitimate  end  in  modern  society.  He 
observes,  that  mankind,  in  a  normal  state,  having  to  act 
together,  are  necessarily,  in  practice,  organized  and 
classed  with  some  rcrerence  to  their  unequal  aptitudes, 
natural  or  acquired,  which  demand  that  some  should  be 
under  tlic  direction  of  others ;  scrui»ulous  regard  being 
at  the  same  time  had  to  the  fulfilment  towards  all  of 
"  the  claims  rightfully  inherent  in  the  dignity  of  ,i 
human  being;  the  aggregate  of  which,  still  very  insuf- 
ficiently ap[)rcciatcd,  will  constitute  more  and  more  the 
principle  of  universal  morahty  as  applied  to  daily  use 
,  .  ,  a  grand  moral  obligation,  which  has  never  been 
directly  denied  since  the  abolition  of  slavery"  (iv.  54). 
Tiicre  is  not  a  word  to  be  said  against  these  doctrines  : 
but  the  practical  question  is  one  which  M.  Comte  never 
even  entertains;  viz.,  when,  after  being  properly  educa- 
ted, people  are  left  to  find  their  places  for  themselves, 
do  they  not  spontaneously  class  themselves  in  a  manner 
much  more  conformable  to  their  unequal  or  dissimilar 
aptitudes,  than  governnients  or  social  institutions  are 
likely  to  do  it  for  them  ?  The  Sovereignty  of  the  People, 
again, — that  metaphysical  axiom  which  in  France  and 
the  rest  of  the  Continent  has  so  long  been  the  theoretic 
basis  of  radical  and  democratic  politics,  —  he  regards  as 
of  a  purely  negative  character,  signifying  the  right  of 
the  [)eople  to  rid  themselves  by  insurrection  of  a  social 
order  that  has  become  op[)rcssive ;  but,  when  erected 
into  a  positive  principle  of  government,  which  condemns 
indefinitely  all  superiors  to  "an  arbitnuy  dei)endence 
u()on  the  nualtitude  of  their  inferiors,"  he  considers  it  as 
u  sort  of  "  transportation  to  people  of  the  divine  right 


74  TriF,  I'OHiTiVK  iMUTiOsornY 

eo  much  reproached  to  kings"  (iv.  /jS,  5G).  On 
the  doctrine  as  a  nictapliy.<ical  dogma  or  an  absohitc 
])rincij)lc,  this  criticism  is  just ;  hut  there  is  also  a 
Positive  doctrine,  without  any  pretension  to  heiiig  ab- 
^!)Inte,  which  claims  the  direct  participation  of  the 
governed  in  tlieir  own  g'o\eniment,  not  as  u  natural 
right,  hilt  as  ji  means  to  ini[>ortant  ends,  under  the  con- 
ditions and  with  the  limitations  which  those  ends  im- 
pose. The  general  residt  of  ]M.  ConUc's  criticism  on 
the  rcvohitionarv  philosophy,  is  that  lie  dcenjs  it  not 
only  incapable  of  aiding  the  necessary  reorganization  of 
society,  but  a  serious  im[)cdlment  tliereto.  i)y  setting"  uj), 
on  all  the  great  interests  of  mankind,  the  mere  negation 
of  authority,  direction,  or  organization,  as  the  most 
perfect  state,  and  the  solution  of  all  problems ;  the 
extreme  point  of  this  aberration  being  reached  by 
Konsseau  and  his  followers,  when  they  extolled  the 
savage  state,  as  an  ideal  from  which  civilization  was 
only  a  degeneracy,  more  or  less  marked  and  com[)lete. 

The  state  of  sociological  speculation  being  surli  as 
has  been  described,  —  divided  between  a  feudal  and 
the(dogical  school,  now  effete,  and  a  democratic  and 
metaphysical  one,  of  no  value  except  for  the  destruction 
of  the  former,  —  the  problem  how  to  render  the  social 
i^cience  positive,  must  naturally  have  jjrescntcd  itself, 
more  or  less  distinctly,  to  superior  minds.  ]M.  Comtc 
examines  and  criticises,  for  the  n)ost  part  justly,  soiuo 
of  the  principal  efforts  which  have  been  made  by  indi- 
vidual thinkers  for  this  purj)osc.  I'ut  the  weak  side  of 
his  philosophy  conies  out  [(romincntly  in  his  sti-i"tin"es 
on  the  only  systematic  attcmj)!  yet  made  by  any  body 
of  thinkers,  to  constitute  a  science,  not  indeed  of  social 


or    AUGITHTK    COMTK.  75 

phenomena  generally,  but  of  one  great  class  or  divisloTi 
of  llieni.  We  mean,  of  course,  })olitical  economy, 
wliicli  (wltii  a  reservation  in  favor  of  the  speculations 
of  Adam  Smith  as  valuable  preparatory  studies  for 
science)  he  deems  unscientific,  unpositivc,  and  a  mer<> 
branch  of  metaphysics,  that  comprehensive  category  of 
condcnmation  in  which  he  places  all  attempts  nt  positive 
science  Nvhich  arc  not  in  his  opinion  directed  by  a  right 
scientific  method.  Any  one  acquainted  with  tlie  writ- 
ings of  [)olitical  economists  need  only  read  his  few  pages 
of  aniniad versions  on  tliem  (iv.  193  to  205)  to  learn 
how  extremely  superficial  ^l.  Comte  can  sometimes  be. 
lie  afiinns  that  they  have  added  nothing  really  new  to 
the  original  (tpcrfus  of  Adam  Smith  ;  when  e\cry  one 
Avho  has  read  tiiem  knows  that  they  have  added  so  much 
as  to  have  changed  the  whole  aspect  of  the  science, 
besides  rectifying  and  clearing  up  in  the  most  essential 
points  the  cqwiyus  themselves.  He  lays  an  almost 
puerile  stress,  for  tlic  })urpose  of  disparagement,  on  the 
discussions  about  the  meaning  of  Avords  which  are  found 
in  the  best  books  on  political  economy,  as  if  such  dis- 
cussions were  not  an  indispensable  accompaniment  of 
the  progress  of  thongiit,  and  abundant  in  the  history 
of  every  physical  science.  On  the  whole  cpiestiou  he 
has  but  one  remark  of  any  value,  and  that  he  misapplies  ; 
namely,  that  the  study  of  the  conditions  of  national 
wealth  as  a  detached  sul)ject  is  unphilosopliical,  because, 
all  the  dilferent  aspects  of  social  phenomena  acting  and 
reacting  on  one  another,  they  cannot  be  rightly  under- 
stood apart ;  which  by  no  means  proves  that  the  material 
and  industrial  phenomena  of  society  arc  not,  even  by 
themselves,   susceptible  of  useful  generalizations,   but 


76  THE    POSITIVE   nilLOSOPHY 

only  that  these  generalizations  niu&t  necessarily  be  re- 
lative to  a  given  i'ovm  of  civilization  and  a  given  stage 
of  social  advancement.  Tliis,  we  ajiprclicnd,  is  what 
no  political  economist  would  deny.  None  of  them 
pretend  that  the  laws  of  wages,  profits,  values,  prices, 
and  the  like,  set  down  in  their  treatises,  would  be  true 
in  the  savage  state  (for  cxain[)le),  or  in  a  conununity 
composed  of  masters  and  slaves.  But  they  do  think, 
with  good  reason,  that  whoever  understands  the  })olitical 
economy  of  a  country  witli  the  complicated  and  manifold 
civilization  of  the  nations  of  Europe,  can  deduce  with- 
out difficulty  the  i)olitIcal  economy  of  any  other  state  of 
society,  with  the  particular  circumstances  of  which  he  is 
equally  well  acquainted.*  Wo  do  not  pretend  that 
political  economy  has  never  been  prosecuted  or  taught 
in  a  contracted  spirit.  As  often  as  a  study  is  cultivated 
by  narrow  minils,  they  will  draw  from  it  narrow  con- 
clusions. If  a  political  economist  is  deficient  in  general 
knowledge,  he  will  exaggerate  the  importance  and  uni- 
versality of  the  limited  class  of  truths  which  he  knowSo 
All  kinds  of  scientific  men  arc  liable  to  this  imputation, 
and  M.  Comtc  is  never  weary  of  urging  it  against  them  ; 
reproaching  them  with  their  narrowness  of  mind,  the 
petty  scale  of  their  thoughts,  their  incapacity  for  large 

•  M.  Littrc",  wlio,  though  a  ■warm  admirer,  and  acceptin;^  thu  pioitioii  of 
a  disciple  of  >[.  Comtc,  is  sin;;ularly  free  from  his  errors,  makes  tlic  equally 
ingenious  and  ju>t  remark,  that  Political  Kconomy  corresjiond.-i  in  social 
K-ience  to  the  theory  of  the  nutritive  functions  in  hiology,  wliich  M.  Cointe, 
with  all  good  jihysiologi^t.",  thinks  it  not  only  permissible,  hut  a  great  ami 
fundamental  improvement,  to  treat,  in  the  (irst  place,  separately,  as  the 
necessary  basis  of  the  higher  branches  of  the  science;  although  the  nutritive 
functions  can  no  more  be  withdrawn  in  fuel  from  the  influence  of  the  animal 
and  human  attributes,  than  the  economical  phenomena  of  society  from  that 
'of  the  political  and  moral. 


OF   AUGUSTE    COMTE.  77 

views,  and  the  stupidity  of  tliose  they  occasionally  at- 
tempt beyond  the  bounds  of  their  own  subjects.  Politi- 
cal economists  do  not  deserve  these  reproaches  more 
than  other  classes  of  positive  enquirers,  but  less  than 
most.  The  princij^al  error  of  narrowness  with  which 
the'']are  frequently  chargeable,  is  that  of  regarding,  not 
any  economical  doctrine,  but  their  present  experience 
of  mankind,  as  of  universal  validity ;  mistaking  tempo- 
rary or  local  phases  of  human  character  for  human 
nature  itself;  having  no  faith  in  the  wonderful  pliability 
of  the  human  mind ;  deeming  it  impossible,  in  spite  of 
the  strongest  evidence,  that  the  earth  can  produce 
human  beings  of  a  different  type  from  that  which  is 
familiar  to  them  in  their  own  age,  or  even,  perhaps,  in 
their  own  country.  The  only  security  against  this 
narrowness  is  a  liberal  mental  cultivation,  and  all  it 
proves  is  tliat  a  person  is  not  likely  to  be  a  good  politi- 
cal economist  who  is  nothing  else. 

Tlius  far,  we  have  had  to  do  with  M.  Comte,  as  a 
sociologist,  only  in  his  critical  capacity.  We  have  now 
to  deal  with  him  as  a  constructor,  —  the  author  of  a. 
sociological  system.  The  first  question  is  that  of  the 
Method  proper  to  the  study.  His  view  of  this  is  highly 
instructive. 

T!ic  ^Method  proper  to  the  Science  of  Society  must  be, 
iu  substance,  the  same  as  in  all  other  sciences, — the 
interrogation  and  interpretation  of  experience,  by  the 
twofold  process  of  Induction  and  Deduction.  But  its 
mode  of  practising  these  operations  has  features  of  pecu- 
liarity. In  general,  Induction  furnishes  to  science  the 
laws  of  the  elementary  facts,  from  which,  when  known, 
those  of  the   complex   combinations   are   thought   out 


78  THE  rosiTiVE  niiLosoriiY 

deductively  :  specific  obscrvntion  of  complex  phenomena 
yields   no   general    laws,    or    only   empirical   ones ;    its 
scientific  function  is  to  verity  the  laws  obtained  by  de- 
duction.    This  mode  of  philosophizing  is  not  adequate 
to  the  exigences  of  sociological  investigation.     In    so- 
cial   phenomena   the  elenjcntary  facts  are  feelings  and 
actions,  and  the  laws  of  these  arc  tlie  laws  of  human 
nature,  social  facts  being  the  results  of  human  acts  and 
situations.      Since,    then,    tlic    phenomena    of   man    in 
society  result  from  his  nature  as  an  indi\i(hial  being,  it 
might  be  thought  that  the  proper  mode  of  coustructing 
u  positive  Social  Science  must  be  by  deducing  it  from 
the  general  laws  of  human  nature,   using  the  facts  of 
history  merely  for  verification.      Such,  accordingly,  has 
been  the  conce[)tion  of  social  science  by  many  of  those 
who  have  endeavored  t(»  ronder  it  ])ositive,  particularly 
by  the  school  of  Bcntham.      M.  Comtc  considers  this  as 
an  error.     AVc  may,  he  says,  draw  from  the  universal 
laws  of  human  natiuv  some  conclusions   (though  even 
these,  we  think,  rather  [trccariods)  concerning  the  very 
earliest  stages  of  hiunan  j)rogi-css,  of  whicii  there  are 
either  no,  or  very  im[>erfect,  historical  records.     Ihit  as 
society  j)rocccds  in  its  development,  its  phenomena  arc 
determined,  more  and  more,  not  by  the  sim{)le  tendencies 
of  universal  human  nature,  but  by  the  accumulated  In- 
fluence of  past  generations  over  the  present.     The  human 
beings  themselves,  on  the  laws  of  whose  nature  the  facts 
of  history  depend,    are    not   abstract   or  universal   but 
historical  human  beings,  already  s]ia[)ed,  and  made  what 
they  arc,  by  human  society.     This  being  the  ease,  no 
powers  of  deduction  could  enable  anyone,  starting  from 
the  mere  conception  of  the  Being  Man,   pl.accd  in  a 


OF   AUGUSTE    COMTE.  79 

world  siicli  .IS  the  earth  ni;iy  have  been  before  the  com- 
mencement of  human  agency,  to  predict  and  calculate 
the  phenomena  of  his  development  sucli  as  they  have  in 
fact  proved.  If  the  facts  of  history,  empirically  con- 
sidered, had  not  given  rise  to  any  generalizations,  a 
deductive  study  of  history  could  never  have  ivached 
higher  than  more  or  less  [)lausible  conjecture.  By  good 
fortune  (for  the  case  might  easily  have  been  otherwise) 
the  history  of  our  species,  looked  at  as  a  comprehensive 
whole,  does  exliibit  a  determinate  course,  a  certain 
order  of  development ;  tht)ugh  history  alone  c;uinot 
prove  this  to  be  a  necessary  law,  as  distinguished  from 
a  tcm[)orary  accident.  Here,  therefore,  begins  the 
office  of  Biology  (or,  as  we  should  say,  of  Psychology) 
in  the  social  science.  The  universal  laws  of  human 
nature  arc  jjart  of  the  data  of  sociology,  but  in  using 
them  we  nmst  reverse  the  method  of  the  deductive 
physical  sciences  ;  for  while  in  these,  specific  ex[)erience 
commonly  serves  to  verlfv  laws  arrived  at  by  deduction, 
in  sociology  it  is  specific  experience  which  suggests  the 
laws,  and  deduction  which  verifies  them.  If  a  socio- 
logical theory,  collected  from  historical  evidence,  con- 
tradicts the  cstal)llshed  general  laws  of  human  nattu'c; 
if  (to  use  M.  Comte's  instances)  it  Im[)lies,  in  the  mass 
of  mankind,  any  very  decided  natural  bent,  cither  in  a 
good  or  in  a  bad  direction  ;  if  it  supposes  that  the 
reason,  in  average  hmnan  beings,  predominates  over 
the  desires,  or  the  disinterested  desires  over  the  i)crsimal, 
we  may  know  that  history  has  been  misinterpreted,  and 
that  the  theory  is  false.  On  the  other  hand,  if  laws  of 
social  phenomena,  em[>lrlcally  gencrali;^ed  from  history, 
can,  when  once  suggested,  be  affiliated  to  the  known  la\v3 


80  THE    POSITIVE    nilLOSOPIIY 

of  human  nature ;  if  the  direction  actually  taken  hy  the 
devclojjnicnts  and  changes  of  human  society,  can  be 
seen  to  be  such  as  tlie  properties  of  man  and  of  his 
dwelling-place  made  antecedently  probable,  the  empiri- 
cal generalizations  are  raised  into  positive  laws,  and 
Sociology  becomes  a  science. 

Much  has  been  said  and  written,  for  centuries  past,  by 
the  practical  or  empirical  school  of  politicians,  in  con- 
demnation of  theories  founded  on  })rinciples  of  human 
nature,  without  an  historical  basis  ;  and  the  theorists,  In 
their  turn,  have  successfully  retaliated  on  the  practi- 
calists.  ^  But  we  know  not  any  thinker  who,  before  ^[. 
Comte,  had  penetrated  to  the  philosophy  of  the  matter, 
and  placed  the  necessity  of  historical  studies  as  the 
foundation  of  sociological  speculation  on  the  true  foot- 
ing. From  this  time  any  political  thinker  who  fancies 
himself  able  to  dispense  with  a  connected  view  of  the 
great  facts  of  history,  as  a  chain  of  causes  and  eft'ects, 
must  be  regarded  as  below  the  level  of  the  age  ;  wliile 
the  vulgar  mode  of  using  history,  by  looking  in  it  for 
parallel  cases,  as  if  any  cases  were  parallel,  or  as  if  a 
single  instance,  or  even  many  instances  not  compared 
and  analysed,  could  reveal  a  law,  will  be  more  than 
ever,  and  irrevocably,  discredited. 

The  inversion  of  the  ordlnarv  relation  between  De- 
duction  a,nd  Induction  is  not  the  only  point  in  which, 
according  to  ^l.  Comte,  the  ]\fethod  proper  to  Sociology 
differs  from  that  of  the  sciences  of  inorganic  nature. 
The  common  order  of  science  proceeds  from  the  details 
to  the  whole.  The  method  of  Sociology  should  proceed 
from  the  whole  to  the  details.  There  is  no  universal 
principle  for  the  order  of  study,  but  that  of  proceeding 


OF   AUGUSTE   COMTE.  81 

from  the  known  to  the  unknown ;  finding  our  way  to 
the  facts  at  whatever  point  is  most  open  to  our  obser- 
vation. In  the  phasnomena  of  the  social  state  the 
collective  phenomenon  is  more  accessible  to  us  than 
the  parts  of  whicii  it  is  composed.  Tiiis  is  already,  in 
a  great  degree,  true  of  the  mere  animal  body.  It  is 
essential  to  the  idea  of  an  organism,  and  it  is  even  more 
true  of  the  social  organism  tlian  of  the  individual.  The 
state  of  every  part  of  the,  social  wiiolc  at  any  time,  is 
intimately  connected  with  the  contemporaneous  state  of 
all  the  others.  Religious  belief,  philosophy,  science, 
the  fine  arts,  the  industrial  arts,  commerce,  navigation, 
government,  all  ai'e  in  close  mutual  dependence  on  one 
another,  insomuch  that,  when  any  considerable  cliange 
takes  place  in  one,  we  may  know  that  a  parallel  change 
in  all  the  others  has  preceded  or  will  follow  it.  The 
progress  of  society  from  one  general  state  to  another  is 
not  an  aggregate  of  partial  changes,  but  the  product  of 
a  single  impulse,  acting  tlirough  all  the  partial  agencies, 
and  can  therefore  be  most  easily  traced  by  studying 
them  together.  Could  it  even  be  detected  in  tiiem 
separately,  its  true  nature  could  not  be  understood 
except  by  examining  tlicm  in  the  ensemble.  In  con- 
structing, therefore,  a  theory  of  society,  all  the  diffiu'cnt 
aspects  of  the  social  organization  must  be  taken  into 
consideration  at  once. 

Our  space  is  not  consistent  with  enquiring  into  all  the 
limitations  of  this  doctrine.  It  requires  many  of  which 
^I.  Comte's  theory  takes  no  account.  There  is  one,  in 
particular,  dependent  on  a  scientific  artifice  familiar  to 
students  of  science,  especially  of  the  applications  of 
mathematics  to  the  study  of  nature.     When  an  effect 

8 


82  THE  POSITIVE  PiiiLosornY 

depends  on  several  variable  conditions,  some  of  which 
change  le<s,  or  more  slowly,  than  others,  we  are  often 
able  to  dctcrniinc,  cither  by  reasoning  or  by  experiment, 
what  woidd  be  the  law  of  variation  of  tJic  eflcct,  if  its 
changes  depended  only  on  some  of  the  conditions,  tlic 
remainder  Iteing  8U[»po.<cd  constant.  The  law  so  found 
will  be  sufhcicntly  near  the  truth  for  all  times  and 
places  In  which  tlic  latter  set  of  conditions  do  not  vary 
greatly,  and  will  be  a  basis  to  set  out  from  when  it 
becomes  necessary  to  allow  for  the  variations  of  those 
conditions  also.  Most  of  the  conclusions  of  social  science 
apj)]icablc  to  practical  use  are  of  this  description.  M. 
Comte's  system  makes  no  room  for  them.  We  have 
seen  how  he  deals  with  the  part  of  them  which  are  the 
most  scientific  in  character,  the  generalizations  of  politi- 
cal economy. 

There  is  one  more  point  in  the  general  philosophy  of 
sociology  requiring  notice.  Social  phenomena,  like  all 
others,  present  two  aspects,  —  the  statical,  and  the  dy- 
namical ;  tlie  phenomena  of  equilibrium,  and  tliose  of 
motion.  The  statical  aspect  is  that  of  tlic  laws  of  social 
existence,  considered  abstractedly  from  progress,  and 
confined  to  wJiat  is  conunon  to  the  progressive  and  the 
stationary  state.  The  dynamical  aspect  is  that  of  social 
progress.  The  statics  of  society  is  the  study  of  the 
conditions  of  existence  and  permanence  of  the  social 
state.  The  dynamics  studies  the  laws  of  its  evolution. 
The  first  is  the  theory  of  the  consensus,  or  inter-depen- 
dence of  social  phenomena ;  the  second  is  the  theory 
of  their  filiation. 

The  first  division  M.  Comte,  in  his  great  work,  treats 
in  a  much  more  summary  manner  than  the  second ;  and 


OF  AUGUSTE   COMTE.  83 

it  forms,  to  our  thinking,  tl>c  weakest  part  of  tlic  treatise. 
lie  can  liardly  have  seemed  even  to  lilmself  to  have 
originated,  in  the  statics  of  society,  any  thing  new,* 
unless  his  revival  of  the  Catholic  idea  of  a  spiritual 
Power  may  be  so  considered.  The  remainder,  with  the 
exception  of  detached  thouglits,  in  which  even  his 
feeblest  productions  arc  always  rich,  is  trite,  while  in 
our  judgment  far  from  being  always  true. 

He  begins  by  a  statement  of  the  general  properties 
of  human  nature  which  make  social  existence  possible. 
Man  has  a  spontaneous  propensity  to  the  society  of  his 
fellow-beings,  and  seeks  it  instinctively,  for  its  own 
t^ake,  and  not  out  of  regard  to  the  advantages  it  pro- 
cures for  him,  which,  in  many  conditions  of  humanity, 
nmst  appear  to  him  very  problematical.  Man  has  also 
a  certain,  though  moderate,  amount  of  natural  ben- 
evolence. On  the  other  hand,  these  social  propensities 
arc  by  nature  weaker  than  liis  selfish  ones ;  and  the 
social  state,  being  mainly  kept  in  existence  through 
tiic  former,  involves  an  habitual  antagonism  between 
the  two.  Further,  our  wants  of  all  kinds,  from  the 
purely  organic  u{)wards,  can  only  be  satisfied  by  means 
of  labor ;  nor  does  bodily  labor  suffice,  without  the 
guidance  of  intelligence.  But  labor,  especially  when 
prolonged  and  monotonous,  is  naturally  hateful,  and 
mental  labor  the   most  irksome   of  all ;    and   hence  a 

*  Indeed  Iiis  cl.iim  to  be  the  creator  of  Sociology  does  not  extend  to  this 
branch  of  tlie  scioni-e:  on  the  contrary,  he,  in  a  subsequent  work,  expressly 
declares  that  the  real  founder  of  it  was  Aristotle,  by  whom  the  tlieory  of  tho 
conditions  of  social  existence  was  carried  as  far  towards  perfection  as  was 
possible  in  the  absence  of  any  theory  of  I'rojjress.  Without  going  quite  this 
length,  we  think  it  hardly  possible  to  appreciate  too  highly  tiic  merit  of  those 
early  elTorts,  beyond  which  little  progress  had  been  naade,  until  a  rciy  recent 
period,  cither  in  ethical  or  in  political  science. 


84  THE  rosrrivE  piiilosophy 

second  antagonism,  which  must  exist  in  all  societies 
•whatever.  The  character  of  the  society  is  principally 
detcnnined  by  the  degree  in  which  the  better  incentive, 
in  each  of  these  cases,  makes  head  against  the  worse. 
In  I)otli  the  points,  human  nature  is  capable  of  great 
amelioration.  The  social  instincts  may  ap[)roximatc 
much  nearer  to  the  strength  of  the  personal  ones,  though 
never  entirely  coming  up  to  it ;  the  aversion  to  labor  in 
general,  and  to  intellectual  labor  in  [)articular,  may  I^e 
much  weakened,  and  the  predominance  of  the  inclina- 
tions over  the  reason  ijreatlv  diminished,  thou^di  never 
completely  destroyed.  The  spirit  of  im[)rovcment  re- 
sults from  the  increasinf;  strenirth  of  the  social  instincts, 
combined  with  the  growth  of  an  intellectual  activity, 
which,  guiding  the  personal  i)ropcnsities,  inspires  each 
individual  with  a  deliberate  desire  to  improve  his  con- 
dition. The  personal  instincts  left  to  their  own  guidance, 
and  the  indolence  and  apathy  natural  to  mankind,  are 
the  sources  which  mainly  feed  the  spirit  of  Conserva- 
tion. The  struggle  between  the  two  spirits  is  a  uni- 
versal incident  of  the  social  state. 

The  next  of  the  universal  elements  in  human  society 
is  family  life ;  which  INI.  Comte  regards  as  ori^-inallv 
the  sole,  and  always  the  principal,  source  of  the  social 
feelings,  and  the  only  school  open  to  mankind  in  general, 
in  which  unselfishness  can  be  learnt,  and  the  feelings 
and  conduct  demanded  by  social  relations  be  made 
habitual.  ^I.  Comte  takes  this  opportunity  of  declaring 
his  opinions  on  the  [)roper  constitution  of  the  family, 
and  in  particular  of  the  marriage  institution.  They  are 
of  the  most  orthodox  and  conservative  sort.  M.  Comte 
adheres  not  only  to  the  popular  Christian,  but  to  the 


OF   AUGUSTE    COMTE.  85 

Catholic  view  of  nuirriagc  iu  its  utmost  strictness,  and 
rebukes  Protestant  nations  for  liaving  tampered  with  the 
indissohibility  of  tlic  engagement,  by  permitting  divorce. 
He  admits  that  tlie  marriage  institution  has  been,  iu 
vax'ious  respects,  beneficially  modified  with  the  advance 
of  society,  and  that  we  may  not  yet  have  reached  the 
last  of  tliese  modifications  ;  but  strenuously  maintains 
that  such  changes  cannot  possibly  aflTect  what  he  regards 
as  the  essential  principles  of  the  institution,  —  the  irre- 
vocability of  the  engagement,  and  the  complete  subor- 
dination of  the  wife  to  tlie  husband,  and  of  women 
generally  to  men  ;  which  are  precisely  the  great  vulner- 
able points  of  tlic  existing  constitution  of  society  on 
this  important  subjects  It  is  unpleasant  to  have  to  say 
it  of  a  philosopher,  but  tlic  incidents  of  his  life  which 
have  been  made  public  by  his  biographers  aflford  an 
explanation  of  one  of  these  two  opinions, — he  had 
quarrelled  with  his  wife.*  At  a  later  period,  under  the 
influence  of  circumstances  equally  personal,  his  opinions 
and  feelings  respecting  women  were  very  much  modified, 
vvitiiout  becominix  more  rational :  iu  his  final  scheme  of 
society,  instead  of  being  ti'catcd  as  grown  children,  they 
were  exalted  into  goddesses ;  honors,  jnivileges,  and 
immunities  were  lavished  on  them,  only  not  simple 
justice.  On  the  otiicr  question,  the  irrevocability  of 
marriage,  M.  Comte  must  receive  credit  for  impartiality, 
since  the  opposite  doctrine  would  have  better  suited  his 
personal  convenience;  but  we  can  give  hun  no  other 
credit,  for  his  argument  is  not  only  futile,  but  refutes 

*  It  is  due  to  tiicni  both  to  say,  that  ho  continued  to  expross,  in  lottcre 
whicl»  liave  been  published,  a  high  opinion  of  her,  both  morally  and  intcl- 
lectunlly;  and  her  persistent  and  strong  concern  for  his  interests  and  his 
£amc  is  attested  both  by  M.  Littrii  aud  by  his  own  correspondence. 


8Q  TiiE  POSITIVE  niiLOSoriir 

itself.  He  s.ays,  that,  with  liberty  of  divorce,  life  would 
be  spent  in  a  constant  succession  of  experiments  and 
failures  ;  and  in  (he  same  breath  congratulates  himself 
on  the  fact  that  modern  manners  and  sentiments  have 
in  the  main  prevented  the  baneful  ciTocts  which  the 
toleration  of  divorce  in  Protestant  countries  might  have; 
l)cen  expected  to  produce.  He  did  not  perceive  that  if 
modern  habits  and  feelings  have  successfully  resisted 
•what  he  deems  the  tendency  of  a  less  rigorous  marriage- 
law,  it  must  be  because  modern  habits  and  feelinirs  are 
inconsistent  with  the  perpetual  series  of  new  trials  which 
be  dreaded.  If  there  are  tendencies  in  human  nature 
which  seek  change  and  variety,  there  are  others  which 
demand  fixity,  in  matters  which  touch  tlie  daily  sources 
of  happiness;  and  one  who  Jiad  studied  history  as  much 
as  M.  Comte,  ought  to  have  known  that  ever  since  the 
nomad  mode  of  life  was  exchanged  for  the  agricultural, 
the  latter  tendencies  have  becii  alwavs  nfjdninLr  lifround 
on  the  former.  All  experience  testifies  that  regidarity 
in  domestic  relations  is  almost  in  direct  proportion  to 
industrial  civilization.  Idle  life,  and  military  life  with 
its  long  intervals  of  idleness,  are  the  conditions  to  which 
cither  sexual  profligacy,  or  prolonged  vagaries  of  ima- 
gination on  that  subject,  arc  congenial.  Busy  men 
have  no  time  for  them,  and  have  too  much  other  occu- 
pation for  their  thoughts  :  they  require  that  home  should 
be  a  place  of  rest,  not  of  incessantly  renewed  excitement 
and  disturbance.  In  the  condition,  therefore,  into  which 
modern  society  has  passed,  there  1h  no  probubillly  that 
marriages  would  often  be  contracted  ^^•ithout  a  sincere 
desire  on  both  sides  that  they  should  be  permanent. 
That  this  has  been  the  case  hitherto  in  countries  where 


OF    AUGUSTE    COMTE.     '  87 

divorce  was  permitted,  wc  have  on  M.  Comtc's  own 
showing ;  and  every  thing  leads  us  to  believe  that  the 
power,  if  granted  elsewhere,  would  in  general  be  used 
only  for  its  legitimate  purpose,  —  for  enabling  those  who, 
by  a  blameless  or  excusable  mistake,  have  lost  their 
first  tiirow  for  domestic  happiness,  to  free  tliemselves 
(with  due  regard  for  all  interests  concerned)  from  the 
burthensome  yoke,  and  try,  under  more  favorable 
auspices,  another  chance.  Any  further  discussion  of 
these  great  social  questions  would  evidently  be  ineonn- 
patiblc  with  the  nature  and  limits  of  the  present 
paper. 

Lastly,  a  phenomenon  universal  in  all  societies,  and 
constantly  assuming  a  wider  extension  as  tliey  advance 
in  their  progress,  is  the  co-operation  of  mankind  one 
with  another,  by  the  division  of  employments  and  in- 
terchange of  commodities  and  services ;  a  conununiou 
which  extends  to  nations  as  well  as  individuals.  The 
economic  imi)ortance  of  this  spontaneous  organization 
of  mankind  as  joint-workers  with  and  for  one  another, 
has  often  been  illustrated.  Its  moral  eftccts,  in  con- 
necting them  by  their  interests,  and,  as  a  more  remote 
consequence,  by  their  sympathies,  are  equally  salutary. 
But  there  arc  some  things  to  be  said  on  the  other  side. 
The  increasing  specialisation  of  all  employments ;  the 
division  of  mankind  into  innumerable  small  fr-ictions, 
each  engrossed  by  an  extremely  minute  fragment  of 
the  business  of  society,  is  not  without  inconveniences, 
art  well  moral  as  intclleotnal,  whieh,  if  they  eoidd  not 
be  remedied,  would  be  a  serious  abatement  from  the 
benefits  of  advanced  civilization.  The  interests  of 
the  whole  —  the  bearings  of  thinjrs  on  the  ends  of  the 


88  THE   POSITIVE    PHILOSOniY 

social  union  —  arc  less  and  less  present  to  the  minds 
of  men  ■who  have  so  contracted  a  sphere  of  activity. 
The  Insignificant  detail  ^vhIch  forms  their  wliole  occu- 
pation —  the  infinitely  minute  \Yhecl  they  help  to  turn 
in  the  maclnnery  of  society  —  does  not  arouse  or  gratify 
any  feeling  bf  public  spirit  or  unity  with  their  fellow- 
men.  Their  work  Is  a  mere  tribute  to  physical  neces- 
sity, not  the  glad  performance  of  a  social  office.  This 
lowering  effect  of  the  extreme  division  of  labor  tells 
most  of  all  on  those  who  arc  set  up  as  the  lights  and 
teachers  of  the  rest.  A  man's  mind  Is  as  fatally 
narrowed,  and  his  feelings  towards  the  great  ends  of 
humanity  as  miserably  stunted,  by  giving  all  his 
thoughts  to  the  classification  of  a  few  insects  or  the 
resolution  of  a  few  equations,  as  to  sharpening  the 
points  or  putting  on  the  heads  of  pins.  The  "disper- 
sive speciality  "  of  the  present  race  of  scientific  men, 
who,  unlike  their  picdcccsxors,  have  u  positive  iivcr.'-iion 
to  enlarged  views,  and  seldom  cither  know  or  care  for 
any  of  the  Interests  of  mankind  beyond  the  narrow 
limits  of  their  pursuit.  Is  dwelt  on  by  M.  Comte  as  one 
of  the  great  and  growing  evils  of  tlic  time,  and  the 
one  whicli  most  retards  moral  and  intellectual  rciren- 
cration.  To  contend  against  it  is  one  of  the  main 
purposes  towards  which  he  thinks  the  forces  of  society 
should  be  directed.  The  obvious  remedy  Is  a  large 
and  liberal  general  education,  preparatory  to  all  special 
pursuits;  and  this  is  ]\I. .  Comte's  opinion.  But  the 
education  of  youth  is  not  in  his  estimation  enougli  :  he 
lerpilres  an  agency  set  apart  for  obtruding  upon  all 
classes  of  persons  through  the  whole  of  life,  the  para- 
mount claims  of  the  general  interest,  and  the  compre- 


OF   AUGUSTE   COMTE.  89 

licnsivc  ideas  that  demonstrate  the  mode  in  which 
human  actions  promote  or  impair  it.  In  other  words, 
he  demands  a  moral  and  intellectual  authority,  charged 
with  the  duty  of  guiding  men's  opinions  and  enlighten- 
ing and  warning  their  consciences ;  a  8[)iritual  Power, 
whose  judgments  on  all  matters  of  high  moment  should 
deserve,  and  receive,  the  same  universal  respect  and 
deference  which  is  paid  to  the  united  judgments  of 
astronomers  in  matters  astronomical.  The  very  idea 
of  such  an  authority  implies  that  a  unanimity  has  been 
attained,  at  least  in  essentials,  among  moral  and  politi- 
cal thinkers,  corresponding  or  approaching  to  that 
which  already  exists  in  the  other  sciences.  There 
cannot  be  this  unanimity,  until  the  true  methods  of 
positive  science  have  been  applied  to  all  subjects,  as 
completely  as  they  have  been  applied  to  the  study  of 
j)hysical  science.  To  this,  however,  there  is  no  real 
<tbs(M('le  ;  and,  when  ducc  It  is  iiccouijiliMhcd,  the  suuks 
tlegree  of  accordance  will  naturally  follow.  The  undis- 
puted authority  which  astronomers  possess  in  astronomy, 
will  be  i)ossessed  on  the  great  social  questions  by 
Positive  Philosophers  ;  to  whom  will  belong  the  spirit- 
ual government  of  society,  subject  to  two  conditions,  — 
that  they  be  entirely  independent,  within  their  own 
tspherc,  of  the  temporal  government ;  and  that  they  be 
pcrcm{)torily  excluded  from  all  share  in  it,  receiving 
instead  the  entire  conduct  of  education. 

This  is  the  leading  feature  in  ]M.  Comte's  conception 
<tf  a  regenerated  society;  and,  however  much  this  ideal 
dUT'crs  from  that  which  is  implied  more  or  less  con- 
fusedly in  the  negative  philosophy  of  the  last  three 
centuries,  we  hold  the  amount  of  truth  in  the  two  to 


90  THE   POSITIVE   nilLOSOrUY 

be  about  the  eamc.     ]M.  Comtc  has  got  hold  of  half 
the  truth,   and  the  so-called   liberal   or   revolutionary 
school  possesses  the  other  half.     Kach  sees  what    the 
other  docs  not  see,  and,  seeing  it  exclusively,  draws 
consequences  from  it  which   to  the  other  appear  niis- 
chicvously  absurd.     It  is,  without  doubt,  the  necessary 
condition  of  nianhind  to  receive  most  of  their  o[)inion8 
on  the  authority  of  those   who   liavc  specially  studied 
the  matters  to  whicli  they  rchite.      Tiie  wisest  cjiii  act 
on  no  other  rule,  on  subjects  with  wliich  the\'  are  not 
themselves   thoroughly   conversant ;    and   the    mass   of 
mankind  have  always  done  the  like  on  all  the  great 
subjects  of  thougiit  and  conduct,  acting  with   implicit 
confidence  on  opinions  of  which  they  did  not   know, 
and  were  often  incapable  of  imderstanding,  the  grounds  ; 
but  on  which,    as   long   as    tlicir   natural   guides  were 
unanimous,    they   fully   relied,   growing   uncertain   and  • 
sceptical  only  when  these  became  divided,  and  teachers 
who,  as  far  as  they  could  judge,  were   equally  com- 
petent,  professed   contradictory  opinions.       Any   doc- 
trines which  come  recommended  by  the  nearly  universal 
verdict  of  instructed  minds  will  no  doubt  contimie  to 
be,  as  they  have   hitherto  been,  accepted  without  mis- 
giving by  the  rest.      1'he  diticrcnce  is,   that,  with   the 
wide  diii'usion  of  scientific  education  among  the  whole 
people,  demanded   by  M.  Comtc,   their  faith,  however 
imj)licit,  would  not  be  that  of  ignorance  :  it  would  not 
be  the  blind  submission  of  dunces  to  men  of  knowledge, 
but  the  intelligent  deference  of  those  who  know  nuich 
to  those  who  know  still  more.     It  is  those  who   have 
some  knowledge  of  astronomy,  not  those  wdio  have  none 
at   all,    who    best    appreciate    how    pnHligi(»usly    more 


OF   AUGUSTE    COMTE.  91 

La"Tangc  or  Laj)l.ace  knew  than  themselves.  Tliis  is 
what  can  be  said  in  favoi'  of  M.  Comte.  On  tlic 
contrary  side,  it  is  to  be  said,  that,  in  order  that  this 
sahitary  ascendency  over  opinion  should  be  exercised 
by  the  most  eminent  thinkers,  it  is  not  necessary  tiiat 
thev  should  be  associated  and  organized.  Tlic  as- 
ccndt'Muy  will  eonio  of  itself  when  the  unanimity  is 
attained,  without  which  it  is  neither  desirable  nor 
possible.  It  is  because  astronomers  agree  in  their 
teaching  that  astronomy  is  trusted,  and  not  because 
there  is  an  Academy  of  Sciences  or  a  Koyal  Society 
issuing  decrees  or  passing  resolutions.  A  constituted 
moral  authority  can  only  be  required  when  the  object 
is  nut  merely  to  promulgate  and  diifuse  principles  of 
conduct,  but  to  direct  the  detail  of  their  applicaticm ; 
to  declare  and  inculcate,  not  duties,  but  each  person's 
duty,  as  was  attempted  by  the  spiritual  authority  of 
the  middle  ages.  From  this  extreme  application  of  his 
principle  M.  Comte  does  not  shrink.  A  function  of 
this  sort,  no  doubt,  may  often  be  very  usefully  dis- 
charged by  individual  members  of  the  speculative  class  ; 
but  if  entrusted  to  any  organized  body  would  involve 
nothing  less  than  a  spiritual  despotism.  This,  how- 
ever, is  what  ]M.  Comte  really  contemplated,  though 
it  would  practically  nullify  that  peremptory  separation 
of  the  spiritual  from  the  temporal  power  which  he  justly 
deemed  essential  to  a  wholesome  state  of  society. 
Those  whom  an  irresistible  public  opinion  invested 
with  the  right  to  dictate  or  control  the  acts  of  rulers, 
though  without  the  means  of  backing  their  advice  by 
force,  would  have  all  the  real  power  of  the  temporal 
authorities,  without  their  labors  or  their  responsibilities. 


92  TIIE    POSITIVE    rillLOSOPIIY 

^I.  Comte  would  probably  have  answered,  that  the 
temporal  rulers,  having  the  whole  legal  power  in  their 
liands,  would  certainly  not  pay  to  tiic  spiritual  authority 
more  than  a  very  limited  obedience  ;  which  amounts  to 
flaying  that  the  ideal  form  of  society  which  he  sets  up 
is  only  fit  to  be  an  ideal  because  it  cannot  possibly  be 
realized. 

That  education  should  be  practically  directed  by  the 
philosophic  class,  when  there  is  a  philosophic  class  who 
have  made  good  their  claim  to  the  place  in  opinion 
hitherto  filled  by  the  clergy,  would  be  natural  and  in- 
dispensable. But  that  all  education  should  be  in  the 
liands  of  a  centralized  authority,  whether  composed  of 
clergy  or  of  philosophers,  and  be  consequently  all 
framed  on  the  same  model,  and  directed  to  the  per- 
petuation of  the  same  type,  is  a  state  of  things  which, 
'instead  of  becoming  more  acceptable,  will  assuredly  be 
more  repugnant  to  mankind,  with  every  step  of  their 
progress  in  the  unfettered  exercise  of  their  highest  facul- 
ties. We  shall  see,  on  a  future  occasion,  the  evils 
with  which  the  conception  of  the  new  Spiritual  Power 
is  pregnant,  coming  out  into  full  bloom  in  the  more 
com[)lete  devclopuicnt  which  M.  Comte  gave  to  the  idea 
in  his  later  years. 

After  this  unsatisfactory  attempt  to  trace  the  outliue 
of  Social  Statics,  M.  Comte  passes  to  a  topic  on  which 
he  is  much  more  at  home,  —  the  subject  of  his  most 
eminent  speculations,  —  Social  Dynamics,  or  the  laws 
of  the  evolution  of  human  society. 

Two  questions  meet  us  at  the  outset.  Is  there  a 
natural  evolution  in  human  affairs?  and  is  that  evolu- 
tion an  improvement?     M.  Comte  resolves  them  both 


OF  AUGUSTS   COMTE.  93 

in  tlie  affirmative  by  the  same  answer.  The  natural 
pro<jress  of  society  consists  in  the  growth  of  our  human 
attributes,  comparatively  to  our  animal  and  our  purely 
organic  ones  ;  the  ]:)rogres8  of  our  humanity  towards 
an  ascendency  over  our  animality,  ever  more  nearly 
api)roachcd  though  incapable  of  being  completely  real- 
ized. This  is  the  character  and  tendency  of  human 
development,  or  of  what  is  called  civilization ;  and  the 
obligation  of  seconding  this  movement  —  of  working  in 
the  direction  of  it  —  is  the  nearest  approach  which  M. 
Comte  makes  in  this  treatise  to  a  general  principle  or 
standard  of  morality. 

But,  as  our  more  eminent,  and  peculiarly  human, 
faculties  are  of  va^^ous  orders,  moral,  intellectual,  and 
ajsthetic,  the  question  presents  itself,  is  there  any  one 
of  these  whose  development  is  the  predominant  agency 
in  the  evolution  of  our  species?  According  to  M. 
Comtc,  the  main  agent  in  the  progress  of  mankind  is 
their  intellectual  development.  Not  because  the  intel- 
lectual is  the  most  powerful  part  of  our  nature,  for, 
limited  to  its  inherent  strength,  it  is  one  of  the  weakest ; 
but  because  it  is  the  guiding  part,  and  acts,  not  with 
its  own  strength  alone,  but  with  the  united  force  of 
all  parts  of  our  nature  which  it  can  draw  after  it.  In 
a  social  state,  the  feelings  and  propensities  cannot  act 
with  their  full  power,  in  a  determinate  direction,  unless 
the  speculative  intellect  places  itself  at  their  head. 
The  passions  arc,  in  the  individual  man,  a  more  ener- 
getic power  than  a  mere  intellectual  conviction ;  but 
the  passions  tend  to  divide,  not  to  unite,  mankind  :  it 
is  only  by  a  common  belief  that  passions  are  brought 
to  work  together,  and  become  a  collective  force  instead 


94  THE   POSITIVE    nriLOSOPHY 

of  forces  ncutralizini;  one  another.  Our  lntcllin:cnce 
is  first  awakened  by  the  stimulus  of  our  animal  wants 
and  of  our  stronger  and  coarser  desires  ;  and  these  for 
a  lon^  time  almost  exclusivelv  determine  the  direction 
in  which  our  intelligence  shall  work :  but  once  roused 
to  activity,  it  assumes  more  and  more  the  management 
of  the  operations  of  which  stronger  impulses  are  the 
prompters,  and  constrains  them  to  follow  its  lead,  not 
by  its  own  strength,  but  because  in  the  play  of  antago- 
nistic forces  the  path  it  points  out  is  (in  scientific 
phraseology)  the  direction  of  least  resistance.  Per- 
sonal interests  and  feelings,  in  the  social  state,  can 
only  obtain  the  maximum  of  satisfaction  by  means  of 
co-operation,  and  the  necessary  condition  of  co-opera- 
tion is  a  common  belief.  All  human  society,  conse- 
quently, is  grounded  on  a  system  of  fundamental  opin- 
ions, which  only  the  speculative  faculty  can  provide, 
and  which,  when  provided,  directs  our  other  impulses 
in  their  mode  of  seeking  their  gratification.  And 
hence  the  history  of  opinions,  and  of  the  speculative 
faculty,  has  always  been  the  leading  element  in  the 
history  of  mankind. 

This  doctrine  has  been  combated  by  Mr.  Herbert 
Spencer  in  the  pamphlet  already  referred  to ;  and  we 
will  quote,  in  his  own  words,  the  theory  he  propounds 
in  opposition  to  it :  — 

"  Ideas  do  not  govern  and  overtlirow  the  world :  the  world 
is  governed  or  overtln'own  by  foelings,  to  which  ideas  serve 
only  as  guides.  Tlic  social  meclianisin  does  not  rest  finally 
upon  opinions,  but  almost  wholly  upon  character.  Not  intel- 
lectual anarchy,  but  moral  antagonism,  is  the  cause  of  political 
crises.     All  eocial  phenomena  aro  produced  by  the  totality 


OP  AUGUSTE   COMTE.  95 

of  human  emotions  and  beliefs,  of  M'liich  the  emotions  arc 
mainly  predetermined,  wliile  the  beliefs  are  mainly  post- 
determined.  Men's  desires  are  chiefly  inherited ;  but  their 
beliefs  are  chiefly  acquired,  and  depend  on  surroundin;?  con- 
ditions; and  the  most  important  surrounding  conditions  de- 
pend on  the  social  state  which  the  prevalent  desires  have 
produced.  The  social  state  at  any  time  existing  is  the  i-c- 
sultant  of  all  the  ambitions,  self-interests,  fears,  reverences, 
indignations,  sympathies,  &c.,  of  ancestral  citizens  and  exist- 
ing citizens.  The  ideas  current  in  this  social  state  must,  on 
the  average,  be  congruous  with  the  feelings  of  citizens,  and 
therefore,  on  the  average,  with  the  social  state  these  feelings 
liavc  produced.  Ideas  wholly  foreign  to  this  social  state 
cannot  be  evolved,  and  if  introduced  from  without  cannot  get 
accepted,  —  or,  if  accepted,  die  out  when  the  temporary  phase 
of  feeling  whicli  caused  their  acceptance  ends.  Hence, 
though  advanced  ideas,  when  once  established,  act  upon 
society  and  aid  its  further  advance,  yet  the  establishment  of 
such  ideas  depends  on  the  fitness  of  society  for  receiving 
them.  Practically,  the  popular  character  and  the  social  state 
determine  what  ideas  siiall  be  current;  instead  of  the  current 
ideas  determining  the  social  state  and  the  character.  The 
modification  of  men's  inoral  natures,  caused  by  the  continuous 
discipline  of  social  life,  which  adapts  them  more  and  more  to 
social  relations,  is  therefore  the  chief  proximate  cause  of 
social  progress."  * 

A  great  part  of  these  statements  would  have  been 
iicknowlctlgcd  as  true  by  M.  Comtc,  and  belong  as 
much  to  his  theory  as  to  ]\Ir.  Spencer's.  The  re-action 
of  all  other  mental  and  social  elements  upon  the  intel- 
lectual, not  only  is  fully  recognized  by  him,  but  his 
philosophy  of  history  makes  great  use  of  it,  pointing 
out  that  the  principal  intellectual  changes  could  not 
*  "  Of  the  ClassificatioQ  of  the  Sciences,"  pp.  37.  36. 


96  THE    POSITIVE   PHILOSOrilY 

have  taken  place  unless  cliangos  in  other  elements  of 
society  had  preceded ;  but  also  showing  that  these 
were  themselves  consequences  of  prior  intellectual 
changes.  It  will  not  be  found,  on  a  fair  examination 
of  what  M.  Comtc  has  written,  that  he  has  overlooked 
any  of  the  truth  that  there  is  in  Mr.  Spencer's  theory- 
He  would  not  indeed  have  said  (what  Mr.  Spencer 
apparently  wishes  us  t(»  say)  that  the  effects  which  can 
be  historically  traced,  for  cxam[)le  to  religion,  were  not 
produced  by  the  belief  in  God,  but  by  reverence  and 
fear  of  him.  He  would  have  said  that  the  reverence 
and  fear  presuppose  the  belief;  that  a  God  nuist  be 
believed  in  before  he  can  be  feared  or  reverenced.  The 
whole  influence  of  the  belief  in  a  God  upon  society  and 
Q  civilization,  depends  on  the  powerful  human  sentiments 
which  are  ready  to  attach  themselves  to  the  belief;  and 
yet  the  sentiments  are  only  a  social  force  at  all,  through 
the  definite  direction  given  to  them  by  that  or  some 
other  intellectual  conviction  ;  nor  did  the  sentiments 
spontaneously  tlu'ow  u[)  the  belief  in  a  God,  since  in 
themselves  they  were  equally  capable  of  gathering 
round  some  other  object.  Though  it  is  true  that  men's 
passions  and  interests  often  dictate  their  opinions,  or 
rather  decide  their  choice  amon^:  the  two  or  three  forms 
of  opinion  which  the  existing  condition  of  human  intel- 
ligence renders  possible,  this  disturbing  cause  is  con- 
fined to  morals,  politics,  and  religion ;  and  it  is  the 
intellectual  movement  in  other  regions  than  these, 
which  is  at  the  root  of  all  the  great  chany:es  in  human 
affairs.  It  was  not  human  emotions  and  passions 
which  discovered  the  motion  of  the  earth,  or  detected 
the  evidence  of  its  antiquity ;  which  exploded  ScholastI- 


OF   AUOUSTE   COMTE.  97 

cism,  and  inauguiMtcd  the  exploration  of  nature  ;  which 
invented  printing,  paper,  and  tlie  mariner's  compass. 
Yet  the  Reformation,  the  English  and  French  Revolu- 
tions, and  still  greater  moral  and  social  changes  yet 
to  come,  ai'c  direct  consequences  of  these  and  similar 
discoveries.  Even  alchemy  and  astrology  were  not 
believed  because  people  thirsted  for  gold  and  were 
anxious  to  pry  into  the  future,  for  these  desires  are  as 
strong  now  as  they  were  then  ;  but  because  alchemy 
and  astrology  were  conceptions  natural  to  a  particular 
stajje  in  the  jjrowth  of  human  knowledLTC,  and  conse- 
qucntly  determined  during  that  stage  the  particular 
means  wliercby  the  passions  which  always  exist,  sought 
their  gratification.  To  say  that  men's  intellectual  be- 
liefs do  not  determine  their  conduct,  is  like  saying  that 
the  ship  is  moved  by  the  steam  and  not  by  the  steers- 
man. The  steam  indeed  is  the  motive  power ;  tlu» 
steersman,  left  to  himself,  could  not  advance  the  vessel 
a  single  inch  ;  yet  it  is  the  .steersman's  will  and  the 
steersman's  knowledge  which  decide  in  what  direction 
it  shall  move  and  whither  it  shall  go. 

Examining  next  what  is  the  natural  order  of  intel- 
lectual progress  among  mankind,  jM.  Comtc  observes, 
that  as  their  "general  mode  of  conceivin^j  the  universe 
must  give  its  character  to  all  their  conceptions  of  detail, 
the  determining  fact  in  tiicir  intellectual  history  must 
be  the  natural  succession  of  theories  of  the  universe ; 
which,  it  has  been  seen,  consists  of  three  stages,  —  the 
theological,  the  metaphysical,  and  tlie  positive.  The 
passage  of  mankind  through  these  stages,  including  the 
successive  modifications  of  the  theological  conception 
)«v  the  rising  influence  of  the  otller  two,   is,   to   M. 

7 


98  THE  POSITIVE  riiiLosoniY 

Comtc's  mind,  the  most  decisive  fact  in  tlie  evolution 
of  Immanity.  Simultaneously,  however,  tliere  has  been 
goinfj  on  throughout  history  a  parallel  movement  in 
the  purely  temporal  dc[)artmcnt  of  things,  consisting 
of  the  gradual  decline  of  the  military  mode  of  life 
(originally  the  chief  occupation  of  all  freemen),  and  its 
replacement  by  the  industrial.  M.  Comtc  maintains 
that  there  is  a  necessary  connexion  and  intcrdc[)cndcncc 
between  this  historical  sequence  and  the  other  :  aixl  he 
easily  shows  that  the  progress  of  industry  and  that  of 
positive  science  are  correlative ;  man's  power  to  modify 
the  facts  of  nature  evidently  depending  on  the  knowl- 
edge he  has  acquired  of  their  laws.  We  do  not  think 
him  equally  successful  in  showing  a  natural  connexion 
between  the  theological  mode  of  thought  and  the  mili- 
tary system  of  society ;  but  since  they  both  belong  to 
the  same  age  of  the  world,  —  since  each  is,  in  itself, 
natural  and  inevitable,  and  they  are  together  modified 
and  together  undermined  by  the  same  cause,  the  prog- 
ress of  science  and  industry,  ]\I.  Comte  is  justified  in 
considering  them  as  linked  together,  and  the  movement 
by  which  mankind  emerge  from  them  as  a  single  evolu- 
tion. 

These  propositions  having  been  laid  down  as  the  first 
principles  of  social  dynamics,  M.  Comte  proceeds  to 
verify  and  apply  them  by  a  connected  view  of  universal 
history.  Tiiis  survey  nearly  fills  two  large  volumes, 
above  a  third  of  the  work,  in  all  of  which  there  is 
scarcely  a  sentence  that  does  not  add  an  idea.  We 
regard  it  as  by  far  his  greatest  achievement,  except  his 
review  of  the  sciences,  and  in  some  respects  more 
striking  even  than  that.     We  wish  it  were  practicable 


OP  AUGUSTE   COMTE.  99 

ill  the  compass  of  an  essay  like  the  present,  to  give  even 
a  faint  conception  of  tlie  extraordinary  merits  of  this 
historical  analysis.  It  must  be  read  to  be  appreciated. 
Whoever  disbelieves  that  the  philosophy  of  history  can 
be  made  a  science,  should  suspend  his  judgment  until  he 
has  read  these  volumes  of  ^NI.  Comte.  We  do  not  affirm 
that  they  would  certainly  change  his  opinion ;  but  we 
would  strongly  advise  him  to  give  them  a  chance. 

We  shall  not  attempt  the  vain  task  of  abridgment. 
A  few  words  are  all  wc  can"  gi\c  to  the  subject.     M. 
Comte  confines  himself  to   the  main  stream  of  human 
progress,   looking  only  at  the  races  and  nations  that 
led   the   van,    and    regarding    as    the    successors    of  a 
jieoplc,  not  their  actual  descendants,  but  those  who  took 
up  the  thread  of  progress  after  them.     His  object  is  to 
characterize    truly,   though    generally,    the    successive 
states  of  society  through  which  the  advanced  guard  of 
our  6[)ccics  has  passed,  and  the  filiation  of  these  states 
on  one  another,  —  how  eacii  grew  out  of  the  preceding, 
and  was  the  parent  of  the  following  state.     A   more 
detailed  explanation,  taking  into   account   minute  dif- 
ferences and   more   special   and  local   phenomena,    M. 
Comte  does  not  aim  at,   though  he  does  not  avoid  it 
when  it  falls  in  his  patlu     Here,  as  in  all  his   other 
speculations,   we   meet    occasional    misjudgnients,   and 
his  historical  correctness  in  minor  matters  is  now  and 
then  at  fault ;   but  we  may  well  wonder  that  it  is  not 
oftencr  so,  considering  the  vastness  of  the  field,  and  a 
passage  in   one   of  his  prefaces   in  which  he  saya  of 
himself  that  he  rapidly  amassed  the  materials  for  his 
great   enterprise    (vi.    34).       This   expression   in   his 
mouth  does  not  imply  what  it  would  in  that  of  the 


100  THE    POSITIVE    PHILOSOPHY 

majority  of  men,  regard  being  liad  to  liis  rare  capacity 
of  prolonged  and  concentrated  mental  labor ;  and  it 
is  wonderful  that  he  so  seldom  gives  cause  to  wish  that 
his  cullection  of  materinis  had  been  less  "rapid/'  But 
(as  he  himself  remarks)  in  an  enquiry  of  this  sort  the 
vulgarcst  facts  are  the  most  important.  A  movement 
common  to  all  mankind  —  to  all  of  them  at  least  who 
do  )nove  —  must  depend  on  causes  aflecting  them  all; 
and  these,  from  the  scale  on  which  they  operate,  cannot 
require  abstruse  research  to  bring  theui  to  light :  they 
are  not  only  seen,  but  best  seen,  in  the  most  obvious, 
most  universal,  and  most  undisputed  phenomena. 
Acconlingly  ^I.  Comte  lays  no  claim  to  new  views 
respecting  the  mere  facts  of  history ;  he  takes  them  as 
he  finds  them,  builds  almost  exclusively  on  those  con- 
cerning which  there  is  no  dispute,  and  only  tries  what 
positive  results  can  be  obtained  by  combining  tlicni. 
Among  the  vast  mass  of  hi-^torical  observations  wliich 
he  has  grouped  and  co-ordinated,  if  we  have  found  any 
errors,  they  are  in  things  which  do  not  affect  his  main 
conclusions.  The  chain  of  causation  by  whicli  he  con- 
nects the  spiritual  and  temporal  life  of  each  era  with 
one  another  and  with  the  entire  series,  will  be  found, 
we  think,  in  all  essentials,  irrefragable.  When  local  or 
temporary  disturbing  causes  have  to  be  taken  into  the 
account  as  modifying  the  general  movement,  criticism 
]»as  more  to  say.  But  this  will  only  become  important 
when  the  .ittempt  is  made  to  write  the  history  or  de- 
lineate the  character  of  some  given  society  on  M. 
Comte's  principles.* 

•  Such  doubtful  statements,  or  mioapprcciations  of  states  of  society,  as 
we  have  remarked,  are  confined  to  cases  which  stand  more  or  less  apart  from 


OI-    AUGUSTE    COMTE.  101 

M.  Comtc  is  singularly  exempt  from  most  of  the 
twsts  and  extiggcratious  which  we  are  used  to  find  in 
almost  all  thinkers  who  meddle  with  speculations  on 
history.  Scarcely  any  of  them  is  so  free  (for  example) 
from  the  opposite  errors  of  ascribing  too  much  or  ti)0 
little  intlucncc  to  accident,  and  to  the  qualities  of  indi- 
viduals. Tiie  vulgar  mistake  of  supposing  that  the 
course  of  history  has  no  tendencies  of  its  own,  and  that 
great  events  usually  proceed  from  small  causes,  or 
that  kings,  or  conquerors,  or  the  founders  of  philos- 
ophies  and   religions,   can   do   with   society  what    they 

the  iirincipal  line  of  dcvolopmeat  of  the  progressive  societies.  For  instance,, 
he  makes  greatly  too  much  of  wliat,  with  many  other  Continental  thinkers, 
he  calls  the  Theocratic  state.  He  rc;^artU  tiiis  as  a  natural,  and  at  one  time 
almost  an  universal,  sta^c  of  social  pro;;ross,  though  admitting  that  it  either 
never  existed  or  speedily  ceased  in  the  two  ancient  nations  to  which  man- 
kind arc  chiefly  indebted  for  being  permanently  progressive.  We  hold  it 
doubtful  if  there  ever  existed  what  .M.  Comtc  means  by  a  theocracy.  There 
was  indeed  no  lack  of  societies  in  which,  the  civil  and  penal  law  being  sup- 
posed to  have  been  divinely  revealed,  the  priests  were  its  authorized  inter- 
preters. "^Dut  this  is  the  case  even  in  Jfussiilman  countries,  the  extreme 
opposite  of  theocracy.  ]Jy  a  theocracy  we  understand  to  be  meant,  and  we 
understand  M.  Comte  to  mean,  a  society  founded  on  caste,  and  in  which  tiie 
speculative,  necessarily  identical  with  the  priestly  caste,  has  the  temporal 
government  in  its  hands  or  under  its  control.  We  believe  that  no  such  state 
of  things  ever  existed  in  the  societies  conunonly  cited  as  theocratic.  There 
is  no  reason  to  think  that  in  any  of  them,  the  king,  or  chief  of  the  goveni- 
ment,  was  ever,  unless  by  occasional  usurpation,  a  member  of  the  priestly 
caste.  It  was  not  so  in  Israel,  even  in  the  time  of  the  Judges;  Jephtha,  for 
example,  was  a  Gileadite,  of  the  tribe  of  Manasseh,  and  a  military  captain, 
as  all  governors  in  such  an  age  and  country  needed  to  be.  I'riestly  rulers 
only  present  themselves  in  two  anomalous  cases,  of  which  next  to  nothing  is 
known,  —  the  ilikadosof  Japan  and  the  Grand  Lamas  of  Thibet;  in  neither 
of  which  instances  \vm  the  general  constitution  of  society  one  of  caste,  and 
in  the  latter  of  them  the  priestly  sovereignty  is  as  nominal  as  it  has  become 
in  the  former.  India  is  the  typical  specimen  of  the  institution  o.f  caste,  —  the 
only  case  in  whicli  we  nrc  certain  that  it  ever  really  existed,  for  its  existence 
an\-where  else  is  a  matter  of  doubtl'ul  inference  In  the  remote  past.  But  in 
India,  where  the  importance  of  the  sacerdotal  order  was  greater  than  in  any 
Other  recorded  state  of  society,  the  king  not  only  was  not  a  priest,  but,  con- 


^ 


102  TKE    POSITIVE    nilLOSOnrY" 

please,  no  one  has  more  completely  avoided  or  more 
tellin"-lv  exposed.  But  he  is  equally  free  from  the 
error  of  those  wlio  ascribe  all  to  general  causes,  and 
imagine  that  neither  casual  circumstances,  nor  govern- 
ments by  their  acts,  nor  individuals  of  genius  by  their 
thoughts,  materially  accelerate  or  retard  human  prog- 
ress. This  is  the  mistake  which  pervades  the  instruc- 
tive Avritings  of  the  thinker  who  in  England  and  in  our 
own  times  bore  the  nearest,  though  a  very  remote, 
resemblance  to  M.  Comte,  —  the  lamented  Mr.  Buckle, 
who,   had   he  not   been   unhappily  cut   off  in  au  early 

sistently  with  the  religious  law,  could  not  be  one:  he  belonged  to  a  ditTerciit 
caste.  The  Brahmins  were  invested  with  an  exalted  character  of  sanctity, 
and  an  enormous  amount  of  civil  privileges;  the  king  was  enjoined  to  have 
a  council  of  liiahniin  advisers;  but  practically  he  took  their  advice  or  disre- 
garded it  exactly  as  he  pleased.  As  is  observed  by  the  historian  who  tirst 
threw  the  light  of  rca-^on  on  Hindoo  society  (Mill,  History  of  Hritish  India, 
book  ii.  chap.  iii.),the  king  —  though  in  dignity,  to  Judge  by  the  written  code, 
he  seemed  vastly  inferior  to  the  liralnnins  —  had  always  the  fidl  power  of  a 
despotic  monarch ;  tlie  reason  being  that  he  had  the  command  of  the  army, 
and  the  control  of  the  public  revenue.  There  is  no  case  known  to  authentic 
history  in  which  either  of  these  belonged  to  tlie  sacerdotal  caste.  Kvcn  in 
the  cases  most  favorable  to  thcni,  the  priesthood  had  no  voice  in  ti'mporal 
affairs,  except  the  "  consultative"  voice  which  !M.  Comfe's  theont- allows  to 
every  spiritual  power.  His  collection  of  materials  must  have  been  unusually 
"rapid"  in  this  instance,  for  he  regards  almost  all  the  societies  of  antiquity, 
except  the  Greek  and  IJoman,  as  theocratic,  even  Gaul  under  the  liruiJs, 
and  Persia  under  Darius;  admitting,  however,  tliat  in  these  two  countrira, 
when  they  emcr;,'e  into  the  light  of  history,  the  theocracy  had  nlr(?ady  been 
much  broken  down  by  military  usurpation.  IJy  what  evidence  he  could 
have  proved  that  it  ever  existed,  we  confess  ourselves  unable  to  divine. 

The  only  other  imperfection  worth  noticin;;  here,  which  we  find  in  M. 
Comte'8  view  of  history,  is  that  he  has  a  very  insullicient  understanding  of 
the  peculiar  phenomena  of  I'nglish  development;  llmugh  he  recognise.",  auil 
on  the  whole  correctly  estimates,  its  exceptional  character  in  relation  to  the 
general  European  movement.  His  failure  consists  chieily  in  want  of  appre- 
ciation of  Protestantism:  which,  like  almost  all  thinkers,  even  unbelievers, 
■who  have  lived  and  thought  exclu'ivi'ly  in  a  Calhojic  atnvisphere,  he  sees 
and  knows  only  on  its  negative  side,  regarding  the  Ueformation  as  a  mere 
destructive  movement,  stopped  short  in  too  early  a  stage.    Uc  docs  not  sceiu 


OF  AUGUSTE   COilTE.  103 

stage  of  his  labors,  and  before  the  complete  maturity 
of  his  powers,  would  probably  have  thrown  off  an  error, 
the  more  to  be  regretted  as  it  gives  a  color  to  the  prej- 
udice whiclj  regards  the  doctrine  of  the  invariabiHty  of 
natural  laws  as  identical  with  fatalism.  ^Ir.  Buckle 
also  fell  into  another  mistake  which  M.  Comtc  avoided, 
that  of  regarding  the  intellectual  as  the  only  progressive 
element  in  man,  and  the  moral  as  too  mucli  the  same  at 
all  times  to  affect  even  the  annual  average  of  crime. 
M.  Comte  shows,  on  the  contrary,  a  most  acute  sense 

to  be  aware  that  Protestantism  has  any  positive  influences,  other  than  the 
general  ones  of  Christianity;  and  misses  one  of  the  most  important  facts 
connected  with  it,  —  its  rcmariiablc  etlicacj",  as  contrasted  with  Catliolicism, 
in  cultivating  the  intelligence  and  conscience  of  the  individual  believer. 
Protestantism,  when  not  merely  professed  but  actually  taken  into  the  mind, 
makes  a  demand  on  the  intelligence;  the  mind  is  expected  to  be  active, 
not  passive,  in  the  reception  of  it.  The  feeling  of  a  direct  responsibility  of 
tlic  individual  immediately  to  God,  is  almost  wholly  a  creation  of  Protes- 
tantism. Even  when  Protestants  were  nearly  as  persecuting  as  Catholics 
(quite  as  much  so  they  never  were);  even  when  they  held  as  (irmly  as 
Catholics  that  salvation  depended  on  having  the  true  belief,  tliey  still  nniin- 
taincd  that  the  belief  was  not  to  be  accepted  from  a  priest,  but  to  be  sought 
and  found  by  the  believer,  at  his  eternal  peril  if  he  failed;  and  that  no  one 
could  answer  to  God  for  him,  but  that  he  had  to  answer  for  himself.  The 
avoidance  of  fatal  error  thus  became  in  a  great  measure  a  question  of  cul- 
ture; and  there  was  the  strongest  inducement  to  every  believer,  however 
humble,  to  seek  culture,  and  to  profit  by  it.  In  those  Protestant  countries, 
accordingly,  wiiose  Churches  were  not,  as  the  Church  of  England  always 
was,  principalh' political  institutions,  —  in  Scotland,  for  instance,  and  the 
New  England  States,  —  an  aniount  of  education  was  canied  down  to  the 
poorest  of  the  people,  of  which  there  is  no  other  example;  every  peasant 
expounded  the  IJible  to  his  family  (many  to  their  neighbours),  and  had  a 
mind  practised  in  meditation  and  discussion  on  all  the  points  of  his  religious 
freed.  The  food  may  not  have  been  the  most  nourishing,  but  we  cannot  bo 
Wind  to  the  sharpening  and  strengthening  exercise  which  such  great  topics 
gave  to  tlic  understanding,  —  the  discipline  in  abstraction  and  reasoning 
which  such  mental  occupation  brought  down  to  (ho  humblest  layman,  antl 
one  of  the  consequences  of  which  was  the  privilege  long  enjoyed  by  Scotland 
of  supplying  the  greater  part  of  Europe  with  professors  for  its  universities, 
And  educated  and  skilled  workoien  for  its  practical  arts. 


104  THE  POSITIVE  riiiLosoriiY 

of  the  causes  wliich  elevate  or  lower  the  general  level  of 
moral  excellence  ;  and  deems  intellectual  progress  in  no 
other  way  so  beneficial  as  by  creating  a  standard  to 
guide  the  moral  sentiments  of  mankind,  and  a  mode  of 
bringing  those  sentiments  cfFectivcly  to  bear  on  con- 
duct. 

M.  Comte  is  equally  free  from  the  error  of  considering 
any  practical  rule  or  doctrine  that  can  be  laid  down  in 
politics  as  universal  and  absolute.  All  political  truth 
lie  deems  strictly  relative,  implying  as  its  correlative  a 
given  state  or  situation  of  society.  This  conviction  is 
now  common  to  him  with  all  thinkers  Avho  arc  on  a  level 
with  the  age,  and  comes  so  naturally  to  any  intelligent 
reader  of  history,  that  the  only  wonder  is  how  men 
could  \m\c  been  prevented  from  reaching  it  sf)()ner.  It 
marks  one  of  the  principal  difTcrcnccs  between  the 
political  philosophy  of  the  present  time  and  that  of 
the  past ;  but  ]M.  Comte  adopted  it  when  the  op[)osite 
mode  of  thinking  was  still  general,  and  there  arc  few 
thinkers  to  whom  the  principle  owes  more  in  the  way 
of  comment  and  illustration. 

Again,  while  he  sots  forth  the  historical  succession  of 
systems  of  belief  and  forms  of  political  society,  and 
places  in  the  strongest  light  those  imperfections  in  each 
which  made  it  impossible  that  any  of  them  should  be 
final,  this  docs  not  make  him  for  a  moment  unjust  to 
the  men  or  the  opinions  of  the  past.  lie  accords  with 
generous  recognition  the  gratitude  due  to  all  who, 
with  whatever  imperfections  of  doctrine  or  even  of  con- 
duct, contributed  materially  to  the  work  of  human 
improvement.  In  all  past  modes  of  thought  and  forms 
of  society  he  acknowledged  a  useful,  in  many  a  neces- 


OF   AUGUSTE    COMTE.  105 

sary,  office,  in  cai'rying  malikinJ  through  one  stage  of 
improvement  into  a  higher.  The  theological  spirit  in 
its  successive  forms,  the  metaphysical  in  its  [jrincipal 
varieties,  ai'e  honored  by  hiiu  for  tlie  services  they 
rendered  in  bringing  mankind  out  of  pristine  savagery, 
into  a  state  in  whicli  more  advanced  modes  of  l)elief 
became  possible.  His  list  of  heroes  and  benefactors  of 
mankind  includes,  not  only  every  important  name  in  the 
scientific  movement  from  Thales  to  Fourier  the  mathe- 
matician and  ]]lainville  the  biologist,  and  in  the  rosthetic 
from  Homer  to  ManzonI,  but  the  most  illustrious  names 
in  the  annals  of  the  various  religions  and  philosophies, 
and  the  really  great  politicians  in  all  states  of  society.* 
Above  all,  he  has  the  most  profound  admiration  for  the 
services  rendered  by  Christianity,  and  by  the  Church  of 
the  middle  ages.  His  estimate  of  the  Catholic  period 
is  such  as  the  majority  of  Englishmen  (from  whom 
we  take  the  liberty  to  differ)  would  deem  exaggerated, 
if  not  absurd.  The  great  men  of  Christianity,  from  St. 
I'aul  to  St.  Francis  of  AssisI,  receive  his  warmest  hom- 
age :  nor  docs  he  forget  the  greatness  even  of  those  who 
lived  and  thought  in  the  centm-ics  in  which  the  Catholic 
Church,  having  stopt  short  while  the  world  had  gone 
on,  had  become  a  hindrance  to  progress,   instead  of  a 

*  At  a  poniewliat  later  jicriod  'M.  Conito  drew  up  what  he  tprmod  a 
I'ositivist  Calendar,  in  which  ever}'  day  was  dedicated  to  some  beiidactDr  of 
hiiniaiiity  (;;encrally  with  the  addition  of  a  siniihir  but  minor  litininary,  tu 
be  ctlobrated  in  the  room  of  his  principal  each  bissextile  year).  In  this  no 
kind  of  hiiinar.  eminence,  really  useful,  is  omitted,  except  that  which  in 
merely  negative  and  destructive.  On  this  principle  (wliich  is  avowed),  the 
I''i-encli  pliiloxojtlicf  as  sucli  are  excluded;  those  only  among  them  being  ad- 
mitted, who,  like  Voltaire  and  Diderot,  had  claims  to  admission  on  other 
grounds:  and  the  Protestant  religious  reformers  are  left  out  entirely,  with  the 
curious  exception  of  George  Tox,  —  who  is  included,  wc  presume,  iu  COB- 
»idcration  of  iiis  Peace  principles. 


106  THE  POSITIVE   PHILOSOPHY 

promoter  of  it ;  such  men  as  Fendlon  and  St.  Vincent 
de  Paul,  Bossuct  and  Joseph  do  Maistre.  A  more 
comprehensive,  and,  in  tlie  primitive  sense  of  the  term, 
more  catholic,  sympathy  and  reverence  towards  real 
worth,  and  every  kind  of  service  to  humanity,  we  have 
not  met  with  in  any  tliinker.  Men  who  would  have 
torn  each  other  in  pieces,  who  even  tried  to  do  so, 
if  each  usefully  served  in  his  own  way  the  interests  of 
mankind,  are  all  hallowed  to  him. 

Neither  is  his  a  cramped  and  contracted  notion  of 
human  excellence,  which  cares  only  for  certain  forms 
of  development.  lie  not  only  jiersonally  ai)prcciates, 
but  rates  high  in  moral  value,  the  creations  of  poets 
and  artists  in  all  departments;  deeming  tl>em,  hy  their 
mixed  appeal  to  the  sentiments  and  the  understanding, 
admirably  fitted  to  educate  the  feelings  of  abstract 
thinkers,  .and  enlarge  the  intellectual  horizon  of  people 
of  the  world.*  lie  regards  the  law  of  progress  as 
applicable,  in  spite  of  aj)pcarances,  to  poetry  and  art 
as  much  as  to  science  and  politics.  The  common  im- 
pression to  the  contrary  he  ascribes  solely  to  tlie  fact, 
that  the  perfection  of  aisthetic  creation  requires  as  its 
condition  a  conscntanoousness  in  the  feelings  of  man- 
kind, which  depends  for  its  existence  on  a  fixed  and 
settled  state  of  opinions ;  while  the  last  five  centuries 
have  been  a  period,  not  of  settling,  but  of  unsettling  and 
decomposing,  the  most  general  beliefs  and  sentiments 
of  mankind.  The  numerous  monuments  of  poetic  and 
artistic  genius  which  the  modern  mind  has  produced 

•  He  goes  still  further  nn<l  deeper  in  a  subsequent  work.  "  L'nrt 
ram^ne  douccment  k  la  r('nli((^  Ics  cnntcinplntinns  trop  nbstrnitc!)  dii  tlu'o- 
ricicD,  tandis  qu'il  pous8c  nol)Icment  Ic  praticien  nux  spi'culatious  di'sia- 
t^re8S(5e9."    S/st6mc  de  I'olitique  Positive,  i.  287. 


OF    AUOUSTE    COMTE.  '  107 

even  under  this  great  disadvantage,  arc  (lie  maintains) 
sufficient  proof  what  great  productions  it  will  be  cap- 
able of,  when  one  harmonious  vein  of  sentiment  shall 
once  more  thrill  through  the  whole  of  society,  as  in  the 
days  of  Homer,  of  iEschylus,  of  Phidias,  and  even  of 
Dante. 

After  so  profound  and  comprehensive  a  view  of  the 
progress  of  human  society  in  the  past,  of  which  the 
future  can  only  be  a  prolongation,  it  is  natural  to  ask, 
to  what  use  does  he  put  this  survey  as  a  basis  of  practi- 
cal rcconnnendations?  Such  recommendations  he  cer- 
tainly makes,  thougli,  in  the  present  Treatise,  they  are 
of  a  much  less  definite  character  than  in  his  later  writ- 
ings. But  we  miss  a  necessary  link :  there  is  a  break 
in  the  otherwise  close  concatenation  of  his  speculations. 
We  fail  to  see  any  scientific  connexion  between  his 
theoretical  explanation  of  the  past  progress  of  society, 
and  his  proposals  for  future  improvement.  The  pro- 
posals are  not,  as  we  might  expect,  recommended  as 
that  towards  which  human  society  has  been  tending  and 
working  througli  the  whole  of  history.  It  is  thus  that 
thinkers  have  usually  proceeded  who  formed  theories 
for  the  future  grounded  on  historical  analysis  of  the 
past.  Tocqucvillc,  for  example,  and  others,  finding, 
as  they  thought,  through  all  history,  a  steady  progress 
in  the  direction  of  social  and  political  equality,  argued, 
that,  to  smooth  this  transition,  and  make  the  best  of 
what  is  certainly  coming,  is  the  proper  employment 
of  political  foreslglit.  We  do  not  find  M.  Comtc  sup- 
porting his  recommendations  by  a  similar  line  of  argu- 
ment. They  rest  as  completely,  each  on  its  separate 
reasons  of  supposed  utility,  as  with  philosophers  who, 


108  *        THE   POSITIVE   PHILOSOPHY 

like  Bcntham,  theorize  on  politics  without  any  historical 
basis  at  all.     The  only  bridge  of  connexion  Aviiich  leads 
from   his   historical   spccidations   to   his   practical   con- 
clusions, is  the  inference,  that,  since  tlie  old  powers  of 
society,  both  in  the  region  of  thought  and  of  action,  are 
declining   and  destined   to  disap[)ear,  leaving  only  the 
two  rising  powers,  —  positive  thinkers  on  the  one  hand, 
leaders  of  industry  on  the  other, — the  future  necessarily 
belongs  to  tiiese  :  spiritual  power  to  tlie  former,   tem- 
poral to  the  latter.     .Vs  a  specimen  of  historical  forecast 
this  is  very  deficient ;  for  are  there  not  the   masses  as 
well  Jis  the  leaders  of  industry?  and  is  not  theirs  also  a 
growing  power?     Be  this  as  it  may,  ]M.  Comte's  con- 
ceptions  of  the   mode  in  which   these  growing  powers 
should   be  organized   and   used,   are  grounded  on  any 
thing  rather  than  on  history.     And  we  cannot  but  re- 
mark a  singular  anomaly  in  a  thinker  of  j\I.  Comte's 
calibre.     After  the  ample  evidence  he  has  brought  for- 
ward of  the  slow  growth  of  the  sciences,   all   of  which 
excci^t  the  mathematico-astronouiical  couple  are  still,  as 
he  justly  thinks,   in  a  very  early  stage,   it  yet  appears 
as  if,  to  his  mind,   the  mere   institution  of  a  positive 
science  of  sociology  were  tantamoimt  to  its  completion  ; 
as  if  all  the  diversities  of  opinion  on  the  subject,  which 
set  mankind  at  variance,  were  solely  owing  to  its  haviug 
been  studied  in  the  theological  or  the  metaj)hysical  man- 
ner, and  as  if  when  the  positive  method  which  has  raised 
up   real  sciences  on   other   subjects    of  knctwlcdge,    is 
similarly  em|)loycd  on  this,   divergence  would  at  once 
cease,  and  tlie  entire   body  of  positive  social  encpiirers 
would  exhibit  as  much  agreement  in  their  doctrines  as 
those  who  cultivate  any  of  the  sciences  of  inorganic  life. 


OF   AUGUSTE    COMTE.  109 

Happy  would  be  the  prospects  of  mankind  if  this  were 
80.     A  time  sucli  as   M.  Comte  reckoned  upon  may 
come ;    unless  something  stops  the  progress  of  human 
improvement,  it  is  sure  to  come  :  but  after  an  unknown 
duration  of  iiard  thought  and  violent  controvci'sy.     Tiie 
period  of  decomposition,  which  has  lasted,  on  his  own 
computation,  from  the  beginning  of  the  fourteenth  cen- 
tury to  the  present,  is  not  yet  terminated  :  the  shell  i)f 
the  old  edifice  will  remain  standing  until  there  is  an- 
other ready  to   replace   it ;    and   the   new  synthesis   is 
barely    begun,    nor   is    even    the    preparatoiy    analysis 
completely  finished.     On  other  occasions  M.  Conitc  is 
very  well  aware  that  the  Method  of  a  science  is  not  the 
science  itself,  and  that  when  the  difficulty  of  discovering 
the  right  processes  has  been  overcome,  there  remains  a 
still  greater  difficulty,   that  of  applying  them.     This, 
which  is  true  of  all  sciences,  is  truest  of  all  in  Sociology. 
Tlie  facts  being  more  complicated,  and  depending  on  a 
greater  concurrence  of  forces,  than  in  any  other  science, 
the  difficulty  of  treating  them  deductively  is  proportion- 
ally increased,  while  the  wide  difference  between  any  one 
case  and  every  other  in  some  of  the  circumstances  which 
affect  the  result,  makes  the  pretence  of  direct  induction 
usually  no  better  than  empiricism.     It  is  therefore,  out 
of  all   proportion,   more  uncertain  than  in    any  other 
science,  whether  two  enquirers  equally  competent  and 
equally  disinterested  will    take    the    same  view  of  the 
evidence,  or  arrive  at  the  same  conclusion.     When  to 
this  intrinsic  difficulty  is   added  the  infinitely  greater 
extent  to  which  personal  or  class  interests  .and  predilec- 
tions  interfere  with   impartial  judgment,   the  hope  of 
such  accordance  of  opinion  among  sociological  enquirers 


110  THE   POSITIVE   PHILOSOPHY 

as  would  obtain,  in  mere  deference  to  their  authority, 
the  universal  assent  wliich  M.  Comtc's  scheme  of  society 
requires,  must  be  adjourned  to  an  indefinite  distance. 

M.  Comtc's  own  theory  is  an  apt  ilhistration  of  these 
difficulties  ;  since,  though  prepared  fur  these  spccuhuions 
aa  no  one  had  ever  been  prepared  before,  liis  views  of 
social   regeneration,  even  in  the   rudimentary  form   in 
which  they  appear  above  ground  in  this  treatise  (not  to 
speak  of  the  singular  83'stem  into  which  he  afterwards 
enlarged  them),  are  such  as  perhaps  no  other  person  of 
equal  knowledge  and  ca[)acity  would  agree  in.     AVere 
those  views  as  true  as  they  are  questionable,  they  could 
not   take   effect   until    the    unanimity    among    positive 
thinkers,  to  which  lie  looked  forward,  shall  have  been 
attained ;    since    the    mainspring    of   his    system    is    a 
Spiritual    Power    composed    of   positive    philosophers, 
which   only  the  i)revious  attaiimicnt  of  the   imanimity 
in  question  could  call  into  existence.     A  few  words  will 
sufficiently  express  the  outline  of  his  scheme.     A  cor- 
poration  of  philosophers,   receiving  a  modest  supi)ort 
from  the  state,  surrounded  by  reverence,  but  peremp- 
torily  excluded,   not  only  from  all  political  power  or 
employment,  but  from  all  riches,   and  all  occui)ations 
except  their  own,  are  to  havje  the  entire  direction   of 
education  :  together  with,   not  only  the  right  and  duty 
of  advising  and  reproving  all  persons  respecting  both 
their  public  and  their  private  life,   but  also  a  control 
(whether  authoritative   or  only  moral   is   not  defined) 
over  the  speculative  class  itself,  to  prevent  them  from 
wasting  time  and  ingenuity  on  enquiries  and  speculations 
of  no  value  to  mankind  (among  which  he  includes  many 
now  in  high  estimation),  and  compel  them  to  employ 


OF   AUGUSTE    COMTE.  Ill 

all  their  powers  on  the  investigations  which  may  be 
judged,  at  the  time,  to  be  the  most  urgently  important 
to    the    general    welfare.      The    temporal    gOAcrnment 
which  is  to  co-exist  with  this  spiritual  authority,  consists 
of    an    aristocracy    of   capitalists,    wliose    dignity    and 
authority  are  to  be  in  the  ratio  of  the  degree  of  gener- 
ality of  tlieir  conceptions  and  operations  —  bankers  at 
the  summit,  merchants  next,  then  manufacturers,  and 
agriculturists  at  the  bottom  of  tlic  scale.     No  re[)rcsen- 
tative  system,  or  other  popular  organization,    by  way 
of  counterpoise  to  this  governing  power,  is  ever  con- 
templated.    The  checks  relied  upon  for  preventing  its 
abuse,    are    the    counsels    and    remonstrances    of   the 
Spiritual  Power,    and    unlimited    liberty  of  discussion 
and  comment  by  all  classes  of  inferiors.     Of  the  mode 
in  which  either  set  of  authorities  should  fulfil  the  office 
assigned   to  it,   little  is   said  in  this  treatise :  but  the 
general  idea  is,  while  regulating  as  little  as  possible  by 
law,  to  make  the  pressure  of  opinion,  directed  by  the 
Spiritual  Power,   so  heavy  on    every  individual,    from 
the  humblest  to  the  most  powerful,   as  to  render  legal 
obligation,    in    as    many    cases    as    possible,    needless. 
Liberty  and  spontaneity  on  the  part  of  individuals  form 
no  part  of  the  scheme.     ]M.  Comte  looks  on  them  with 
as  great  jealousy  as  any  scholastic  pedagogue,  or  eccle- 
siastical director  of  consciences.     Every  particular  of 
conduct,  public  or  private,  is  to  be  open  to  the  public 
eye,  and  to  be  kept,  by  the  power  of  opinion,  in  the 
course  which  the  Spiritual  corporation  shall  judge  to  be 
the  most  right. 

This  is  not  a  sufficiently  tempting  picture  to  have 
mnch  chance  of  making  converts  rapidly,  and  the  objec- 


112  TILE    POSITIVE    nilLOSOPIIY   OF   COMTE. 

tions  to  tlie  scheme  are  too  obviou?  to  need  stating. 
Indeed,  it  is  only  thoughtful  persons  to  whom  it  will  be 
credible,   that  speculations   leading   to   this   result   can 
deserve  the  attention  necessary  for  understanding  them. 
Their  further  consideration   must  he  deferred  until  we 
can  examine  them  as  part  of  the  elaborate  and  coherent 
system   of  doctrine,   which   M.  Comte    afterwards    put 
together  for  the  reconstruction  of  society.      iNIcanwhilc 
the  reader  will  gather,  from  what  has  been  said,  that 
!M.  Comte  has  not,  in  our  opinion,  created  Sociology. 
Except  his  analysis  of  history,  to  which  there  is  much 
to  be  added,   but  which  wc  do  not  think  likely  to  be 
ever,  in  its  general  features,   superseded,   he  has  done 
nothing  in    Sociology  which    docs    not    rccpiire    to    be 
done  over   again,    and    better.     Xevertlicless,    he    has 
greatly  advanced  the  study.     Besides  the  great  stores 
of  thought,  of  various  and  often  of  eminent  merit,  with 
which  he  has  enriched  the  subject,  his  conce[)tIc)u  of  its 
method  is  so  much  truer  and  more  profound  than  that 
of  any  one  who  preceded  him,  as  to  constitute  an  era  in 
its  cultivation.      If  it  cannot  be  said  of  him  that  he  has 
created  a  science,  it  may  be  said  truly  that  he  has,   for 
the  first  time,   made  the  creation  possible.     This  is  u 
great  achievement,  and,  with  the  extraordinary  merit  of 
his   historical   analysis,   and   of  his    phllosopjiy   of  the 
physical  sciences,  is  enough  to  immortalize  his  name. 
But   his    renown  with    posterity   would    probably  have 
been  greater  than  it  is  now  likely  to  be,  if  after  showing 
the  way  in  which  the  social  science  should  be  formed, 
he  had  not  flattered  himself  that  he  had  formed  it,  and 
that  it  was  already  sufficiently  solid   for  attem[)tlng  to 
Ibuild  upon  its  foundation  the  entire  fabric  of  the  Politi- 
cal Art. 


LATER  SPECULATIONS  OF  AUGUSTE  COMTE/ 


The  list  of  publications  given  below  contains  the  mate- 
rials for  knowinfj  and  estimatinor  what  M.  Conite  termed 
his  second  career,  in  which  the  savant ^  historian,  and 
philosopher  of  his  fundcCmental  treatise,  came  forth  trans- 
figured as  the  High  Priest  of  the  Religion  of  Humanity. 
They  include  all  his  writings  except  the  Cours  de  Phil- 

*  1.  Si/steme  de  Politique  Positive,  ou  Traite  de  Sociohgie,  instiluant  la 
Religion  de  I' Ilumanile.  Par  Auguste  Comte,  Auteur  du  SystSme  de 
Philosophic  Positive.    4  vols.     8vo.    Paris:  1851-1854. 

2.  CuOxhisme  Puiilivlde,  ou  Sommaire  Exposition  de  la  Religion  Univer- 
telle,  en  onze  Enlreliens  Systcmaliqiies  enlre  une  Femme  et  un  Pretre  de 
V IIumanitA,  Par  Auguste  Comte,  Auteur  du  Systeme  de  Philosophic  Posi- 
tive et  du  Systeme  de  Politique  Positive.     1vol.     12iuo.     Paris:  1852. 

3.  Appel  aux  Conservateurt.  Par  Auguste  Comte,  Auteur  du  SystSme 
de  Philosophic  Positive  et  du  Systeme  de  Politique  Positive.  Paris:  1865 
(brochure). 

4.  Si/iithise  Subjective,  ou  Systeme  Unicersel  des  Conceptions  propres  h 
VElnt  Nonnal  de  I'lTumayiit^.  Par  Auguste  Comte,  Auteur  du  SystSme  de 
Philosophic  Positive  et  du  Systeme  de  Politique  Positive.  Tome  Premier 
contenaiit  Ic  Systeme  de  Logique  Positive,  ou  Traite  de  Philosophic  Mathd- 
matique.    Svo.    Paris:  1856. 

6.  Auguste  Comte  et  la  Phihsophie  Positive.  Par  E.  Littke.  1  vol.  Svo. 
Paris:  18C3. 

6.  Erjx).<iilion  Abr^gee  et  Populaire  de  la  Philosophie  et  de  la  Religion  Posi 
tivet.  Par  Celestin  de  Bligxieres,  ancien  616ve  de  I'Ecole  Polytech- 
nique.    1vol.    12mo.    Paris:  1857. 

7.  Notice  aur  f  CEuvre  et  $ur  la  Vie  d^ Auguste  Comte.  Par  le  Docteur 
Hobinet,  son  jSrt'decin,  et  Pun  de  ses  trcize  Ex^cuteurs  Testamentaires.  1 
vol.    Svo.    Paris:  1860. 

Westminster  Kcvicw,  July,  1865. 

8  [118  J 


114  LATER   SPECULATIONS 

osopliie  Positive :  for  liis  early  productions,  and  the 
occasional  publications  of  his  later  life,  are  reprinted  as 
Preludes  or  Appendices  to  the  treatises  here  enumerated, 
or  in  Dr.  Robinet's  voiuinc,  wliich,  as  well  as  thut  of 
M.  Littre,  also  contains  copious  extracts  from  his  cor- 
respondence. 

In  the  concluding  pages' of  his  great  systematic  work, 
M.  Ci)mte  had  announced  four  other  treatises  as  in 
contemplation  :  on  Politics  ;  on  the  Philosophy  of  Ma- 
thematics;  on  Education,  a  project  subsequently  en- 
larged to  include  the  systematlzatlon  of  Morals  ;  and  on 
Industry,  or  the  action  of  man  upon  external  nature. 
Our  list  comprises  the  only  two  of  these  which  he  lived 
to  execute.  It  further  contains  a  brief  exposition  of 
his  final  doctrines,  in  the  form  of  a  Dialogue,  or,  as 
he  terms  it,  a  Catechism,  of  which  a  translation  has 
been  published  by  his  principal  English  adherent,  Mr. 
Congreve.  There  has  also  appeared  very  recently, 
under  the  title  of  ''A  General  View  of  Positivism,"  a 
translation  by  Dr.  Bridges,  of  the  Preliminary  Dis- 
course in  six  chapters,  prefixed  to  the  Systcmc  do  Poli- 
tique Positive.  The  remaining  three  books  on  our  list 
are  the  productions  of  disciples  in  different  degrees.  M. 
Littre,  the  only  thinker  of  established  reputation  who 
accepts  that  character,  Is  a  disciple  only  of  the  G^urs  de 
Philosophic  Positive,  and  can  see  the  weak  points  even 
in  that.  Some  of  them  he  has  discriminated  and  dis- 
cussed with  great  judgment :  and  the  merits  of  his 
volume,  both  as  a  sketch  of  M.  Comte's  life  and  an  ap- 
preciation of  his  doctrines,  would  well  deserve  a  fuller 
notice  than  we  are  able  to  give  it  here.  M.  dc  Blifrn- 
i^res  is  a  far  more  thorough   adherent ;    so  much  so, 


OP  AUGU8TE   COMTE,  115 

that  the  reader  of  his  singularly  well  and  attractivelj" 
written  condensation  and  popularization  of  his  mastcr'a 
doctrines,  does  not  easily  discover  in  what  it  falls  short 
of  that  unqualified  acceptance  which  alone,  it  would 
seem,  could  find  favor  with  M.  Comte.  For  he  ended 
by  casting  off  M.  dc  Blignieres,  as  he  had  previously 
cast  off  M.  Littrd,  and  every  other  person  who,  having 
gone  with  him  a  certain  length,  refused  to  follow  him 
to  the  end.  The  author  of  the  last  work  in  our  enum- 
eration. Dr.  Robinet,  is  a  disciple  after  M.  Comte's  own 
heart ;  one  whom  no  difficulty  stops,  and  no  absurdity 
startles.  But  it  is  far  from  our  disposition  to  speak 
otherwise  than  respectfully  of  Dr.  Robinet  and  the  other 
earnest  men,  who  maintain  around  the  tomb  of  their 
master  an  organized  co-operation  for  the  diffusion  of 
doctrines  which  they  believe  destined  to  regenerate  the 
human  race.  Their  enthusiastic  veneration  for  him,  and 
devotion  to  the  ends  he  pursued,  do  honor  alike  to 
them  and  to  their  teacher,  and  are  an  evidence  of  the 
personal  ascendency  he  exercised  over  those  who  ap- 
proached him ;  an  ascendency  which  for  a  time  carried 
away  even  M.  Littre,  as  he  confesses,  to  a  length  which 
liis  calmer  judgment  does  not  now  approve. 

These  various  writings  raise  many  points  of  interest 
regarding  M.  Comte's  personal  history,  and  some,  not 
without  philosophic  bearings,  respecting  his  mental 
habits  :  from,  all  which  matters  we  shall  abstain,  with 
the  exception  of  two,  which  he  himself  proclaimed  with 
great  emphasis,  and  a  knowledge  of  which  is  almost  in- 
dispensable to  an  apprehension  of  the  characteristic 
difference  between  his  second  career  and  his  first.  It 
should  be  known,  that  during  his  later  life,  and  even 


116  LATER    SrECULATIONS 

before  completing  his  first  great  treatise,   M.    Comte 
adojited   a   rule,    to  which    he   very   rarely  made   any 
exception :    to    abstain    systematically,    not   only   from 
newspapers  or  periodical   publications,    even   scientific, 
but  from  all  reading  whatever,  except  a  few  favorite 
poets,  in  the  ancient  and  modem  European  languages. 
This   abstinence  he  practised   for  the    sake    of  mental 
health ;   by  way,  as  he  said  of  "  hygiene  cei'ebrale." 
We  are  far  from  thinking  that  the  practice  has  nothing 
whatever  to  recommend  it.     For  most  thinkers,  doubt- 
less, it  would  be  a  very  unwise  one  ;    but  wc  will  not 
aflSrm  that  it  may  not  sometimes  be  advantageous  to  a 
mind  of  the  peculiar  quality  of  M.  Comte's  —  one  that 
can  usefully  devote  itself  to  following  out  to  the  remo- 
test developments  a  particular  line  of  meditations,  of  so 
arduous  a  kind  that  the  c()m})lctc  concentration  of  the 
intellect  upon  its  own  thoughts  is  almost  a  necessary 
condition  of  success.     When  a  mind  of  this  character 
has  laboriously  and  conscientiously  laid  in   beforehand, 
as  M.  Comte  had  done,  an  ample  stock  of  nmterials,  he 
may  be  justified  in  thinking  that  he  will  contribute  most 
to  the  mental  wealth  of  mankind  by  occujjying  himself 
'solely  in  working  upon  these,   witliout  distracting  his 
attention   by  continually   taking   in    more   matter,    or 
keeping  a  communication  open  with  other  independent 
intellects.     The  practice,  therefore,  may  be  legitimate ; 
but  no  one  should  adopt  it  without  being  aware  of  what 
he  loses    by  it.     He    must   resign    the    pretension    of 
arriving  at  the  whole  truth,  on  the  subject,  whatever  it 
be,  of  his  meditations.     That  he  should  effect  this,  even 
on  a  narrow  subject,  by  the  mere  force  of  his  own  mind, 
building  on  the  foundations  of  his  predecessors,  without 


OF   AUGUSTE   COMTE.  117 

aid  or  correction  from  his  cotemporaries,  is  simply  im- 
possible. He  may  do  eminent  service  by  elaborating 
certain  sides  of  the  truth,  but  he  must  expect  to  find 
that  there  are  other  sides  which  have  wholly  escaped  his 
attention.  However  great  his  powers,  every  thing  tliat 
he  can  do  without  the  aid  of  incessant  rcmindings  from 
other  thinkers,  is  merely  provisional,  and  will  require  a 
thorough  revision.  He  ought  to  be  aware  of  this,  and 
accept  it  with  his  eyes  open,  regarding  himself  as  a 
pioneer,  not  a  constructor.  If  he  thinks  that  he  can 
contribute  most  towards  the  elements  of  the  final  synthe- 
sis by  following  out  his  own  original  thoughts  as  far  as 
they  will  go,  leaving  to  other  thinkers,  or  to  himself  at 
a  subseqent  time,  the  business  of  adjusting  them  to  the 
thoughts  by  which  they  ought  to  be  accompanied,  he  is 
ri":ht  in  doing  so.  But  he  deludes  himself  if  he  im- 
agines  that  any  conclusions  he  can  arrive  at,  while  he 
practises  M.  Comte's  rule  of  hygiene  cerebrate ^  can 
possibly  be  definitive. 

Neither  is  such  a  practice,  in  a  hygienic  point  of 
view,  free  from  the  gravest  dangers  to  the  pliilosopher's 
own  mind.  When  once  he  has  persuaded  himself  that 
he  can  work  out  the  final  truth  on  any  subject,  exclu- 
sively from  his  own  sources,  he  is  apt  to  lose  all  measure 
or  standard  by  which  to  be  apprised  when  he  is  departing 
from  common  sense.  Living  only  witli  his  own  thougiits, 
he  gradually  forgets  the  aspect  they  present  to  minds  of 
a  different  mould  from  his  own ;  he  looks  at  his  con- 
clusions only  from  the  point  of  view  which  suggested 
them,  and  from  which  they  naturally  appear  perfect ;  and 
every  consideration  which  from  other  points  of  view 
might  present  itself  either  as  an  objection  or  as  a  necea- 


118  LATER   SPECULATIONS 

sary  modification,  is  to  him  as  if  it  did  not  exist.  When 
his  merits  come  to  be  recognized  and  appreciated,  and 
especially  if  he  obtains  disciples,  the  intellectual  infirm- 
ity goon  becomes  complicated  with  a  moral  one.  The 
natunil  result  of  the  position  is  a  gigantic  self-confidence, 
not  to  say  self-conceit.  That  of  M.  Comtc  is  colossal. 
Except  here  and  there  in  an  entirely  self-taught  thinker, 
who  has  no  high  standard  with  which  to  compare  him- 
self, we  have  met  with  nothing  approaching  to  it.  As 
his  thoughts  grew  more  extravagant,  his  self-confidence 
grew  more  outrageous.  The  height  it  ultimately  at- 
tained must  be  seen,  in  his  writings,  to  be  believed. 

The  other  circumstance  of  a  personal  nature  which  it 
is  impossible  not  to  notice,  because  M.  Comte  is  per- 
petually referring  to  it  as  the  origin  of  the  great  supe- 
riority which  he  ascribes  to  his  later  as  compared  with 
his  earlier  speculations,  is  the  "moral  regeneration" 
which  he  underwent  from  "  une  ang(3llquc  influence"  and 
"  incomparable  passion  privdc."  He  formed  a  passionate 
attachment  to  a  lady  whom  he  describes  as  uniting  every 
thing  which  is  morally  with  much  that  is  intellectually 
admirable,  and  his  relation  to  whom,  besides  the  direct 
influence  of  her  character  upon  his  own,  gave  him  an 
insight  into  the  true  sources  of  human  happiness,  which 
changed  his  whole  conception  of  life.  This  attachment, 
which  always  remained  pure,  gave  him  but  one  year  of 
passionate  enjoyment,  the  lady  having  been  cut  off*  by 
death  at  the  end  of  that  short  period  ;  but  the  .adoration 
of  her  memory  survived,  and  became,  as  we  shall  see, 
the  type  of  his  conception  of  the  sympathetic  culture 
proper  for  all  human  beings.  The  change  thus  effected 
in  his  personal  character  and  sentiments,   manifested 


OF   AUOUSTE    COMTE.  119 

itself  at  once  in  his  speculations ;  which,  from  having 
been  only  a  philosophy,  now  aspired  to  become  a  religion  ; 
and  from  having  been  as  purely,  and  almost  rudely, 
scientific  and  intellectual,  as  was  compatible  with  a 
character  always  enthusiastic  in  its  admirations  and  in 
its  ardor  for  improvement,  became  from  this  time  what, 
for  want  of  a  better  name,  may  be  called  sentimental ; 
but  sentimental  in  a  way  of  its  own,  very  curious  to 
contemplate^  In  considering  the  system  of  religion, 
politics,  and  morals,  which  in  his  later  writings  M. 
Comte  constructed,  it  is  not  unimportant  to  bear  in 
mind  the  nature  of  the  personal  experience  and  inspira- 
tion to  which  he  himself  constantly  attributed  this  phasis 
of  his  jjhilosophy.  But  as  we  shall  have  much  more  to 
say  against,  than  in  favor  of,  the  conclusions  to  which 
he  was  in  this  manner  conducted,  it  is  right  to  declare 
that,  from  the  evidence  of  his  writings,  we  really  believe 
the  moral  influence  of  Madame  Clotilde  de  Vaux  upon 
his  character  to  have  been  of  the  ennobling  as  well  as 
softeniuf;  character  which  he  ascribes  to  it.  jMakinjr 
allowance  for  the  eflfects  of  his  exuberant  <xrowth  in  self- 
conceit,  we  perceive  almost  as  much  improvement  in  his 
feelings,  as  deterioration  in  his  speculations,  compared 
with  those  of  the  Philosophic  Positive-  Even  the 
speculations  are,  in  some  secondary  aspects,  improved 
through  the  beneficial  effect  of  the  improved  feelings ; 
and  might  have  been  more  so,  if,  by  a  rare  good  fortune, 
the  object  of  his  attachment  had  been  qualified  to 
exercise  as  improving  an  influence  over  him  intellectually 
as  morally,  and  if  he  could  have  been  contented  with 
something  less  ambitious  than  being  the  supreme  moral 
legislator  and  religious  pontiflT  of  the  human  race. 


120  LATER   SPECULATIONS 

"WTien  we  say  that  M.  Comte  has  erected  his  phil- 
osophy into  a  religion,  the  word  religion  must  not  be 
understood  in  its  ordinary  sense.     lie  .made  no  chan<Te 
in   the   purely  negative   attitude  which  he  maintained 
towards  theology :  his  religion  is  without  a  God.     In 
saying  this,  we  have  done  enough  to  induce  nine-tenths 
of  all  readers,  at  least  in  our  own  country,  to  avert  their 
faces  and  close  their  ears.     To  have  no  reli'non,  thouirh 
scandalous  enough,  is  an  idea  they  arc  partly  used  to  : 
but  to  have  no  God,  and  to  talk  of  religion,  is  to  their 
feelings  at  once  an  absurdity  and  an  impiety.     Of  the 
remaining  tenth,  a  great  proportion,  perhaps,  will  turn 
away  from  any  thing  which  calls  itself  by  the  name  of 
religion  at  all.     Between  the  two,  it  is  difficult  to  find 
an  audience  who  can  be  induced  to  listen  to  M.  Comte 
without  an  insurmountable  prejudice.     But,   to  be  just 
to  any  opinion,  it  ought  to  be  considered,  not  exclusively 
from  an  opponent's  point  of  view,  but  from  that  of  the 
mind  which  propounds  it.     Though  conscious  of  bein<T 
in  an  extremely  small  minority,  we  venture  to  think 
that  a  religion  may  exist  without  belief  in  a  God,  and 
that  a  religion  without  a  God  may  be,  even  to  Christians, 
an  instructive  and  profitable  object  of  contemplation. 

What,  in  truth,  are  the  conditions  necessary  to  con- 
stitute a  religion  ?  There  must  be  a  creed,  or  conviction, 
claiming  authority  over  the  whole  of  human  life ;  a 
belief,  or  set  of  beliefs,  deliberately  adopted,  respecting 
Imman  destiny  and  duty,  to  which  the  believer  inwardly 
acknowledges  that  all  his  actions  ought  to  be  subor- 
dinate. Moreover,  there  must  be  a  sentiment  connected 
with  this  creed,  or  capable  of  being  invoked  by  it, 
eufficiently  powerful  to  give  it  in  fact,  the  authority  over 


OF  AUGUSTE    COMTE.  121 

human  conduct  to  wliich  it  lays  claim  in  theory.  It  is 
a  great  advantage  (though  not  absolutely  indispensable) 
that  this  sentiment  should  ciystallize,  as  it  were,  round 
a  concrete  object ;  if  possible  a  really  existing  one, 
though,  in  all  the  more  important  cases,  only  ideally 
present.  Sucii  an  object  Theism  and  Christianity  offer 
to  the  believer :  but  the  condition  may  be  fulfilled,  if 
not  in  a  manner  strictly  equivalent,  by  another  object. 
It  has  been  said  that  whoever  believes  in  "  tlic  Infinite 
nature  of  Duty,"  even  if  he  believe  in  nothing  else,  is 
religious.  M.  Comte  believes  in  what  is  meant  by  the 
infinite  nature  of  duty,  but  he  refers  the  obligations  of 
duty,  as  well  as  all  sentiments  of  devotion,  to  a  concrete 
object,  at  once  ideal  and  real ;  the  Human  Race,  con- 
ceived as  a  continuous  whole,  including  the  past,  the 
present,  and  the  future.  This  great  collective  existence, 
this  "  Grand  Etre,"  as  he  terms  it,  though  the  feelings 
it  can  excite  are  necessarily  very  different  from  those 
which  direct  themselves  towards  an  ideally  perfect 
Being,  has,  as  he  forcibly  urges,  this  .advantage  in 
respect  to  us,  that  it  really  needs  our  services,  which 
Omnipotence  cannot,  in  any  genuine  sense  of  the  term, 
be  supposed  to  do  :  and  jNI.  Comte  says,  that  assuming 
the  existence  of  a  Supreme  Providence  (which  he  is  as 
far  from  denying  as  from  affirming)  the  best,  and  even 
the  only,  way  in  which  we  can  rightly  worship  or  serve 
Illm,  is  by  doing  our  utmost  to  love  and  serve  that 
other  Great  Being,  whose  inferior  Providence  has  be- 
stowed on  us  all  the  benefits  that  we  owe  to  the  labors 
and  virtues  of  former  generations.  It  may  not  be  con- 
sonant to  usage  to  call  this  a  religion ;  but  the  term, 
no  applied,  has  a  meaning,  and  one  which  is  not  ade- 


122^  LATER   SPECULATIONS 

quately  expressed  by  any  other  word.  Candid  persona 
of  all  creeds  may  be  willing  to  admit,  that  if  a  person 
has  an  ideal  object,  his  attachment  and  sense  of  duty 
towards  which,  are  .able  to  control  and  discipline  all  his 
other  sentiments  and  propensities,  and  prescribe  to  him 
a  rule  of  life,  that  person  has  a  religion  :  and  though 
every  one  naturally  prefers  his  own  religion  to  any 
other,  all  must  admit  tiiat  if  the  object  of  this  attach- 
ment, and  of  this  feeling  of  duty,  is  the  aggregate  of 
our  fellow  creatures,  this  Religion  of  the  Infidel  canjiut, 
in  honesty  and  conscience,  be  called  an  intrinsically  bad 
one.  Many,  indeed,  may  be  unable  to  believe  that  this 
object  is  capable  of  gathering  round  it  feelings  sufficiently 
strong :  but  this  is  exactly  the  point  on  which  a  doubt 
can  hardly  remain  in  an  intelligent  reader  of  M.  Comte  : 
and  we  join  with  him  in  contcnming,  as  equally  irra- 
tional and  mean,  the  conception  of  human  nature  as 
incapable  of  giving  its  love  and  devoting  its  existence 
to  any  object  which  cannot  afford  in  exchange  an  eter- 
nity of  personal  enjoyment. 

The  power  which  may  be  acquired  over  the  mind  by 
the  idea  of  the  jjeneral  interest  of  the  human  race,  both 
as  a  source  of  emotion  and  as  a  motive  to  conduct, 
many  have  perceived  ;  but  we  know  not  if  any  one, 
before  M.  Comte,  realized  so  fully  as  he  has  done,  all 
the  majesty  of  which  that  idea  is  susceptible.  It  ascends 
into  the  unknown  recesses  of  the  past,  embraces  the 
manifold  present,  and  descends  into  the  indefinite  and 
unforeseeable  future.  Forming  a  collective  Kxistencc 
without  assignable  beginning  or  end,  it  appeals  to  that 
feeling  of  the  Infinite,  which  is  deeply  rooted  in  human 
nature,  and  which  seems  necessary  to  the  imposingness 


OF   AUGUSTE    COMTE-  123 

of  all  our  highest  conceptions.     Of  the  vast  unrolling 
web  of  human  life,  the  part  best  known  to  us  is  irrevo- 
cably past ;  this  wc  C:;n  no  longer  serve,  but  can  still 
love  :  it  comprises  for  most  of  us  the  far  greater  number 
of  those  who  have  loved  us,  or  from  whom  we  have 
received   benefits,    as   well   as  the  long  series  of  tliose 
who,  by  their  labors  and  sacrifices  for  mankind,  have 
deserved  to  be  held  in  everlasting  and  grateful  remem- 
brance.    As  M.  Comte  truly  says,  the  highest  minds, 
even  now,  live  in  thought  with  the  great  dead,  far  more 
than  with  the  living;  and,  next  to  the  dead,  with  those 
ideal  human  beings  yet  to  come,  whom  they  arc  never 
destined  to  see.     If  we  honor  as  we  ought  those  who 
have  served  mankind  in  the  past,  we  shall  feel  that  we 
are  also  working  for  those  benefactors  bv  serving  that 
to  which  their  lives  were  devoted.     And  when  reflec- 
tion, guided  by  history,  has  taught  us  the  intimacy  of 
the  connection  of  every  age  of  humanity  with  every 
other,  making  us  see  in  the  earthly  destiny  of  mankind 
the  playing-out  of  a  great  drama,  or  the  action  of  a 
prolonged  epic,  all  the  generations  of  mankind  become 
indissolubly  united  into  a  single  image,  combining  all 
the  power  over  the  mind  of  the  idea  of  Posterity,  with 
our  best  feelings  towards  the  living  world  which  sur- 
rounds us,  and  towards  the  predecessors  who  have  made, 
us  what  we  are.    That  the  ennobling  power  of  this  grand 
conception  may  have  its  full  efficacy,  we  should,  with 
M.  Comte,  regard  the  Grand  Etre,  Humanity,  or  ]\Ian- 
kind,  as  composed,  in  the  past,  solely  of  those  who,  in 
every  age  and  variety  of  position,  have  played  their  part 
worthily  in  life.     It  is  only  as  thus  restricted  that  the 
aggregate  of  our  species  becomes  an  object  deserving 


124  '     LATER   SPECULATIONS 

our  veneration.  The  unworthy  members  of  it  are  best 
dismissed  from  our  habitual  tlioughts ;  and  the  imper- 
fections which  adhered  through  life,  even  to  those  of  the 
dead  who  deserve  honorable  remembrance,  should  i)c 
no  further  borne  in  mind  than  is  necessary  not  to  falsify 
our  conception  of  facts.  On  tiic  other  hand,  the  Grand 
Etre  in  ita  completeness  ought  to  include  not  only  all 
whom  we  venerate,  but  all  sentient  beings  to  which  wc 
owe  duties,  and  which  have  a  claim  on  our  attachment. 
]\L  Comte,  therefore,  incorporates  into  the  ideal  object 
whose  service  is  to  be  the  law  of  our  life,  not  our  own 
species  exclusively,  but,  in  a  subordinate  degree,  our 
humble  auxiliaries,  those  animal  races  which  enter  into 
real  society  with  man,  which  attach  themselves  to  him, 
and  voluntarily  co-operate  with  him,  like  the  noble  dog 
who  gives  his  life  for  his  human  friend  and  benefactor. 
For  this  M.  Comte  has  been  subjected  to  unworthy 
ridicule,  but  there  is  nothing  truer  or  more  honorable 
to  him  in  the  whole  body  of  his  doctrines.  The  strong 
sense  he  always  shows  of  the  worth  of  the  inferior  ani- 
mals, and  of  the  duties  of  mankind  towards  them,  is 
one  of  the  very  finest  traits  of  his  character. 

"We,  therefore,  not  only  hold  that  M.  Comte  was 
justified  in  the  attempt  to  develop  his  philosophy  into 
a  religion,  and  had  realized  the  essential  conditions  of 
one,  but  that  all  other  religions  are  made  better  in 
proportion  as,  in  their  practical  result,  they  are  brought 
to  coincide  with  that  which  he  aimed  at  constructing. 
But,  unhappily,  the  next  thing  wc  are  obliged  to  do,  is 
to  charge  him  with  making  a  complete  mistake  at  the 
very  outset  of  his  operations  —  with  fundamentally  mis- 
conceiving the  proper  oflice  of  a  rule  of  life.     He  com- 


OF   AUGU8TE   COMTE.  *  125 

mitted  the  en*or  which  is  often,  but  falsely,  charged 
against  the  whole  class  of  utilitarian  moralists  ;  he  re- 
quired that  the  test  of  conduct  should  also  be  the 
exclusive  motive  to  it.  Because  the  good  of  the  human 
race  is  the  ultimate  standard  of  right  and  wrong,  and 
because  moral  discipline  consists  in  cultivating  the 
utmost  possible  repugnance  to  all  conduct  injurious  to 
the  general  good,  M.  Comte  infers  that  the  good  of 
others  is  the  only  inducement  on  which  we  should  allow 
ourselves  to  act ;  and  that  we  should  endeavor  to 
starve  the  whole  of  the  desires  which  point  to  our 
personal  satisfaction,  by  denying  them  all  gi'atification 
not  strictly  required  by  physical  necessities.  The 
golden  rule  of  morality,  in  M.  Comte's  religion,  is  to 
live  for  others,  "vivre  pour  autrul."  To  do  as  we 
would  be  done  by,  and  to  love  our  neighbor  as  our- 
self,  ai'e  not  sufficient  for  him  :  they  partake,  he  thinks, 
of  the  nature  of  personal  calculations.  We  should 
endeavor  not  to  love  ourselves  at  all.  We  shall  not 
succeed  in  it,  but  we  should  make  the  nearest  approach 
to  it  possible.  Nothing  less  will  satisfy  him,  as  towards 
humanity,  than  the  sentiment  which  one  of  his  favorite 
writers,  Thomas  a  Kempis,  addresses  to  God :  Amem 
te  plus  quam  me,  nee  me  nisi  propter  te.  All  education 
and  all  moral  discipline  should  have  but  one  object,  to 
make  altruism  (a  word  of  his  own  coining)  predominate 
over  egoism.  If  by  this  were  only  meant  that  egoism 
is  bound,  and  should  be  taught,  always  to  give  way  to 
the  well-understood  interests  of  enlarged  altruism,  no 
one  who  acknowledges  any  morality  at  all  would  object 
to  the  proposition.  But  M.  Comte,  taking  his  stand 
on  the  biological  fact  that  organs  are  strengthened  by 


126  LATER   SPECULATIONS 

exercise  and  atrophied  by  disuse,  and  firmly  convinced 
that  each  of  our  elementary  inclinations  has  its  distinct 
cerebral  organ,  thinks  it  the  grand  duty  of  life  not  only 
to  strengthen  the  social  affections  by  constant  habit  and 
by  referring  all  our  actions  to  them,  but,  as  far  as  pos- 
sible, to  deaden  the  personal  passions  and  propensities 
by  desuetude.  Even  the  exercise  of  the  intellect  is  re- 
quired to  obey  as  an  authoritative  rule  the  dominion  of 
the  social  feelings  over  the  intelligence  (du  coeur  sur 
I'esprit).  The  physical  and  other  personal  instincts  are 
to  be  mortified  far  beyond  the  demands  of  bodily  health, 
which  indeed  the  morality  of  the  future  is  not  to  insist 
much  upon,  ft)r  fear  of  encouraging  "  les  calculs  person- 
nels." M.  Comte  condemns  only  such  austerities  as, 
by  diminishing  the  vigor  of  the  constitution,  makes  us 
less  capable  of  being  useful  to  others.  Any  indulgence, 
even  in  food,  not  necessary  to  health  and  strength,  he 
condemns  as  immoral.  All  gratifications,  except  those 
of  the  affections,  are  to  be  tolerated  only  as  "  inevitable 
infirmities."  Novalis  said  of  Spinoza  that  he  was  a 
God-intoxicated  man  :  !M.  Comte  is  a  morality-intoxi- 
cated man.  Every  question  with  him  is  one  of  morality, 
and  no  motive  but  that  of  morality  is  permitted. 

The  explanation  of  this  we  find  in  an  original  and 
mental  twist,  very  common  in  French  thinkers,  and  by 
which  M.  Comte  was  distinguished  beyond  them  all. 
He  could  not  dispense  with  what  he  called  "unity."  It 
was  for  the  sake  of  Unity  that  a  religion  was,  in  his  cyc", 
desirable.  Not  in  the  mere  sense  of  Unanimity,  but  in 
a  far  wider  one.  A  religion  must  be  something  by 
which  to  "systematize"  imman  life.  His  definition  of 
it,  in  the  ** Catdchisme,"  is  "the  state  of  complete  unity 


OF   AUOUSTE   COMTE  127 

which  distinguishes  our  existence,  at  once  personal  and 
social,  when  all  its  parts,  both  moral  and  physical, 
converge  habitually  to  a  common  destination  .  .  .  Such 
a  harmony,  individual  and  collective,  being  incapable 
of  complete  realization  in  an  existence  so  complicated  as 
ours,  this  definition  of  religion  characterizes  the  im- 
movable type  towards  which  tends  more  and  more  the 
aggregate  of  human  efforts.  Our  happiness  and  our 
merit  consist  especially  in  approaching  as  near  as  possi- 
ble to  this  unity,  of  which  the  gradual  increase  consti- 
tutes the  best  measure  of  real  improvement,  personal 
or  social."  To  this  theme  he  continually  returns, 
and  argues  that  this  unity  or  harmony  among  all  the 
elements  of  our  life  is  not  consistent  with  the  predomi- 
nance of  the  personal  propensities,  since  these  drag  us 
in  different  directions  :  it  can  only  result  from  the  sub- 
ordination of  them  all  to  the  social  feelings,  which  may 
be  made  to  act  in  a  uniform  direction  by  a  common 
system  of  convictions,  and  which  differ  from  the  per- 
sonal inclinations  in  this,  that  we  all  naturally  encour- 
age them  in  one  another,  while,  on  the  contrary,  social 
life  is  a  perpetual  restraint  upon  the  selfish  propensities. 
The  fons  errorum  in  M.  Comte's  later  speculations 
is  this  inordinate  demand  for  "  unity "  and  "  systema- 
tization."  Tliis  is  the  reason  why  it  does  not  suffice  to 
him  that  all  should  be  ready,  in  case  of  need,  to  post- 
pone their  personal  interests  and  inclinations  to  the 
requirements  of  the  general  good  :  he  demands  tliat 
each  should  regard  as  vicious  any  care  at  all  iov  his 
personal  interests,  except  as  a  means  to  the  good  of 
others  —  should  be  ashamed  of  it,  should  strive  to  cure 
himself  of  it,  because  his  existence  is  not  "systema- 


128  LATER   SPECULATIONS 

tized,"  is  not  in  "  complete  unity,'*  as  long  as  he  cares 
for  more  than  one  thing.  The  strangest  part  of  the 
matter  is  that  this  doctrine  seems  to  M.  Comte  to  be 
axiomatic.  That  all  perfection  consists  in  unity,  he 
apparently  considers  to  be  a  maxim  which  no  sane  man 
thinks  of  questioning.  It  never  seems  to  enter  into  his 
conceptions  that  any  one  could  object  ah  initio,  and 
ask,  why  this  universal  systematizing,  systematizing, 
systematizing?  Why  is  it  necessary  that  all  luiman 
life  should  point  but  to  one  object,  and  be  cultivated 
into  a  system  of  means  to  a  single  end  ?  May  it  not 
be  the  fact  that  mankind,  who  after  all  arc  made  up 
of  single  human  beings,  obtain  a  greater  sum  of  hap- 
piness when  each  pursues  his  own,  under  the  rules  and 
conditions  required  by  the  good  of  the  rest,  than  when 
each  makes  the  good  of  the  rest  his  only  object,  and 
allows  himself  no  personal  pleasures  not  indispensable 
to  the  preservation  of  his  faculties?  The  regimen  of  a 
blockaded  town  should  be  cheerfully  submitted  to  when 
hif^h  purposes  require  it,  but  is  it  the  ideal  perfection 
of  human  existence?  M.  Comte  sees  none  of  these 
difficulties.  The  only  true  happiness,  he  affirms,  is  in 
the  exercise  of  the  affi3ctions.  He  had  found  it  so  for 
a  whole  year,  which  was  enough  to  enable  him  to  get 
to  the  bottom  of  the  question,  and  to  judge  whether  he 
could  do  without  evcr>'  thing  else.  Of  course  the  sup- 
position was  not  to  be  heard  of  that  any  other  person 
could  require,  or  be  the  better  for,  what  ^I.  Comte  did 
not  value.  "  Unity  "  and  "  systcmatization  "  absolutely 
demanded  that  all  other  people  should  model  themselves 
after  M.  Comte.  It  would  never  do  to  suppose  that 
there  could  be  more  than  one  road  to  human  happiness, 
or  more  than  one  ingredient  in  it. 


OF  AUGUSTE    COMTE.  120 

The  most  prejudiced  must  admit,  that  this  religion 
without  theology  is  not  chargeable  with  any  relaxtion 
of  moral  restraints.  On  the  contrary,  it  prodigiously 
cxaijijcrates  them.  It  makes  the  same  ethical  mistake 
as  the  theory  of  Calvinism,  that  every  act  in  life  should 
be  done  for  the  glory  of  God,  and  that  whatever  is  not 
a  duty  is  a  sin.  It  does  not  perceive  that  between 
the  region  of  duty  and  that  of  sin  there  is  an  interme- 
diate space,  the  region  of  positive  worthiness.  It  is 
not  good  that  persons  should  be  bound,  by  other  peo- 
ple's opinion,  to  do  every  thing  that  they  would  deserve 
praise  for  doing.  There  is  a  standard  of  altruism  to 
which  all  should  be  required  to  come  up,  and  a  degree 
beyond  it  which  is  not  obligatory,  but  meritorious.  It 
is  incumbent  on  every  one  to  restrain  the  pursuit  of  his 
personal  objects  within  the  limits  consistent  with  the 
essential  interests  of  others.  What  those  limits  are  it 
Is  the  province  of  ethical  science  to  determine ;  and  to 
keep  all  individuals  and  aggregations  of  individuals 
within  them,  is  the  proper  office  of  punishment  and  of 
moral  blame.  If,  in  addition  to  fulfilling  this  obliga- 
tion, persons  make  the  good  of  others  a  direct  object 
of  disinterested  exertions,  postponing  or  sacrificing  to 
it  even  innocent  personal  Indulgences,  they  deserve 
gi-atltude  and  honor,  and  are  fit  objects  of  moral  praise. 
So  long  as  they  are  in  no  way  compelled  to  this  con- 
duct by  any  external  pressure,  there  cannot  be  too 
much  of  It ;  but  a  necessary  condition  is  its  sponta- 
neity ;  since  the  notion  of  a  happiness  for  all,  procured 
by  the  self-sacrifice  of  each,  if  the  abnegation  Is  really 
felt  to  be  a  sacrifice,  is  a  contradiction.  Such  spon- 
taneity by  no  means  excludes  sympathetic  encourago- 

9 


130  LATER   SPECULATIONS 

ment ;    but   the   encouragement  should   take  the  form 
of  making  self-devotion  pleasant,  not  that  of  making 
every  thing  else  j)ainrul.     The  object  should  be  to  stim- 
ulate services  to   humanity  by  their  natural  rewards ; 
not  to  render  the  pursuit  of  our  own  good  in  any  other 
manner   impossible,  by  visiting   it  with  the  reproaches 
of  others   and  of   our  own   conscience.      The    proper 
office  of  those  sanctions  is  to  enforce  upon  every  one 
the  conduct  necessary  to  give  all  other  persons  their 
fair   chance  :    conduct    which    chiefly    consists    in    not 
doing  them  harm,  and  not  impeding  them  in  any  thing 
which    without    harming   others    docs    good    to    them- 
selves.     To  this  must  of  course  be  added  that,  when 
we  cither  expressly  or  tacitly  imdcrtakc  to  do  more,  we 
are    bound  to   keep   our  promise.     And  inasmuch   as 
every   one  who    avails    himself   of   the  advantages  of 
society,  lends  others  to  expect  from  him  all  such  positive 
good   olHccs   and  disintcroisted   Horvicon    nm    tho    moral 
improvement  attained  by   mankind  has    rendered    cus- 
tomary,   he    deserves    moral    blame    if,    without   just 
cause,  he  disappoints  that  exi)CCtation.     Througii  this 
principle  the  domain  of  moral  duty  is  always  widening. 
When  what  once  was  uncommon  virtue  becomes  com- 
mon virtue,  it  comes  to  be  numbered  among  obligations, 
while  a  degree  exceeding  what  has  grown   common, 
remains  simply  meritorious. 

M.  Comte  is  accustomed  to  draw  most  of  his  ideas 
of  moral  cultivation  from  the  discipline  of  the  Catholic 
Church.  Had  he  followed  that  guidance  in  the  present 
case,  he  would  have  been  less  wide  of  the  mark.  For 
the  distinction  which  we  have  drawn  was  fully  recog- 
nized by  the  sagacious  and  far-sighted  men  who  created 


OF  AUGUSTE   COMTE.  131 

the  Catholic  ethics.  It  is  even  one  of  the  stock  re- 
proaches against  Catholicism,  that  it  lias  two  standards 
of  morality,  and  docs  not  make  obligatory  on  all  Chris- 
tians the  highest  rule  of  Christian  perfection.  It  has 
one  standard  which  faithfully  acted  up  to,  suffices  for 
salvation,  another  and  a  higher  which  when  realized 
constitutes  a  saint.  M.  Conite,  perhaps  unconsciously, 
for  there  is  nothing  that  he  would  have  been  more 
unlikely  to  do  if  he  had  been  aware  of  it,  has  taken 
a  leaf  out  of  the  book  of  the  despised  Protestantism. 
Like  the  extreme  Calvinists,  he  requires  that  all  believ- 
ers shall  be  saints,  and  damns  them  (after  his  own 
fashion)  if  they  are  not. 

Our  conception  of  human  life  is  different.  We  do 
not  conceive  life  to  be  so  rich  in  enjoyments  that  it 
can  afford  to  forego  the  cultivation  of  all  those  which 
address  themselves  to  what  M.  Comte  terms  the  cgotis- 
(iu  propt'UtiJlioM.  On  the  eoutniry,  wo  bollovo  that  a 
sufficient  gratification  of  these,  short  of  excess,  but  up 
to  the  measure  wliich  rendci's  the  enjoyment  greatest,  is 
almost  always  favorable  to  the  benevolent  affections. 
The  moralization  of  the  personal  enjoyments  we  deem 
to  consist,  not  in  reducing  them  to  the  smallest  possible 
amount,  but  in  culti\ating  the  habitu.al  wish  to  share 
them  with  others,  and  with  all  others,  and  scorning  to 
desire  any  thing  for  one's  self  which  is  incapable  of  being 
so  shax'cd.  There  is  only  one  passion  or  inclination 
which  is  permanently  incompatible  with  this  condition 
—  the  love  of  domination,  or  superiority,  for  its  own 
sake;  which  implies,  and  is  grounded  on,  the  equiva- 
lent depression  of  other  people.  As  a  rule  of  conduct, 
to  be  enforced  by  moral  sanctions,  we  think  no  more 


132  LATER    SPECULATIONS 

should  be  attempted  than  to  prevent  people  from  doing- 
harm  to  others,  or  omitting  to  do  such  good  as  they 
have    undertaken.       Demanding   no    more    tlian    tins, 
gociety,  in  any  tolerable  circumstances,   obtains  much 
more  ;    for  the  natural  activity  of  human  nature,  shut 
out  from  all  noxious  directions,  will  expand  itself  in 
useful  ones.     This  is  our  conception  of  the  moral  rule 
prescribed   by  the  religion  of  Humanity.      But  above 
this    standard    there  is   an    unlimited    range   of  moral 
worth,  up  to   the  most  exalted  heroism,  which  should 
be  fostered  by   every  positive   encouragement,  though 
not    converted   into   an   obligation.     It   is   as   much   a 
part  of  our  scheme  as  of  M.  Comte's,  that  the  direct 
cultivation  of  altruism,  and  the  subordination  of  egoism 
to   it,   far  beyond   the  point  of  absolute   moral   duty, 
should   be   one  of  the  chief  aims   of  education,    both 
individual    and    collective.       We    even    recognize    the 
value,  for  this  end,  of  ascetic  discipline,  in  the  original 
Greek  sense  of  the  word.     We  think  witli  Dr.  John- 
son,  that  he  who  has  never  denied  himself  any  thing 
which  is  not  wrong,  cannot  be  fully  trusted  for  denying 
himself  every  thing  which   is   so.     We  do   not  doubt 
that  children  and  young  persons  will  one  day  be  again 
systematically    disciplined    in    self-mortification  ;    that 
they  will   be  taught,  as  in  antiquity,   to  control  their 
appetites,  to  brave  dangers,  and  submit  voluntarily  to 
pain,  as  simple  exercises  in  education.     Something  has 
been   lost  as  well  as  gained"  by  no  longer  giving  to 
every  citizen  the  training  necessary  for  a  soldier.     Xor 
can  any  pains  taken  be  too  great,  to  form  the  habit, 
and  develop  the  desire,  of  being  useful  to  others  and 
to  the  world,  by  the  practice,  independently  of  reward 


OF   AUGLMK    COMTE.  133 

and  of  every  personal  consideration,  of  positive  virtue 
beyond  the  bounds  of  prescribed  duty.  No  efforts 
should  be  spared  to  associate  the  pupil's  self-respect, 
und  his  desire  of  the  respect  of  others,  with  service 
rendered  to  Humanity  ;  when  possible,  collectively, 
but  at  all  events,  what  is  always  possible,  in  the  per- 
sons of  its  individual  members.  There  arc  many 
remarks  and  precepts  in  jNI.  Comtc's  volumes  which,  as 
no  less  pertinent  to  our  conception  of  morality  than  to 
his,  we  fully  accept.  For  cxaujplc  :  without  admitting 
tiiat  to  make  "  calculs  personnels  "  is  contrary  to  mo- 
rality, %ve  agree  with  him  in  the  opinion,  that  the  prin- 
cipal hygienic  precepts  should  be  inculcated,  not  solely 
or  principally  as  maxims  of  prudence,  but  as  ia  matter 
of  duty  to  others,  since  by  squandering  our  health  we 
disable  ourselves  from  rendering  to  our  fellow-creatures 
the  services  to  which  they  are  entitled.  As  M.  Comte 
truly  says,  the  prudential  motive  is  by  no  means  fully 
sufficient  for  the  purpose,  even  physicians  often  disre- 
garding their  own  precepts.  The  personal  penalties 
of  neglect  of  health  are  commonly  distant,  as  well  as 
more  or  less  uncertain,  and  require  the  additional  and 
more  immediate  sanction  of  moral  responsibility.  M. 
Comte,  therefore,  in  this  instance,  is,  we  conceive, 
right  in  principle ;  though  we  have  not  the  smallest 
doubt  that  he  would  have  fjone  into  extreme  cxa^ijera- 
tion  in  practice,  and  would  have  wholly  ignored  the 
legitimate  liberty  of  the  individual  to  judge  for  himself 
respecting  his  own  bodily  conditions,  with  due  relation 
to  the  sufficiency  of  his  means  of  knowledge,  and 
taking  the  responsibility  of  the  result. 

Connected  with  the  same  considerations  is  another 


134:  LATER   SPECULATIONS 

idea  of  M.  Comtc,  which  has  great  beauty  and  grandeur 
in  it,  and  the  realization  of  Avhich,  witiiin  the  hounds 
of  possibility,  would  be  a  cultivation  of  tiic  social  feel- 
ings on  a  most  essential  point.     It  is,  that  every  person 
who  lives   by  any  useful  work,  should  be  habituated  to 
regard   himself  not   as    an    individual   workini;  for  his 
private  benefit,  but  as   a  public  functionary  ;    and  his 
wages,   of  whatever  sort,  as   not  the  remuneration   or 
purchase-money  of  his    labor,   which   should   be  given 
freely,  but  as  the  provision  made  by  society  to  enable 
him   to   carry  it  on,  and  to  replace  the- nmtcrials  and 
products   which    have   been    consumed   in   the  process. 
M.   Comte    observes,    that  in    modern    industry  every 
one  in  fact  works  much  more  for  others  than  for  him- 
self, since  his  productions  are  to  be  consumed  by  others, 
and  it  is  only  necessary  that  his  thoughts  and  imagina- 
tion should  adapt  themselves   to  the  real  state  of  the 
fact.     The  practical   problem,  however,  is  not  quite  so 
simple,  for  a  strong  sense  that  he  is  working  for  others 
m.ay  lead  to  nothing  better  than  feeling  himself  necessary 
to  them,  and,  instead  of  freely  giving  his  commodity,  may 
only  encourage  him  to  put  a  high  price  upon  it.     What 
M.  Comte  really  means  is,  that  we  should  regard  work- 
ing for  the  benefit  of  others  as  a  good  in  itself;  that 
we  should  desire  it  for  its  own  sake,  and  not  for  the 
sake  of  remuneration  which  cannot  justly  be  claimed 
for  doing  what  we  like :    that  the  proper  return  for  a 
service  to  society  is  the  gratitude  of  society  ;    and  that 
the  moral  claim  of  any  one  in  regard  to  the  pro^  ision 
for  his  personal  wants,  is  not  a  question  of  quid  pro 
quo  in  respect  to  his  co-operation,  but  of  how  much 
the  circumstances  of  society  permit  to  be  assigned  to 


OF    AUGUSTE    COMTE.  135 

him,  consistently  with  the  just  claims  of  others.  To 
this  opinion  we  entirely  subscribe.  The  rough  method 
of  settling  the  hiborer's  share  of  the  produce,  by  the 
competition  of  the  market,  may  represent  a  practical 
necessity,  but  certainly  not  a  moral  ideal.  Its  defence 
is,  that  civilization  has  not  hitherto  been  equal  to  organ- 
izing any  thing  better  than  this  first  rude  approach  to  an 
equitable  distribution.  Rude  as  it  is,  we  for  the  present 
go  less  wrong  by  leaving  the  thing  to  settle  itself,  than 
by  settling  it  artificially  in  any  mode  which  has  yet. 
been  tried.  But  in  wliatever  manner  that  question 
may  ultimately  be  decided,  the  true  moral  and  social 
idea  of  Labor  is  in  no  way  affected  by  it.  Until  labor- 
ers and  employers  perform  the  work  of  industry  in  the 
S2)irit  in  which  soldiers  perform  tliat  of  an  army,  indus- 
try will  never  be  moralized,  and  military  life  will 
remain,  what,  in  spite  of  the  anti-social  character  of  its 
direct  object  it  has  hitherto  been  —  the  chief  school  of 
moral  co-operation. 

Thus  far  of  the  general  idea  of  M.  Comte's  ethics 
and  religion.  We  must  now  say  something  of  the 
details.  Here  we  approach  the  ludici'ous  side  of 
the  subject :  but  we  shall  unfortunately  have  to  relate 
other  things  far  more  really  ridiculous. 

There  cannot  be  a  religion  without  a  cidtus.  We 
use  this  term  for  want  of  any  other,  for  its  nearest 
equivalent,  worship,  suggests  a  different  order  of  ideas. 
T\'e  mean  by  it  a  set  of  systematic  observances,  in- 
tended to  cultivate  and  maintain  the  religious  sentiment. 
Though  M.  Comte  justly  api}reciates  the  superior  effi- 
cacy of  acts,  in  keeping  up  and  strengthening  the 
feeling  which  prompts  them,  over  any  mode  whatever 


136  LATER   SPECULATIONS 

of  mere  expression,   he  takes  pains  to   organize   the 
latter  also   witli   great    minuteness.      lie  provides   an 
equivalent  both   for  the  private  devotions,  and  for  tlie 
public  ceremonies  of  other  faiths.     Tiie  reader  will  be 
surprised  to  learn,  that   the  former  consists  of  prayer. 
But  prayer,    as    understood    by  M.    Comte,   docs   not 
mean  asking  ;   it  is  a  mere  outpouring  of  feeling  ;   and 
for  this  view  of  it  he  claims  the  authority  of  tiic  Chris- 
tian mystics.     It  is  not  to  be  addressed  to  the  Grand 
Etre,  to  collective  Humanity ;    though  he  occasionally 
carries  metaphor  so  far  as  to  style  this  a  goddess.     The 
honors  to  collective  Humanity  are  reserved  for  the  pub- 
lic celebrations.     Private  adoration  is  to  be  addressed 
to  it  in  the  persons  of  Avorthy  individual  representa- 
tives, who  may  be  either  living  or  .dead,  but  must  in 
all  cases  be  women  ;  for  women,  being  the  scxe  aimant, 
represent  the  best  attribute  of  humanity,   that  which 
ought  to   regulate  all   human   life,  nor  can   Humanity 
possibly    be    symbolized    in    any    form    but   that    of  a 
woman.       The    objects    of   private    adoration    arc    the 
mother,  the  wife,  and  the  daughter,  representing  sev- 
erally the  past,  the  present,  and  the  futiu'c,  and  calling 
into  active  exercise  the  three  social  sentiments,  vener- 
ation, attachment,  and   kindness.     We   are   to   regard 
them,  whether  dead  or  alive,  as  our  guardian  angels, 
"les  vrais  anges  gardiens."     If  the  two  last  have  never 
existed,  or  if,  in  the  particular  case,  any  of  the  three 
types  is  too  faulty  for  the  office  assigned  to  it,  their 
place  may  be  supplied  by  some  other  type  of  womanly 
excellence,   even   by  one   merely  historical.      Be  tho 
object  living  or  dead,  tho  adoration  (as  wo  understand 
it)  is  to  be  addressed  only  to  the  idea.     The  prayer 


OF   AUGUSTE   COMTE.  137 

consists  of  two  parts ;  a  commemoration,  followed  by 
an  effusion.  By  a  commemoration  M.  Comte  means  an 
cifoi't  of  memory  and  imagination,  summoning  up 
with  the  utmost  possible  vividness  the  image  of  the 
object :  and  every  artifice  is  exhausted  to  render  the 
image  as  life-like,  as  close  to  the  reality,  as  near  an 
approach  to  actual  hallucination,  as  is  consistent  with 
.  sanity.  This  degree  of  intensity  having  been,  as  far 
as  practicable,  attained,  the  effusion  follows.  Every 
person  sliould  compose  his  own  form  of  prayer,  which 
should  be  repeated  not  mentally  only,  but  orally,  and 
may  be  added  to  or  varied  for  sufficient  cause,  but 
never  arbitrarily.  It  may  be  interspersed  with  passages 
from  the  best  poets,  when  they  present  themselves 
sj^ontaneously,  as  giving  a  felicitous  expression  to  the 
adorer's  own  feeling.  These  observances  ^f.  Corate 
j)ractised  to  the  memory  of  his  Clotildc,  and  he  enjoins 
them  on  all  true  believers.  They  are  to  occupy  two 
hours  of  every  day,  divided  into  three  parts  ;  at  rising, 
in  the  middle  of  the  working-hours,  and  in  bed  at 
night.  The  first,  which  should  be  in  a  kneeling  atti- 
tude, will  commonly  be  the  longest,  and  the  second 
the  shortest.  The  t'.iird  is  to  be  extended  as  nearly 
as  possible  to  the  moment  of  falling  asleep,  that  its 
effect  may  be  felt  in  disciplining  even  the  dreams. 

The  public  cultus  consists  of  a  series  of  celebrations 
or  festivals,  eighty-four  in  the  year,  so  arranged  that  at 
least  one  occurs  in  every  week.  They  are  devoted  to 
the  successive  glorification  of  Humanity  itself;  of  tlie 
various  ties,  political  and  domestic,  among  mankind; 
of  the  buc'cestilvo  stages  in  tlio  past  evolution  of  our 
gpecies ;    and   of  the    several   classes   into  which   M. 


138  LATER   SPECULATIONS 

Gimte's  polity  divides  mankind.  M.  Comte's  religion 
has,  moreover,  nine  Sacraments ;  consisting  in  the 
solenm  consecration,  by  tlie  priests  of  Humanity,  with 
appropriate  exhortations,  of  all  the  great  transitions  in 
life ;  the  entry  into  life  itself,  and  into  each  of  its  suc- 
cessive stages  :  education,  marriage,  the  choice  of  a 
profession,  and  so  forth.  Among  these  is  death,  which 
receives  the  name  of  transformation,  and  is  considered 
as  a  passage  from  objective  existence  to  subjective  —  to 
livin"-  in  the  memorv  of  our  fcllow-ercaturcs.  llavin'j 
no  eternity  of  objective  existence  to  offer,  M.  Comte's 
religion  gives  all  it  can,  by  holding  out  the  hope  of 
subjective  immortality  —  of  existing  in  the  remem- 
brance and  in  the  posthumous  adoration  of  mankind  at 
large,  if  we  have  done  any  thing  to  deserve  remem- 
brance from  them ;  at  all  events,  of  those  whom  we 
loved  during  life  ;  and  when  tliey  too  are  gone,  of  being 
included  in  the  collective  adoration  paid  to  the  Grand 
Etre.  People  are  to  be  taught  to  look  forward  to  this 
as  a  sufficient  recompense  for  the  devotion  of  a  whole 
life  to  the  service  of  Humanity.  Seven  years  aflnr 
death  comes  the  last  Sacrament:  a  public  judgment,  by 
the  priesthood,  on  the  memory  of  the  defunct.  This 
is  not  designed  for  purposes  of  reprobation,  but  of 
honor;  and  anyone  may,  by  declaration  during  life, 
exempt  himself  from  it.  If  judged  and  found  worthy, 
he  is  solemnly  incorporated  with  the  Grand  Etre  ;  and 
his  remains  are  transferred  fron\  the  civil  to  the  religious 
place  of  sepulture :  '*  le  bois  6acr<*  qui  doit  entourer 
chaque  temple  de  THumanitiJ." 

This  brief  abstract  gives  no  idea  of  the  minuteness 
of  M.   Comte's    prescriptions,   and   the   extraordinary 


OF  AUGUSTE   COMTE.  139 

height  to  wliich  he  carries  the  mania  for  regulation  by 
which  Frcnclimen  arc  distinguished  among  Europeans, 
and  ]\r.  Comtc  among  Frenchmen.  It  is  this  which 
throws  an  irresistible  air  of  ridicule  over  the  whole 
subject.  There  is  nothing  really  ridiculous  in  the  devo- 
tional practices  which  M.  Comte  recommends  towards 
a  cherished  memory  or  an  ennobling  ideal,  when  they 
come  unj^rompted  from  the  depths  of  the  individual 
feeling ;  but  there  is  something  ineffably  ludicrous  in 
enjoining  that  everybody  shall  practise  them  three  times 
daily  for  a  period  of  two  hours,  not  because  his  feelings 
require  them,  but  for  the  premeditated  purpose  of  get- 
ting his  feelings  up.  The  ludicrous,  however,  in  any 
of  its  shapes,  is  a  phenomenon  with  which  M.  Comte 
seems  to  have  been  totally  unacquainted.  There  is 
nothing  in  his  writings  from  which  it  could  be  inferred 
that  he  knew  of  the  existence  of  such  things  as  wit  and 
humor.  The  only  writer  possessed  of  either  for  whom 
he  shows  any  admiration  is  ]\Ioliere,  and  him  he  admires 
not  for  his  wit  but  for  his  wisdom.  We  notice  this 
without  intending  any  reflection  on  M.  Comte ;  for  a 
profound  conviction  raises  a  person  above  the  feeling 
of  ridicule.  But  there  ai*e  passages  in  his  writings 
which,  it  really  seems  to  us,  could  have  been  written 
by  no  man  who  had  ever  laughed.  We  will  give  one 
of  these  instances.  Besides  the  regular  prayers,  M. 
Comte's  religion,  like  the  Catholic,  has  need  of  forms 
which  can  be  applied  to  casual  and  unforeseen  occa- 
sions. These,  he  says,  must  in  general  be  left  to  the 
believer's  own  choice  ;  but  he  suggests  as  a  very  suita- 
ble one  the  repetition  of  the  "  fundamental  formula  of 
Positivism,"  viz.,  "I'amour  pour  principe,  I'ordre  pour 


140  LATER   SrECULATIONS 

base,  et  le  progres  pour  but."  Not  content,  however, 
with  an  equivalent  for  tlje  Paters  and  Aves  of  Catholi- 
cism, he  must  have  one  for  the  sign  of  the  cross  also ; 
and  he  thus  delivers  himself:*  "  Cette  expansion  peut 
etre  perfection nde  par  dcs  signes  univcrsels.  .  .  .  Afin 
de  micux  d(5velo[)pcr  I'aptitude  nccessaire  de  la  formule 
positiviste  a  representor  toujours  la  condition  humaine, 
il  convicnt  ordinairement  de  Tcnoncer  en  touchant  suc- 
cessivement  Ics  j^rincipaux  organcs  rpie  la  th(^orie  c6r6-' 
brale  assigne  a  ses  trois  Elements."  This  mat/  be  a 
very  appropriate  mode  of  expressing  one's  devotion  to 
the  Grand  Etre :  but  any  one  who  had  ajipreciated  its 
effect  on  the  profane  reader,  would  have  thought  it  judi- 
cious to  keep  it  back  till  a  considerably  more  advanced 
stage  in  the  propagation  of  the  Positive  licligion. 

As  M.  Comte's  religion  has  a  cultus,  so  also  it  has 
a  clergy,  who  are  the  pivot  of  his  entire  social  and 
political  system.  Their  nature  and  office  will  be  best 
shown  by  describing  his  ideal  of  political  society  in  its 
normal  state,  with  the  various  classes  of  which  it  is 
composed. 

The  necessity  of  a  Spiritual  Power,  distinct  and 
separate  from  the  temporal  government,  is  the  essential 
principle  of  M.  Comte's  political  scheme ;  as  it  may 
well  be,  since  the  Spiritual  Power  is  the  only  counter- 
poise he  provides  or  tolerates  to  the  absolute  dominion 
of  the  civil  rulers.  Nothing  can  exceed  his  combined 
detestation  and  contempt  for  government  by  assemblies, 
and  for  parliamentary  or  representative  institutions  in 
any  form.     They  are  an  expedient,  in  his  opinion,  only 

•  SjBtSme  de  Politique  Positive,  ir.  100 


OP  AUGUSTE   COMTE.  141 

suited  to  a  state  of  transition,  and  even  that  nowhere 
hut  in  England.  The  attempt  to  naturalize  them  in 
France,  or  any  Continental  nation,  he  regards  as  mis- 
chievous quackery.  Louis  Napoleon's  usurpation  is 
absolved,  is  made  laudable  to  him,  because  it  overthrew 
a  representative  government.  Election  of  superiors  by 
inferiors,  except  as  a  revolutionary  expedient,  is  an 
abomination  in  his  sight.  Public  functionaries  of  all 
kinds  should  name  their  successors,  subject  to  the 
approbation  of  their  own  superiors,  and  giving  public 
notice  of  the  nomination  so  long  beforehand  as  to  admit 
of  discussion,  and  the  timely  revocation  of  a  wrong 
choice.  But,  by  the  side  of  the  temporal  rulers,  he 
places  another  authority,  with  no  power  to  command, 
but  only  to  advise  and  remonstrate.  The  family  being 
in  his  mind  as  in  that  of  Frenchmen  generally,  the 
foundation  and  essential  type  of  all  society,  the  separa- 
tion of  the  two  .powers  commences  there.  The  spiritual, 
or  moral  and  religious  power,  in  the  family,  is  the 
women  of  it.  The  positivist  family  is  composed  of 
the  "fundamental  couple,"  their  children,  and  the  pa- 
rents of  the  man,  if  alive.  The  whole  government  of 
the  household,  except  as  regards  the  education  of  the 
children,  resides  in  the  man ;  and  even  over  that  he  has 
complete  power,  but  should  forbear  to  exert  it.  The 
part  assigned  to  the  women  is  to  improve  the  man 
through  his  affections,  and  to  bring  up  the  children, 
who,  until  the  age  of  fourteen,  at  which  scientific 
instruction  begins,  are  to  be  educated  wholly  by  their 
mother.  That  women  may  be  better  fitted  for  these 
functions,  they  are  peremptorily  excluded  from  all 
others.     No  woman  is  to  work  for  her  living.     Every 


142  LATER   SPECULATIONS 

woman  is  to  be  supported  by  her  husband  or  her  male 
relations,  and,  if  she  has  none  of  these,  by  the  State. 
She  is  to  have  no  powers  of  goverament,  even  domes- 
tic, and  no  property,  ller  legal  rights  of  inlieritance 
are  preserved  to  her,  that  her  feelings  of  duty  may 
make  her  voluntarily  forego  them.  There  are  to  be  no 
marriage  portions,  that  women  may  no  longer  be  sought 
in  marriaiie  from  interested  motives.  Marriages  arc  to 
be  rigidly  indissoluble,  except  for  a  single  cause.  It  is 
remarkable  that  the  bitterest  enemy  of  divorce  among 
all  philosophers,  nevertheless  allows  it,  in  a  case  which 
the  laws  of  England,  and  of  other  countries  reproached 
by  him  with  tolerating  divorce,  do  not  admit ;  namely, 
when  one  of  the  parties  has  been  sentenced  to  an  infa- 
mizing punishment,  involving  loss  of  civil  rights.  It 
is  monstrous  that  condenmation,  even  for  life,  to  a 
felon's  punishment,  should  leave  an  unhappy  victim 
bound  to,  and  in  tiie  wife's  case  under  the  legal  author- 
ity of,  the  culprit.  M.  Comtc  could  feel  for  the 
injustice  in  this  special  case,  because  it  chanced  to 
be  the  unfortunate  situation  of  his  Clotilde.  Minor 
degrees  of  unworthiness  may  entitle  the  innocent  party 
to  a  legal  separation,  but  without  the  power  of  re- 
marriage. Second  marriages,  indeed,  arc  not  permitted 
by  the  Positive  Religion.  There  is  to  be  no  impediment 
to  them  by  law,  but  morality  is  to  condemn  them,  and 
every  couple  who  are  married  religiously  as  well  as 
civilly  arc  to  make  a  vow  of  eternal  widowhood,  "  le 
veuvage  ^ternel."  This  absolute  monogany  is,  in  M. 
Comte'a  opinion,  essential  to  the  complete  fusion  be- 
tween two  beings,  which  is  the  essence  of  marriage ; 
and  moreover,  eternal  constancy  is  required  by  the  post- 


OF  AUGUSTE   COMTE.  14.3 

humous  .idoratlon,  which  is  to  be  continuously  paid  by 
the  survivor  to  one  who,  though  objectively  dead,  still 
lives  "subjectively."  The  domestic  spiritual  power, 
which  resides  in  the  women  of  the  family,  is  chiefly 
concentrated  in  the  most  venerable  of  them,  the  hus- 
band's mother,  while  alive.  It  has  an  auxiliary  in  the 
influence  of  age,  represented  by  the  husband's  father, 
who  is  supposed  to  have  passed  the  period  of  retirement 
from  active  life,  fixed  by  M.  Comte  (for  he  fixes  every 
thing)  at  sixty-three ;  at  which  age  the  head  of  the 
family  gives  up  the  reins  of  authority  to  his  son, 
retaining  only  a  consultative  voice. 

This  domestic  Spiritual  Power,  being  principally 
moral,  and  confined  to  private  life,  requires  the  support 
and  guidance  of  an  intellectual  power  exterior  to  it,  the 
sphere  of  which  will  naturally  be  wider,  extending  also 
to  public  life.  This  consists  of  the  clergy,  or  priest- 
hood, for  jM.  Couite  is  fond  of  borrowing  the  conse- 
crated expressions  of  Catholicism  to  denote  the  nearest 
equivalents  which  his  own  system  affords.  The  clergy 
are  the  theoretic  or  philosophical  class,  and  are  sup- 
ported by  an  endowment  from  the  State,  voted  periodi- 
cally, but  administered  by  themselves.  Like  wonien, 
they  are  to  be  excluded  from  all  riches,  and  from  all 
participation  in  power  (except  the  absolute  power  of 
each  over  his  own  household).  They  are  neither  to 
inherit,  nor  to  receive  emolument  from  any  of  their 
functions,  or  from  their  writings  or  teachings  of  any 
description,  but  are  to  live  solely  on  their  small  salaries. 
This  M.  Comte  deems  necessary  to  the  complete  disin- 
terestedness of  their  counsels.  To  have  the  confidence 
of  the  masses,  they  must,  like  the  masses,   be  poor. 


144  LATER   SPECULATIONS 

Their  exclusion  from  political  and  from  all  other  prac- 
tical occupations  is  indispensable  for  the  same  reason, 
and  for  others  equally  peremptory.  Those  occupations 
arc,  he  contends,  incompatible  with  the  habits  of  mind 
necessary  to  philosophers.  A  practical  position,  cither 
private  or  public,  chains  the  mind  to  specialities  and 
details,  while  a  philosopher's  business  is  with  general 
truths  and  connected  views  (vucs  d'enscmble).  These, 
again,  require  an  habitual  abstraction  from  details, 
which  unfits  the  mind  for  judging  well  and  rapidly  of 
individual  cases.  The  same  person  cannot  be  both  a 
good  theorist,  and  a  good  practitioner  or  ruler,  though 
practitioners  and  rulers  ougiit  to  have  a  solid  theoretic 
education.  The  two  kinds  of  function  must  be  abso- 
lutely exclusive  of  one  another :  to  attempt  them  both, 
is  inconsistent  with  fitness  for  either.  But  as  men  may 
mistake  their  vocation,  up  to  the  age  of  thirty-five  they 
arc  allowed  to  change  their  career. 

To  the  clergy  is  entrusted  the  theoretic  or  scientific 
instruction  of  youth.  The  medical  ai't  also  is  to  be  in 
their  hands,  since  no  one  is  fit  to  be  a  physician  who 
does  not  study  and  understand  the  whole  man,  moral 
as  well  as  physical.  M.  Comte  has  a  contemptuous 
opinion  of  the  existing  race  of  physicians,  who,  he 
says,  deserve  no  higher  name  than  that  of  vctcrinaires, 
since  they  concern  themselves  with  man  only  in  his 
animal,  and  not  in  his  hum.an  character.  In  his  last 
years,  M.  Comte  (as  we  learn  from  Dr.  Robinet's  vol- 
lime)  indulged  in  the  wildest  speculations  on  medical 
science,  declaring  all  maladies  to  be  one  and  tiie  same 
disease,  the  disturbance  or  destruction  of  "  I'unitd  c(jrd- 
brale.*'     The  other  functions  of  the  clergy  are  moral, 


OF   AUGUSTE   COMTE.  145 

much  more  than  intellectual.  They  are  the  spu'itual 
directors,  and  venerated  advisers,  of  the  active  or  prac- 
tical classes,  including  the  politicaL  They  are  the 
mediators  in  all  social  differences ;  between  the  laborers, 
for  instance,  and  their  employers.  They  are  to  advise 
and  admonish  on  all  important  violations  of  the  moral 
law.  Especially,  it  devolves  on  them  to  keep  the  rich 
and  powerful  to  the  performance  of  their  moral  dutie.-> 
towards  their  inferiors.  If  private  remonstrance  fails, 
public  denunciation  is  to  follow  :  in  extreme  cases  they 
may  proceed  to  the  length  of  excommunication,  wliich. 
though  it  only  operates  through  opinion,  yet,  if  it  carrie.- 
opinion  with  it,  may,  as  M.  Comte  complacently  ob- 
serves, be  of  such  powerful  efficacy,  that  the  richest 
man  may  be  driven  to  produce  his  subsistence  by  his 
own  manual  labor,  through  the  impossibility  of  inducing 
any  other  person  to  work  for  him.  In  this  as  in  all 
other  cases,  the  priesthood  depends  for  its  authority  on 
carrying  with  it  the  mass  of  the  people,  —  those  who, 
possessing  no  accumulations,  live  on  the  wages  of  daily 
labor;  popularly  but  incorrectly  termed  the  working 
classes,  and  by  French  writers,  in  their  Eoman-law 
phraseology,  proletaires.  These,  therefore,  who  are 
not  allowed  the  smallest  political  rights,  are  incorpo- 
rated into  the  Spiritual  Power,  of  which  they  form, 
after  women  and  the  clergy,  the  third  element. 

It  remains  to  give  an  account  of  the  Temporal 
Power,  composed  of  the  rich  and  the  employers  of 
labor,  two  classes  who  in  M.  Comte's  system  are 
reduced  to  one,  for  he  allows  of  no  idle  rich.  A  life 
made  up  of  mere  amusement  and  self-indulgence » 
though  not  interdicted  by  law,  is  to  be  deemed  so  dis- 

10 


146  LATER   SPECULATIONS 

graceful,  that  nobody  with  the  smallest  sense  of  shame 
would  choose  to  be  guilty  of  it.  Here,  we  think,  M. 
Comte  has  liglitcd  on  a  true  principle,  towards  which 
the  tone  of  opinion  in  modern  Europe  is  more  and 
more  tending,  and  which  is  destined  to  be  one  of  tlie 
constitutive  principles  of  regenerated  society.  We  be- 
lieve, for  example,  with  him,  that  in  the  future  there 
will  be  no  class  of  landlords  living  at  case  on  their 
rents,  but  every  landlord  will  be  a  capitalist  trained  to 
agriculture,  himself  superintending  and  directing  the 
cultivation  of  his  estate.  Xo  one  but  he  who  guides 
the  work  should  have  the  control  of  tiie  tools.  In  M. 
Conjte's  system,  the  rich,  as  a  rule,  consist  of  the 
"captains  of  industry:"  but  the  rule  is  not  entirely 
without  exception,  for  M.  Comte  recognizes  other  use- 
ful modes  of  employing  riches.  In  particular,  one  of 
his  favorite  ideas  is  that  of  an  order  of  Ciiivalry,  com- 
posed of  the  most  generous  and  self-devoted  of  the 
rich,  voluntarily  dedicating  themselves,  like  knights- 
errant  of  old,  to  the  redressin":  of  wronsfs,  and  the 
protection  of  the  weak  and  oppressed.  He  remarks, 
that  oppression,  in  modern  life,  can  seldom  reach,  or 
even  venture  to  attack,  the  life  or  liberty  of  its  victims 
(lie  forgets  the  case  of  domestic  tyranny),  but  only 
their  pecuniary  means,  and  it  is  therefore  by  the  purse 
chiefly  that  individuals  can  usefully  interpose,  as  they 
formerly  did  by  the  sword.  The  occupation,  however, 
of  nearly  all  the  rich,  will  be  the  direction  of  labor, 
and  for  this  work  they  will  be  educated.  Reciprocally, 
it  is  in  M.  Comte's  opinion  essential,  that  all  directors 
of  labor  should  be  rich.  Capital  (in  which  he  includes 
land)  should  be  concentrated  in  a  few  holders,  so  that 


.    OF  AUGUSTE   COMTE.  147 

every  capitalist  may  conduct  the  most  extensive  opera- 
tions which  one  mind  is  capable  of  superintending. 
This  is  not  only  demanded  by  good  economy,  in  order 
to  take  the  utmost  advantage  of  a  rare  kind  of  prac- 
tical ability,  but  it  necessarily  follows  from  the  principle 
of  M.  Comte's  scheme,  which  regards  a  capitalist  as  a 
public  functionary.  M.  Comte's  conception  of  the  rela- 
tion of  capital  to  society  is  essentially  that  of  Socialists, 
but  he  would  bring  about  by  education  and  opinion, 
what  they  aim  at  effecting  by  positive  institution.  The 
owner  of  capital  is  by  no  means  to  consider  himself  its 
absolute  proprietor.  Legally  he  is  not  to  be  controlled 
in  his  dealings  with  it,  for  power  should  be  in  propor- 
tion to  responsibility  :  but  it  does  not  belong  to  him  for 
his  own  use ;  he  is  merely  intrusted  by  society  with  a 
portion  of  the  accumulations  made  by  the  past  pro\'i- 
dence  of  mankind,  to  be  administered  for  the  benefit 
of  the  present  generation  and  of  posterity,  under  the 
obligation  of  preserving  them  unimpaired,  and  handing 
them  down,  more  or  less  augmented,  to  our  successors. 
He  is  not  entitled  to  dissipate  them,  or  divert  them 
from  the  service  of  Huuianity  to  his  own  pleasures. 
Nor  has  he  a  moral  right  to  consume  on  himself  the 
whole  even  of  his  profits.  He  is  bound  in  conscience, 
if  they  exceed  his  reasonable  wants,  to  employ  the  sur- 
plus in  improving  either  the  efficiency  of  his  operations, 
or  the  physical  and  mental  condition  of  liis  laborers. 
The  portion  of  his  gains  which  he  may  appropriate  to 
Lis  own  use,  must  be  decided  by  himself,  under  account- 
ability to  opinion  ;  and  opinion  ought  not  to  look  very» 
narrowly  into  the  matter,  nor  hold  him  to  a  rigid  reck- 
oning for  any  moderate  indulgence  of  luxury  or  osten- 


148  LATER   SPECULATIONS 

tation ;  since  under  the  gi-eat  responsibilities  that  will 
be  iniposed  on  him,  the  position  of  an  employer  of  labor 
■will  be  80  much  less  desirable,  to  any  one  in  wliom 
the  instincts  of  pride  and  vanity  are  not  strong,  than  the 
"heureuse  insouciance"  of  a  laborer,  that  those  instincts 
must  be  to  a  certain  degree  indulged,  or  no  one  would 
undertake  the  office.  With  this  limitation,  every  em- 
ployer is  a  mere  administrator  of  his  possessions,  for 
his  work-people  and  for  society  at  large.  If  he  indulges 
himself  lavishly,  without  reserving  an  ample  remunera- 
tion for  all  who  are  employed  under  him,  he  is  morally 
culpable,  and  will  incur  sacerdotal  admonition.  This 
state  of  things  necessarily  implies  that  capital  sliould  be 
in  a  few  hands,  because,  as  M.  Cumte  observes,  without 
great  riches,  the  obligations  which  society  ought  to 
impose,  could  not  be  fulfilled  without  an  amount  of 
])ersonal  abnegation  that  it  would  be  hopeless  to  expect. 
If  a  person  is  conspicuously  qualified  for  the  conduct 
of  an  industrial  enterprise,  but  destitute  of  the  fortune 
necessary  for  undertaking  it,  M.  Comte  recommends 
that  he  should  be  enriched  by  subscription,  or,  in  cases 
of  sufficient  importance,  by  the  State.  Small  landed 
proprietors  and  capitalists,  and  the  middle  classes  alto- 
gether, he  regards  as  a  parasitic  growth,  destined  to  dis- 
appear, the  best  of  the  body  becoming  large  capitalists, 
and  the  remainder  proletaires.  Society  will  consist 
only  of  rich  and  poor,  and  it  will  be  the  business  of  the 
rich  to  make  the  best  possible  lot  for  the  poor.  The 
remuneration  of  the  laborers  will  continue,  as  at  preisent, 
to  be  a  matter  of  voluntary  arrangement  between  them 
and  their  employers,  the  last  resort  on  either  side  being 
refusal  of  co-operation,  "refus  de  concours,"  in  other 


or   AUGUSTE   COMTE.  149 

words,  a  strike  or  a  lock-out ;  with  the  6acei;dotal  order 
for  mediators  in  case  of  need.  But  though  wages  are 
to  be  an  affair  of  free  contract,  their  standard  is  not  to 
be  the  competition  of  the  market,  but  the  apphcation 
of  the  products  in  equitable  proportion  between  tlic 
wants  of  the  laborers  and  the  wants  and  dignity  of 
the  employer.  As  it  is  one  of  M.  Comte's  principles 
that  a  question  cannot  be  usefully  proposed  without  an 
attempt  at  a  solution,  he  gives  his  ideas  from  the  begin- 
ning as  to  what  the  normal  income  of  a  laboring  family 
(should  be.  They  are  on  such  a  scale,  that  until  some 
great  extension  shall  have  taken  place  in  the  scientific 
resources  of  mankind,  it  is  no  wonder  he  thinks  it 
necessary  to  limit  as  nmch  as  possible  the  number  of 
those  who  are  to  be  supported  by  what  is  left  of  the 
produce.  In  the  first  place  the  laborer's  dwelling, 
which  is  to  consist  of  seven  rooms,  is,  with  all  that  it 
contains,  to  be  his  own  property  :  it  is  the  only  landed 
property  he  is  allowed  to  possess,  but  every  family 
should  be  the  absolute  owner  of  all  things  which  are 
destined  for  its  exclusive  use.  Lod<Ting  bein":  thus 
independently  provided  for,  and  education  and  medical 
attendance  being  secured  gratuitously  by  the  general 
arrangements  of  society,  the  pay  of  the  laborer  is  to 
consist  of  two  portions,  the  one  monthly,  and  of  fixed 
amount,  the  other  weekly,  and  proportioned  to  the  pro- 
duce of  his  labor.  The  former  M.  Comte  fixes  at  100 
francs  (£4)  for  a  month  of  28  days ;  being  £52  a 
year :  and  the  rate  of  piece-work  should  be  such  as  to 
make  the  other  part  amount  to  an  average  of  seven 
francs  (5s.  6d.)  per  working-day. 

Agreeably  to  M.   Comte's  rule,   that   every  public 


150  LATER   SPECULATIONS 

functionary  should  appoint  hia  successor,  the  capitalist 
has  unlimited  power  of  transmitting  his  capital  by  gift 
or  bequest,  after  his  o\\n  death  or  retirement.  In  gen- 
eral it  will  be  best  bestowed  entire  upon  one  person, 
unless  the  business  will  advantageously  admit  of  sub- 
division, lie  will  naturally  leave  it  to  one  or  more  of 
his  sons,  if  sufficiently  qualified  ;  and  rightly  so,  heredi- 
tary being,  in  ^I.  Comte's  opinion,  preferable  to  acquired 
wealth,  as  being  usually  more  generously  administered. 
But,  merely  as  his  sons,  they  have  no  moral  right  to  it. 
M.  Comte  here  recognizes  another  of  the  principles,  on 
which  wc  believe  that  the  constitution  of  regenerated 
society  will  rest.  lie  maintains  (as  others  in  the  present 
generation  have  done)  that  the  father  owes  nothing  to 
his  son,  except  a  good  education,  and  pecimiary  aid 
sufficient  for  an  advantageous  start  in  life  :  that  he  is 
entitled,  and  may  be  morally  bound,  to  leave  the  bulk 
of  his  fortune  to  some  other  properly  selected  person  or 
persons,  whom  he  judges  likely  to  make  a  more  benefi- 
cial use  of  it.  This  is  the  first  of  three  important 
points,  in  which  ]M.  Comte's  theory  of  the  family, 
wrong  as  wc  deem  it  in  its  foundations,  is  in  advance 
of  prevailing  theories  and  existing  institutions.  The 
second,  is  the  re-introduction  of  adoption,  not  only  in 
default  of  children,  but  to  fulfil  the  purposes,  and  sat- 
isfy the  sympathetic  wants,  to  which  such  children  as 
there  are  may  happen  to  be  inadequate.  The  third  is 
a  most  important  point — the  incorporation  of  domestics 
as  substantive  members  of  the  family.  There  is  hardly 
any  part  of  the  present  constitution  of  society  more 
essentially  vicious,  and  morally  injurious  to  both  par- 
ties, than  the  relation  between  masters  and  servants. 


OF   AUGUSTE    COMTE,  151 

To  make  this  a  really  human,  and  a  moral  relation,  is 
one  of  the  principal  desiderata  in  social  improvement. 
The  feeling  of  the  vul-^ar  of  all  classes,  that  domestic 
service  has  any  thing  in  it  peculiarly  mean,  is  a  feeling 
than  which  there  is  none  meaner.  In  the  feudal  ages, 
youthful  nobles  of  the  highest  rank  thougiit  tlicmsclvcs 
honored  by  officiating  in  what  is  now  called  a  menial 
capacity,  about  the  persons  of  superiors  of  both  sexes, 
for  whom  they  felt  respect :  and,  as  jVI.  Comte  observes, 
there  are  many  families  who  can  in  no  other  way  so 
usefully  serve  Humanity,  as  by  ministering  to  the  bodily 
wants  of  other  families,  called  to  functions  which  re- 
quire the  devotion  of  all  their  thoughts.  We  will  add 
by  way  of  supplement  to  M.  Cointe's  doctrine,  that 
much  of  the  daily  physical  work  of  a  household,  even 
in  opulent  families,  if  silly  notions  of  degradation,  com- 
mon to  all  ranks,  did  not  interfere,  might  very  advan- 
tageously be  performed  by  the  family  itself,  at  least  by 
its  younger  members  ;  to  whom  it  would  give  healthful 
exercise  of  the  bodily  powers,  which  has  now  to  be 
sought  in  modes  far  less  useful,  and  also  a  familial* 
acquaintance  with  the  real  work  of  the  world,  and  a 
moral  mlllnsTiess  to  take  their  share  of  its  burthens, 
which,  in  the  great  majority  of  the  better-off  classes, 
do  not  now  get  cultivated  at  all. 

We  have  still  to  speak  of  the  directly  political  func- 
tions of  the  rich,  or,  as  M.  Comte  terms  them,  the 
patriciate.  The  entire  political  government  is  to  be  in 
their  hands.  First,  however,  the  existing  nations  are 
to  be  broken  up  into  small  republics,  the  largest  not 
exceeding  the  size  of  Belgium,  Portugal,  or  Tuscany, 
any  larger  nationalities  being  incompatible  Avith  the  unity 


152  LATER   SPECULATIONS 

of  wants  and  feelings,  which  is  required,  not  only  to 
give  due  strength  to  the  sentiment  of  patriotism  (always 
strongest  in  small  estates),  but  to  prevent  undue  com- 
pression ;   for  no  territory,  M.  Comte  thinks,  can  with- 
out   oppression    be    governed    from    a    distant    centre. 
Algeria,   therefore,   is   to  be   given  up   to  the  Arabs, 
Corsica  to  its  inhabitants,  and  France  proper  is  to  be, 
before  the  end  of  the  century,  divided  into  seventeen 
republics,  corresponding  to  the  number  of  considerable 
to\>Tis  :   Paris,  however,  (need  it  be  said?)  succeeding 
to   Eome    as    tlie   religious    metropolis    of  the   world, 
Ireland,  Scotland,  and  Wales,  are  to  be  separated  from 
England,  which  is  of  course  to  detach  itself  from  all  its 
transmarine  dependencies.     In  each  state  thus  consti- 
tuted, the  powers  of  government  are   to  be  vested  in 
a  triumvirate  of  the  three  principal  bankers,  who  are  to 
take  the  foreign,  home,  and  financial  departments  re- 
spectively.    How  they  are  to  conduct  the  government 
and  remain  bankers,  does  not  clearly  appear ;   but  it 
must  be  intended  that  they  should  combine  both  offices, 
for  they  are  to  receive  no  pecuniary  remuneration  for 
the  political  one.     Their  power  is  to  amount  to  a  dicta- 
torship  (^I.    Comte's  own  word)  :    and   he  is   hardly 
justified  in  saying  that  he  gives  political  power  to  the 
rich,  since  he  gives  it,  over  the  rich  and  every  one  else, 
to  three  individuals  of  the  number,  not  even  chosen  by 
the  rest,  but  named  by  their  predecessors.     As  a  check 
on  the  dictators,  there  is  to  be  complete  freedom  of 
s]>eech,  writing,   printing,   and  voluntary  association ; 
and  all  important  acts  of  the  government,  except  in 
cases  of  emergency,  are  to  be  announced  sufficiently 
long  beforehand  to  ensure  ample  discussion.     This,  and 


OF   AUGUSTE    COMTE.  153 

the  influence  of  the  Spiritual  Power,  arc  the  only  guar- 
antees provided  against  misgovernment.  When  we 
consider  that  the  complete  dominion  of  every  nation  of 
mankind  is  thus  handed  over  to  only  four  men — for 
the  Spiritual  Power  is  to  be  under  the  absolute  and 
undivided  control  of  a  single  Pontiff  for  the  whole 
human  race  —  one  is  appalled  at  the  picture  of  entire 
subjugation  and  slavery,  which  is  recommended  to  us 
as  the  last  and  higliest  result  of  the  evolution  of 
Humanity.  But  the  conception  rises  to  the  temfic, 
when  we  are  told  the  mode  in  which  the  single  High 
Priest  of  Humanity  is  intended  to  use  his  authority. 
It  is  the  most  warning  example  we  know,  into  what 
frightful  aberrations  a  powerful  and  comprehensive  mind 
may  be  led  by  the  exclusive  following-out  of  a  single 
idea. 

The  single  idea  of  M.  Comtc,  on  this  subject,  is  that 
the  intellect  should  be  wholly  subordinated  to  the  feel- 
ings ;  or,  to  translate  the  meaning  out  of  sentimental 
into  logical  language,  that  tlic  exercise  of  the  intellect, 
as  of  all  our  other  faculties,  should  have  for  its  sole 
object  tlie  general  good.  Every  other  employment  of 
it  should  be  accounted  not  only  idle  and  frivolous,  but 
morally  culpable.  Being  indebted  wholly  to  Humanity 
for  the  cultivation  to  which  we  owe  our  mental  powers, 
we  arc  bound  in  return  to  consecrate  them  wholly  to 
her  service.  Having  made  up  his  mind  that  this  ought 
to  be,  there  is  with  M.  Comte  but  one  step  to  con- 
cluding that  the  gi-and  Pontiff  of  Humanity  must  take 
care  that  it  shall  be ;  and  on  this  foundation  he  organ- 
izes an  elaborate  system  for  the  totnl  suppression  of  all 
independent  thought.     He  does  not,  indeed,  invoke  the 


154  LATER   SPECULATIONS 

arm  of  the  law,  or  call  for  any  proliibitions.  The 
clergy  arc  to  have  no  monopoly.  Any  one  else  may 
cultivate  science  if  he  can,  may  write  and  piiblii^h  if 
he  can  find  readers,  may  give  private  instrnction  if  any- 
body consents  to  receive  it.  But  since  the  sacerdotal 
body  will  absorb  into  itself  all  but  those  whom  it  deems 
cither  intellectually  or  morally  unccpial  to  the  vocation, 
all  rival  teachers  will,  as  he  calculates,  be  so  discredited 
beforehand,  that  their  competition  will  not  be  formida- 
ble. Within  the  body  itself,  the  High  Priest  has  it  in 
his  power  to  make  sure  that  there  shall  be  no  opinions, 
and  no  exercise  of  mind,  but  such  as  he  apjiroves  ;  for 
he  alone  decides  the  duties  and  local  residence  of  all  its 
members,  and  can  even  eject  them  from  the  body. 
Before  electinjr  to  be  under  tiiis  rule,  we  feel  a  natural 
curiosity  to  know  in  what  manner  it  is  to  be  exercised. 
Humanity  has  only  yet  had  one  P<»ntifF,  whose  mental 
qualifications  for  the  post  are  not  likely  to  be  often  sur- 
passed, ]M.  Comte  himself.  It  is  of  some  importance 
to  know  what  are  the  ideas  of  this  High  Priest,  con- 
cerning the  moral  and  religious  government  of  the 
human  intellect. 

One  of  the  doctrines  which  ]\I.  Comte  most  strenu- 
ously enforces  in  his  latter  writings,  is,  that  during  the 
preliminary  evolution  of  humanity,  terminated  by  the 
foundation  of  Positivism,  the  free  development  of  our 
forces  of  all  kinds  was  the  important  matter,  but  tliat 
from  this  time  forward  the  principal  need  is  to  regulate 
them.  Formerly  the  danger  was  of  their  being  insuf- 
ficient, but  henceforth,  of  their  being  abused.  Let  ut; 
express,  in  passing,  our  entire  dissent  from  this  doc- 
trine.    Whoever   thinks  that   the  wretched   cducatLou 


OF   AUGUSTE   COMTE.  155 

which  mankind  as  yet  receive,  calls  forth  theirmcntal 
powers  (except  those  of  a  select  few)  in  a  sufficient 
or  even  tolerable  degree,  must  be  very  easily  satisfied  : 
and  the  abuse  of  them,  far  from  becoming  proportion- 
ally greater  as  knowledge  and  mental  capacity  increase, 
becomes  rapidly  less,  provided  always  that  the  diffusion 
of  those  qualities  keeps  pace  with  their  growth.  The 
abuse  of  intellectual  power  is  only  to  be  dreaded,  when 
society  is  divided  between  a  few  highly  cultivated  intel- 
lects and  an  ignorant  and  stupid  multitude.  But  men- 
tal power  is  a  thing  which  M.  Comtc  does  not  want  — - 
or  Avants  infinitely  less  than  he  wants  submission  and 
obedience.  Of  all  the  ingredients  of  human  nature,  he 
continually  says,  the  intellect  most  needs  to  be  disci- 
plined and  reined  in.  It  is  the  most  turbulent,  "les 
plus  perturbatcur,"  of  all  the  mental  elements  ;  more  so 
than  even  the  selfish  instincts.  Thi'oughout  the  whole 
modern  transition,  bcgiiming  with  ancient  Greece,  (for 
M.  Comtc  tells  us  that  we  have  always  been  in  a  state 
of  revolutionary  transition  since  then,)  the  intellect  has 
been  in  a  state  of  systematic  insurrection  sigainst  "Ic 
cccur."  The  metaphysicians  and  literati  (lettr(js),  after 
helping  to  pull  down  the  old  religion  and  social  order, 
are  rootcdly  hostile  to  the  construction  of  the  new,  and 
desire  only  to  prolong  the  existing  scepticism  and  intel- 
lectual anarchy,  which  secure  to  them  a  cheap  social 
ascendency,  without  the  labor  of  earning  it  by  solid 
scientific  preparation.  The  scientific  class,  ft'om  whom 
better  might  have  been  expected,  ai*e,  if  possible,  worse. 
Void  of  enlarged  views,  despising  all  that  is  too  largo 
for  their  comprehension,'  devoted  exclusively,  each  to  his 
special  science,  contemptuously  indiflfercnt  to  moral  and 


156  LATER   SPECULATIONS 

political  interests,  their  sole  aim  is  to  acquire  an  easy 
reputation,  and  in  France  (through  paid  Academies 
and  professorships)  personal  lucre,  by  pushing  their 
sciences  into  idle  and  useless  inquiries  (speculations 
oiseuses),  of  no  value  to  the  real  interests  of  mankind, 
and  tending  to  divert  the  thouu^lits  from  them.  One  of 
the  duties  most  incumbent  on  opinion  and  on  the  Spirit- 
ual Power,  is  to  stigmatize  as  immoral,  and  effectually 
suppress,  these  useless  employments  of  the  speculative 
faculties.  All  exercise  of  thought  should  be  abstained 
from,  which  has  not  some  beneficial  tendency,  some 
actual  utih'ty  to  mankind.  M.  Comte,  of  course,  is 
not  the  man  to  say  that  it  nmst  be  a  merely  material 
utility.  If  a  speculation,  though  it  has  no  doctrinal, 
has  a  logical  value  —  if  it  tiirows  any  light  on  univer- 
sal Method  —  it  is  still  more  deserving  of  cultivation 
than  if  its  usefulness  was  merely  practical :  but  either 
as  method  or  as  doctrine,  it  must  brinj;  fortli  fruits  to 
Humanity,  otherwise  it  is  not  only  contemptible,  but 
criminal. 

That  there  is  a  portion  of  trutli  at  the  bottom  of  all 
this,  we  should  be  the  last  to  deny.  No  respect  is  due 
to  any  employment  of  the  intellect  which  docs  not  tend 
to  the  good  of  mankind.  It  is  precisely  on  a  level 
witli  any  idle  amusement,  and  should  be  condemned  as 
waste  of  time,  if  carried  beyond  the  limit  within  which 
amusement  is  permissible.  And  whoever  devotes  pow- 
ers of  thought  which  could  render  to  Humanity  services 
it  urgently  needs,  to  speculations  and  studies  wliich  it 
could  dispense  with,  is  liable  to  the  discredit  attaching 
to  a  well-grounded  suspicion  of  earing  little  for  Human- 
ity.    But  who  can  affirm  positively  of  any  speculations, 


OF   AUGUSTS    COMTE.  157 

guided  by  right  scientific  methods,  on  subjects  really 
accessible  to  the  human  faculties,  that  they  are  incapable 
of  being  of  any  use  ?  Nobody  knows  what  knowledge  will 
prove  to  be  of  use,  and  what  is  destined  to  be  useless. 
The  most  that  can  be  said  is  that  some  kinds  are  of 
more  certain,  and  above  all,  of  more  present,  utility 
than  others.  How  often  the  most  important  practical 
results  have  been  the  remote  consequence  of  studies 
which  no  one  would  have  expected  to  lead  to  them  I 
Could  the  mathematicians,  who,  in  the  schools  of  Alex- 
andria, investigated  the  properties  of  the  ellipse,  have 
foreseen  that  nearly  two  thousand  years  afterwards 
their  speculations  would  explain  the  solar  system,  and 
a  little  later  would  enable  ships  safely  to  circumnavi- 
gate the  c.ai-th?  Even  in  jVI.  Comte's  opinion,  it  is 
well  for  mankind  that,  in  those  early  days,  knowledge 
was  thought  worth  pursuing  for  its  own  sake.  Nor 
has  the  "foundation  of  Positivism,"  we  imagine,  so  fur 
changed  the  conditions  of  human  existence,  that  it 
should  now  be  criminal  to  acquire,  by  observation  and 
reasoning,  a  knowledge  of  the  facts  of  the  universe, 
leaving  to  posterity  to  find  a  use  for  it.  Even  in  the 
last  two  or  three  years,  has  not  the  discovery  of  new 
metals,  which  may  prove  important  even  in  the  prac- 
tical arts,  arisen  from  one  of  the  investigations  which 
M.  Comte  most  unequivocally  condemns  as  idle,  the 
research  into  the  internal  constitution  of  the  sun  ? 
How  few,  moreover,  of  the  discoveries  which  have 
changed  the  face  of  the  world,  either  were  or  could 
have  been  arrived  at  by  investigations  aiming  directly 
at  the  object  1  Would  the  mariner's  compass  ever  have 
been  found  by  direct  efforts  for  the  improvement  of 


158  LATER   SPECULATIONS 

navigation?     Should  we  liave  reached  the  electric  tele- 
gi*aph  by  any  amount  of  striving  for  a  means  of  instan- 
taneous communication,  if  Franklin  had  not  identified 
electricity  with  lightning,  and  Ampere  with  magnetism? 
The  most  .apparently  insignificant  archaeological  or  geo- 
lo":ical  fact,  is  often  found  to  throw  a  liijht  on  human 
history,   which   M.   Comte,   the   basis   of  whose   social 
philosophy  is  history,  should  be  the  last  person  to  dis- 
parage.    The  direction   of   the   entrance   to   the  great 
PjTaraid  of  Ghizch,   by  showing  the   position   of  the 
circumpolar   stars    at   the   time   when  it  was  built,  is 
the  best  evidence  wo  even  now  have  of  the  immense 
antiquity  of  Egyptian  civilization.     The  one  point  on 
which  ]M.  Comte's  doctrine  has  some  color  of  reason, 
is  the  case  of  sidereal  astronomy :   so  little  knowledge 
of  it  being  really  accessible  to  us,  and  the  connexion  of 
that  little  with  any  terrestrial  interests  being,  according 
to  all  our  means  of  judgment,  infinitesimal.     It  is  cer- 
tainly difficult  to  conceive  how  any  considerable  benefit 
to  humanity  can  be  derived  from  a  knowledge  of  the 
motions  of  the  double  stars  :  should  these  ever  become 
important  to  us  it  will   be  in  so   prodigiously  remote 
an  age,  that  we  can  afford  to  remain  ignorant  of  them 
until,  at  least,  all  our  moral,  political,  and  social  diffi- 
culties have  been  settled.     Yet  the  discovery  that  gravi- 
tation extends  even  to  those  remote  regions,  j;ives  some 
additional  strength  to  the  conviction  of  the  universality 
of  natural  laws ;  and  the  habitual  meditation  on  such 
vast  objects  and  distances  is  not  without  an  aesthetic 
usefulness,  by  kindling  and  exalting   the  imagination, 
the  worth  of  which  in  itself,  and  even  its  re-action  on 
the  intellect,  M.  Comte  is  qtn'te  capable  of  appreciating. 


OF  AUGUSTE   COMTE.  159 

He  would  reply,  however,  tliat  there  are  better  means 
of  accomplishing  these  purposes.  In  the  same  spirit  he 
condemns  the  study  even  of  the  solar  system,  when 
extended  to  any  planets  but  those  wliich  arc  visible  to 
the  naked  eye,  and  which  alone  exert  an  appreciable 
gravitativc  influence  on  the  earth.  Even  the  perturba- 
tions lie  thinks  it  idle  to  study,  beyond  a  mere  general 
conception  of  them,  and  tliinks  that  astronomy  may 
well  limit  its  domain  to  the  motions  and  mutual  action 
of  the  earth,  sun,  and  moon.  He  looks  for  a  similar 
expurgation  of  all  the  other  sciences.  In  one  passage 
he  expressly  says  that  the  greater  part  of  the  researches 
which  arc  really  accessible  to  us  are  idle  and  useless^. 
He  would  pare  down  the  dimensions  of  all  the  sciences 
as  narrowly  as  possible.  He  is  continually  repeating 
that  no  science,  as  an  abstract  study,  should  be  carried 
further  than  is  necessary  to  lay  the  foundation  for  the 
science  next  above  it,  and  so  ultimately  for  moral  sci- 
ence, the  principal  purpose  of  them  all.  Any  further 
extension  of  the  mathematical  and  physical  sciences 
should  be  merely  "  episodic  ?"  limited  to  what  may  from 
time  to  time  be  demanded  by  the  requirements  of 
industry  and  the  arts  ;  and  should  be  left  to  the  indus- 
trial classes  except  when  they  find  it  necessary  to  a[)ply 
to  the  sacerdotal  order  for  some  additional  development 
of  scientific  theory.  This,  he  evidently  thinks,  would 
be  a  rare  contingency,  most  physical  truths  sufficiently 
concrete  and  real  for  practice  being  empirical.  Accord- 
ingly in  estimating  the  number  of  clergy  necessary  for 
France,  Eux'ope,  and  our  entire  planet  (for  his  fore- 
thought extends  thus  far) ,  he  proportions  it  solely  to 
their  moral  and  religious  attributions  (overlooking,  by 


160  LATER   SPECULATIONS 

the  way,  even  their  medical)  ;  and  leaves  nobody  with 
any  time  to  cultivate  tlie  sciences,  except  abortive  can- 
didates for  the  priestly  office,  who  having  been  refused 
admittance  into  it  for  insufficiency  in  moral  excellence 
or  in  strength  of  character,  may  be  thought  worth 
retaining  as  "  pensioners  "  of  the  sacerdotal  order,  on 
account  of  their  theoretic  abilities. 

It  is  no  exaggeration  to  say,  that  M.  Comte  gradu- 
ally acquired  a  real  hatred  for  scientific  and  all  purely 
intellectual  pursuits,  and  was  bent  on  retaining  no  more 
of  them  than  was  strictly  indispensable.     The  greatest 
of  his  anxieties  is  lest  people  should  reason,  and  seek  to 
know  more  than  enough.     He  regards  all  abstraction 
and  all  reasoning  as  morally  dangerous,  by  developing 
an  inordinate  pride   (orgucil),  and  still  more,  by  pro- 
ducing  dryness    (sdcheresse).      Abstract   thought,   he 
says,  is  not  a  wholesome  occupation  for  more  than  a 
small  number  of  human  beings,  nor  of  them  for  more 
than  a  small  part  of  their  time.     Art,  which  calls  the 
emotions  into  play  along  with  and  more  than  the  rcjison, 
is  the  only  intellectual  exercise  really  adapted  to  human 
nature.     It  is  nevertheless  indispensable  that  the  chief 
theories  of  the  various  abstract  sciences,  togctiier  with 
the  modes  in  which  those  theories  were  historically  and 
logically  arrived  at,   should  form  a  part  of  universal 
education  :   for,  first,  it  is  only  thus  that  the  methods 
can  be  learnt,  by  which  to  attain  the  results  sought  by 
the  moral  and  social  sciences  :   though  we  cannot  per- 
ceive that  M.  Comte  got  at  his  own  moral  and  social 
results  by  those  processes.      Secondly,   the  principal 
truths  of  the  subordinate  sciences  are  necessary  to  the 
Bystematization  (still  systematization  1)  of  our  coneep- 


OF   AUGUSTE   COMTE.  161 

tions,  by  binding  together  our  notions  of  the  world  in 
a  set  of  propositions,  which  arc  coherent,  and  a  suf 
ficiently  correct  representation  of  fact  for  our  practical 
wants.  Thirdly,  a  familiar  knowledge  of  the  inv.ariable 
laws  of  natural  piienomena  is  a  great  elementary  lesson 
of  submission,  which,  he  is  never  weary  of  saying,  is 
the  first  condition  both  of  morality  and  of  happiness. 
For  these  reasons,  he  would  cause  to  be  taught,  from 
the  age  of  fourteen  to  that  of  twenty-one,  to  all  per- 
sons, rich  and  poor,  girls  or  youths,  a  knowledge  of 
the  whole  series  of  abstract  sciences,  such  as  none  but 
the  most  highly  instructed  persons  now  possess,  and  of 
a  far  more  systematic  and  philosophical  character  than 
is  usually  possessed  even  by  them.  (N,B.  — They  are 
to  learn,  during  the  same  years,  Greek  and  Latin,  hav- 
ing previously,  bet\yeen  the  ages  of  seven  and  fourteen, 
learnt  the  five  principal  modern  languages,  to  the 
degree  necessary  for  reading,  with  due  appreciation, 
the  chief  poetical  compositions  in  each).  But  they  arc 
to  be  taught  all  this,  not  only  without  encouraging,  but 
stifling  as  much  as  possible,  the  examining  and  ques- 
tioning spirit.  The  disj^osition  Avhich  should  be  encour- 
aged is  that  of  recei\ing  all  on  the  authority  of  the 
teacher.  The  Positivist  faith,  even  in  its  scientific  part 
is  la  foi  demontrable^  but  ought  by  no  means  to  be 
la  foi  toujours  demontrce.  The  pupils  have  no  busi- 
ness to  be  over-solicitous  about  proof.  The  teacher 
should  not  even  present  the  proofs  to  them  in  a  com 
pletc  form,  or  as  proofs.  The  object  of  instruction  is 
to  make  them  understand  the  doctrines  themselves,  per- 
ceive their  mutual  connection,  and  form  by  means  of 
them  a  consistent  and  systematized  conception  of  nature. 

11 


162  LATER   SPECULATIONS 

As   for  the  demonstrations,  it  is  ratlier  desirable  than 
otherwise  that  even  tlicorists  should  forget  them,  retain- 
ing only  the   results.      Among   all   the   aberrations  of 
gcientific  men,  M.  Conitc  thinks  none  greater  thiin  the 
pedantic  anxiety  they  show  for  complete  proof,  and  [)er- 
fect  rationalization  of  scientific  proccst-cs.      It  ou^ht  to 
be  enough  that  the  doctrines  afford  an  explanation  of 
phenomena,    consistent    with    itself   and    witli    known 
facts,  and  that  tlie  processes  are  justified  by  their  fruits. 
This  over-anxiety  for  proof,  he'conj{)lains  is  breaking 
down,  by  vain  scruples,  the   knowledge  whicli  seemed 
to  have   been   attained  ;    witness   the  present  state  of 
chemistry.     The  demand   of  proof   for  what  has   been 
acce{)ted  by  Hiniiamty,  is  itself  a  mark  of  "distrust,  if 
not  hostility,  to  the  sacerdotal  order"  (the  naivete  of 
this  woidd  be  charming,  if  it  were  not  deplorable),  and 
is  a  revolt  against  the  traditions  of  the  human  race. 
So  early  had  the  new  High  Priest  adopted  the  feelings 
and  taken  up  the  inheritance  of  the  old.      One  of  his 
favorite  aphorisms   is  the  strange  one,  that  the  living 
are  more  and  more  governed  by  the  dead.     As  is  not 
uncommon  with  him,  he   introduces   the  dictum  in  one 
sense,  and  uses  it  in  another.     What  he  at  first  means 
by  it  is,  that  as  civilization  advances,  the  sum  of  our 
possessions,    physical    and    intellectual,    is    due    in    a 
decreasing  proportion  to  ourselves,  and  in  an  increasing 
one  to   our  progenitors.     The   use   he  makes  of  it  is, 
that  we  should  submit  ourselves  more  and  more  im[)lic- 
itly  to  the  authority  of  previous  generations,  and  suffer 
ourselves  less  and  less  to  doubt  their  judgment,  or  test 
by  our  own  reason  the  grounds  of  their  opinions.     The 
unwillingness  of  the  human  intellect  and  conscience,  in 


OF   AUGUSTE   COMTE.  ,  163 

their  present  state  of  "  anarchy,"  to  sign  their  own  abdi- 
cation, he  calls  "the  insurrection  of  the  living  against 
the  dead."  To  this  complexion  has  Positive  Philosophy 
come  at  last ! 

^\'^orse,   however,   remains   to   be   told.     M.    Corate 
selects    a    hundred    volumes    of    science,    philosophy, 
poetry,    history,    and    general    knowledge,    which    he 
deems  a  sufficient  library  for  every  positivist,  even  of 
the  theoretic  order,  and  actually  proposes  a  systematic 
iiolocaust  of  books  in  general  —  it  would  almost  seem  of 
all  books  except  these.     Even  that  to  which  he  shows 
most  indulgence,   poetry^   except   the   very  best,  is  to 
undergo   a  similar  fate,  with   the  reservation  of  select 
passages,  on  the  ground  that,  poetry  being  intended  to 
cultivate  our  instinct  of  ideal  perfection,  any  kind  of  it 
that  is  less  than  the  best  is   worse  than  none^     Tiiis 
imitation  of  the  error,  we  will  call  it  the  crime,  of  the 
early   Christians  —  and    in    an  exaggerated    foi'm,   for 
even  they  destroyed  only  those  writings  of  pagans  or 
heretics  which  were  directed  against  themselves  —  is  the 
one   thing  in  iNl.    Comte's   projects   which  merits   real 
indignation.     When  once  ]M.   Comte  has  decided,  all 
evidence  on  the  other  side,  nay  the  very  historical  evi- 
dence on  which  he  grounded  his  decision,  had  better 
perish,     AVhcn  mankind  have  enlisted  under  his  ban- 
ner, they  must  burn  their  ships.     There  is,  though  in  a 
less  offensive  form,  the  same  overweening  presumption 
in  a  suggestion  he  makes,  that  all  species  of  animale; 
and  plants  which  are  useless  to  man  should  be  syste- 
matically rooted  out.     As  if  any  one  could  presume  to 
assert  that  the  smallest  weed  may  not,  as  knowledge 
advances,  be  found  to  have  some  property  serviceable 


164  LATER   SPECULATIONS 

to  man.  "When  we  consider  that  the  united  power  of 
the  whole  human  race  cannot  reproduce  a  species  once 
eradicated — that  what  is  once  done,  in  the  extirpation 
of  races,  can  never  be  repaired ;  one  can  only  l)e 
thankful  that  amidst  all  which  the  past  rulers  of  jnan- 
kind  have  to  answer  for,  they  have  never  come  iq)  to 
tlie  measure  of  the  great  regenerator  of  Humanity  ; 
mankind  have  not  yet  been  under  the  rule  of  one  who 
assumes  that  he  knows  all  there  is  to  be  known,  and 
that  when  he  puts  himself  at  the  head  of  humanity,  the 
book  of  human  knowledge  may  be  closed. 

Of  course  M.  Conite  does  not  make  this  assumption 
consistently.  He  docs  not  imagine  that  he  actually 
possesses  all  knowledge,  but  only  that  he  is  an  infallible 
judge  what  knowledge  is  worth  possessing.  He  does 
not  believe  that  mankind  have  I'eachcd  in  all  directions 
the  extreme  limits  of  useful  and  laudable  scientific 
inquiry.  He  thinks  there  is  a  large  scope  for  it  still, 
in  adding  to  our  power  over  the  external  world,  but 
chiefly  in  perfecting  our  own  physical,  intellectual,  and 
moral  nature.  He  holds  that  all  our  mental  strength 
should  be  economized,  for  the  pursuit  of  this  object  in 
the  mode  leading  most  directly  to  the  end.  Witli  this 
view,  some  one  problem  should  always  be  selected,  the 
solution  of  which  would  be  more  important  than  any 
other  to  the  interests  of  humanity,  and  upon  this  the 
entire  intellectual  resources  of  the  theoretic  mind  should 
be  concentrated,  until  it  is  either  resolved,  or  has  to  be 
given  up  as  insoluble  :  after  which  mankind  should  go 
on  to  another,  to  be  pursued  with  similar  exclusivcness. 
The  selection  of  this  problem  of  course  rests  with  tho 
sacerdotal   order,  or  in  other  words,  with  the   High 


OF   AUGUSTE   COMTE.  165 

Priest.  We  should  tlien  see  the  whole  speculative 
intellect  of  the  human  race  simultaneously  at  work  on 
one  question,  by  orders  from  above,  as  a  French  min- 
ister of  public  instruction  once  boasted  that  a  million 
of  boys  wei'c  saying  the  same  lesson  during  the  same 
half-hour  in  every  town  and  village  of  France.  The 
reader  will  be  anxious  to  know,  how  much  better  and 
more  wisely  the  human  intellect  will  be  applied  under 
this  absolute  monarchy,  and  to  what  degree  this  system 
of  government  will  be  preferable  to  the  present  anarchy, 
in  which  every  theorist  does  what  is  intellectually  right 
in  his  own  eyes.  M.  Comte  has  not  left  us  in  igno- 
rance on  this  point.  He  gives  us  am})le  means  of 
judging.  The  Pontiff  of  Positivism  informs'  us  what 
problem,  in  his  oi)inion,  should  be  selected  before  all 
others  for  this  united  pursuit. 

What  this  problem  is,  we  must  leave  those  who  are 
curious  on  the  subject  to  learn  from  the  treatise  itself. 
When  they  have  done  so,  they  will  be  qualified  to  form 
their  own  opinion  of  the  amount  of  advantage  which 
the  general  good  of  mankind  would  be  likely  to  derive, 
from  exchanging  the  present  "dispersive  speciality" 
and  "  intellectual  anarchy  "  for  the  subordination  of  the 
intellect  to  the  cceur,  personified  in  a  High  Priest,  pre- 
scribing a  single  problem  for  the  undivided  study  of  the 
theoretic  mind. 

We  have  given  a  sufficient  general  idea  of  M.  Comte's 
plan  for  the  regeneration  of  human  society,  by  put- 
ting an  end  to  anai'chy,  and  "systematizing"  human 
thought  and  conduct  under  the  direction  of  feeling. 
I3ut  an  adequate  conception  will  not  have  been  formed 
of  the   height  of  his  self-confidence,  until  something 


166  LATER  SrECULATIONS 

more  has  been  told.  Be  it  known,  then,  that  M. 
Comte  by  no  means  proposes  this  new  constitution  of 
society  for  realization  in  the  remote  future.  A  com- 
plete plan  of  measures  of  transition  is  ready  prepared, 
and  he  dotcrnjincs  the  year,  heforc  tlic  end  of  the 
present  century,  in  wliich  the  new  spiritual  and  tem- 
poral powers  will  be  installed,  and  the  rc^in)e  of  our 
maturity  will  begin.  lie  did  not  indeed  cal(?u]ate  on 
converting  to  Positivism,  within  tiiat  time,  more  tliau  a 
thousandth  part  of  all  the  heads  of  familiet*  in  Western 
Europe  and  its  ofF-shoots  beyond  the  Atlantic,  But  he 
fixes  the  time  necessary  for  the  complete  political  estab- 
lishment of  Positivism  at  thirty-three  years,  divided 
into  three  periods,  of  seven,  five,  and  twenty-one  years 
respectively.  At  the  expiration  of  seven,  the  direction 
of  public  education  in  France  would  be  placed  in  M. 
Comte's  hands.  In  five  years  more,  the  Emperor  Na- 
poleon, or  his  successor,  will  resign  his  power  to  a 
provisional  triumvirate,  composed  of  three  eminent  pro- 
letaircs  of  the  positivist  faith ;  for  proletaires,  though 
not  fit  for  permanent  rule,  arc  the  best  agents  of  the 
transition,  being  most  free  from  the  prejudices  which 
are  the  chief  obstacle  to  it.  These  riders  will  employ 
the  rcm-iining  twenty-one  years  in  preparing  society 
for  its  final  constitution  ;  and  after  duly  installing  the 
Spiritual  Power,  and  cfTectlng  the  decomposition  of 
France  into  the  seventeen  republics  before  mentioned, 
will  give  jover  the  temporal  government  of  each  to  the 
normal  dictatorship  of  the  three  bankers.  A  man  may 
be  deemed  happy,  but  scarcely  modest,  who  had  such 
boundless  confidence  in  his  own  powers  of  foresight, 
and  expected  to  complete  a  triumph  of  his  own  ideas 


OF   AUGUSTE    COMTE.  167 

on  tlic  rcconstltutlon  of  society  within  the  possible 
limits  of  his  lifetime.  If  he  could  live  (he  said)  to  the 
age  of  Fontenelle,  or  of  Ilobbes,  or  even  of  Voltaire, 
he  should  see  all  this  realized,  or  as  good  as  realized. 
lie  died,  however,  at  sixty,  without  leaving  any  dis- 
ciple sutticicntly  advanced  to  be  appointed  his  successor. 
There  is  now  a  College,  and  a  Director,  of  Positivism ; 
but  Humanity  no  longer  possesses  a  High  Priesto 

What  more  remains  to  be  said  may  be  despatched 
more  summarily.  Its  interest  is  philosopliic  rather 
than  practical.  In  his  four  volumes  of  "Politique  Posi- 
tive," M.  Comte  revises  and  re-elaborates  tlie  scientific 
and  historical  expositions  of  his  first  treatise.  His 
object  is  to  systematize  (again  to  systematize)  knowl- 
edge from  the  human,  or  subjective  point  of  view,  the 
only  one,  he  contends,  from  which  a  real  synthesis  is 
possible.  For  (he  says)  tlie  knowledge  attainable  by 
us  of  the  laws  of  the  universe  is  at  best  fragmentary, 
and  incapable  of  reduction  to  a  real  unity.  An  objec- 
tive syntliesis,  the  dream  of  Descartes  and  the  best 
thinkers  of  old,  is  impossible.  The  Laws  of  the  real 
world  are  too  numerous,  and  the  manner  of  their  work- 
ing into  one  another  too  intricate,  to  be,  as  a  general 
rule,  correctly  traced  and  represented  by  our  reason. 
The  only  connecting  principle  in  our  knowledge  is  its 
relation  to  our  wants,  and  it  is  upon  that  we  must  found 
our  systematization.  The  answer  to  this  is,  first,  that 
there  is  no  necessity  for  an  universal  syntljesis ;  and 
secondly,  that  the  same  arguments  may  be  used  against 
the  possibility  of  a  complete  subjective,  as  of  a  complete 
objective  systematization.  A  subjective  synthesis  must 
consist  in  the  arranjjement  and  co-ordination  of  all  use- 


168  LATER   SPECULATIONS 

fill  knowledge,  on  tlie  basis  of  its  relation  to  human 
wants  and  interests.  But  tliose  wants  and  interests 
are,  like  the  laws  of  the  universe,  extremely  nuiltifiirious, 
and  the  order  of  [)rcference  among  them  in  all  their  dif- 
erent  gradations  (for  it  varies  according  to  the  degree 
of  each)  cannot  be  cast  into  precise  general  proposi- 
tions. ^I.  Comte's  subjective  synthesis  consists  only  in 
eliminating  from  the  sciences  every  thing  tliat  he  deems 
useless,  and  presenting  as  far  as  possible  every  theoreti- 
cal investigation  as  the  solution  of  a  practical  problem. 
To  this,  however,  he  cannot  consistently  adhere ;  for, 
m  every  science,  the  theoretic  truths  are  much  more 
closely  connected  with  one  another,  than  with  the  iuiman 
purposes  Avhich  they  eventually  serve,  and  can  only  be 
made  to  cohere  in  the  intellect  bv  bcin^j,  to  a  f^reat 
degi'ce,  presented  as  if  they  were  truths  of  pure  reason, 
irrespective  of  any  practical  application. 

There  are  many  things  eminently  characteristic  of  M. 
Comte's  second  career,  in  this  revision  of  the  results  of 
his  first.  Under  the  head  of  Biology,  and  tor  the  better 
combination  of  that  science  with  Sociology  and  Ethics, 
he  found  that  he  required  a  new  system  of  Phrenology, 
being  justly  dissatisfied  with  that  of  Gall  and  his  suc- 
cessors. Accordingly  he  set  about  constructing  one 
d  priori,  grounded  on  the  best  enumeration  and  classi- 
fication he  could  make  of  the  elementary  faculties  of  our 
intellectual,  moral,  and  animal  nature  ;  to  each  of  which 
he  assigned  an  hypothetical  jdace  in  the  skull,  the  most 
conformable  that  he  could  to  the  few  positive  facts  on 
the  subject  which  he  considered  as  established,  and 
to  the  general  presumption  that  functions  which  re-act 
strongly  on  one  another  must  have  their  organs  adja- 


OF    AUGUSTS    COMTE.  109 

cent :  leaving  the  localities  avowedly  to  be  hereafter 
verified,  by  anatomical  and  inductive  investigation. 
There  is  considerable  merit  in  this  attempt,  though  it  is 
liable  to  obvious  criticisms  of  the  same  nature  as  his 
own  upon  Gall.  But  tlic  characteristic  thing  is,  that 
while  [)rescnting  all  this  as  hypothesis  waiting  for  veri- 
fication, lie  could  not  have  taken  its  truth  more  coui- 
pletely  for  granted  if  the  verification  liad  been  made. 
In  all  that  he  afterwards  wrote,  every  detail  of  his 
thory  of  the  brain  is  as  unhesitatingly  asserted,  and  as 
confidently  built  upon,  as  any  other  doctrine  of  sciencco 
This  is  his  first  great  attempt  in  the  "  Subjective  ^Icth- 
od,"  which,  originally  meaning  only  the  subordination 
of  the  pursuit  of  truth  to  human  uses,  had  already 
come  to  mean  drawing  truth  itself  from  the  fountain  of 
his  own  mind.  He  had  become,  on  the  one  hand, 
almost  indifferent  to  proof,  provided  he  attained  theo- 
retic coherency,  and  on  the  otiier,  serenely  confident 
that  even  tlic  guesses  which  originated  with  himself 
could  not  but  come  out  true. 

There  is  one  point  in  his  later  view  of  tlic  sciences, 
which  appears  to  us  a  decided  improvement  on  his 
earlier.  He  adds  to  the  six  fundamental  sciences  of  his 
original  scale,  a  seventh  under  the  name  of  Morals, 
forming  the  highest  step  of  the  ladder,  immediately 
after  Sociology :  remarking  tliat  it  might,  with  still 
greater  [)roprIcty,  be  termed  Anthropology,  being  the 
science  of  individual  human  nature,  a  study,  when 
rightly  understood,  more  special  and  complicated  than 
even  that  of  Society.  For  it  is  obliged  to  take  inti» 
consideration  the  diversities  of  constitution  and  temper- 
ament  (la   reaction  ccrdbrale  des   visceres   vegetatifs) 


170  LATER   SPECULATIONS 

tlie  effects  of  wliicli,  still  very  imperfectly  understood, 
.ire  ln;Ljlily  important  in  the  individual,  but  in  tlie  theory 
of  society  mny  be  neglected,  because,  differing  jn  dif- 
ferent jiersons,  they  neutralize  one  anotlier  on  tlie  large 
hcaie.  I'his  is  a  remark  worthy  of  ^M.  Comtc  in  his 
best  days ;  and  the  science  thus  conceived  is,  as  he 
pays,  the  true  scientific  foundation  of  the  art  of  Morals 
(and  indeed  of  the  art  of  human  life)  which,  therefore, 
may,  l)oth  philosopliically  and  didactically,  be  properly 
combined  with  it. 

His  philosophy  of  general  history  is  recast,  and  in 
many  respects  changed ;  we  cannot  but  say,  greatly  for 
the  worse.  He  gives  much  greater  develoi»ment  than 
before  to  the  Fetishistic,  and  to  what  he  terms  the 
Theocratic,  periods.  To  the  Fetishistic  view  of  nature 
he  evinces  a  partiality,  whicli  aj)pears  strange  in  a  Posi- 
tive [)hilosophcr.  But  the  reason  is  that  Fetish-worship 
is  a  religion  of  the  feelings,  and  not  at  all  of  the  intel- 
ligence. He  regards  it  as  cultlvatini;  universal  love : 
as  a  practical  fact  it  cultivates  much  rather  universal 
fear.  He  looks  upon  Fetishism  as  nuich  more  akin  to 
Positi\ism  than  any  of  tlie  forms  of  Theology,  inas- 
much as  these  consider  matter  as  inert,  and  moved  only 
by  forces,  natural  and  supernatural,  exterior  to  itself: 
wJiile  Fetishism  resemi)les  Positivism  in  conceiving  mat- 
ter as  spontaneously  active,  and  errs  only  by  not  distin- 
guishing activity  from  life.  As  if  the  superstiti«)n  of 
the  Fetishist  consisted  only  in  believing  that  the  ol)jcct3 
whicli  produce  the  [)henomena  of  nature  involuntarily, 
produce  them  voluntarily.  The  Fetishist  thinks  not 
merely  that  his  Fetish  is  .alive,  but  that  it  can  help 
him  in  war,  can  cure  him  of  diseases,  can  grant  him 


OF   AUGU8TE    COMTE.  171 

prosperity,  or  afflict  him  witli  all  the  contrary  evils. 
Therein  consists  the  lamentable  effect  of  Fetishism  — 
its  degrading  and  prostrating  influence  on  the  feelings 
and  conduct,  its  conflict  with  all  genuine  experience, 
and  antajifonlsm  to  all  real  knowledge  of  nature. 

y{.  Comte  had  also  no  small  sympathy  with  the 
Oriental  theocracies,  as  lie  calls  the  sacerdotal  castes, 
who  indeed  often  deserved  it  by  their  eai'ly  services 
to  intellect  and  civilization ;  by  the  aid  they  gave  to 
the  establishment  of  regidar  government,  the  valuable 
though  empirical  knowledge  they  accumulated,  and  the 
height  to  which  they  helped  to  carry  some  of  the  useful 
arts.  M.  Comtc  admits  tliat  they  became  oppressive, 
and  that  the  prolongation  of  their  ascendency  came  to  be 
incompatible  with  further  improvement.  But  he  ascribes 
this  to  their  having  arrogated  to  themselves  the  tem- 
poral government,  which,  so  far  as  we  have  any  authen- 
tic information,  they  never  did.  The  reason  why  the 
sacerdotal  corporations  became  oppressive,  was  because 
they  were  organized  :  because  they  attempted  the 
"  unity  "  and^  "  systematization  "  so  dear  to  M.  Comte, 
and  allowed  no  science  and  no  speculation,  except  with 
their  leave  and  under  their  direction.  M.  Comte's 
sacerdotal  order,  which,  in  his  system,  has  all  the  power 
tiiat  ever  they  had,  would  be  oppressive  in  the  same 
manner :  witli  no  variation  but  that  which  arises  from 
the  altered  state  of  society  and  of  the  human  mind. 

M.  Comte's  partiality  to  the  theocracies  is  strikingly 
contrasted  with  his  dislike  of  the  Greeks,  whom  as  a 
people  he  thoroughly  detests,  for  their  undue  addiction 
to  intellectual  speculation,  (ind  considers  to  have  been, 
by  an  inevitable  fatality,  morally  sacrificed  to  the  forma- 


172  LATER   SPECULATIONS 

tion  of  a  few  gi'cat  scientific  intellects,  —  principally 
Aristotle,  Archiincdcs,  Apollonius,  and  IIip[)archus. 
Any  one  who  knows  Grecian  hij^tory  as  it  can  now  be 
known,  will  be  amazed  at  ^I.  Comte's  travcstie  of  it, 
in  which  the  vulgarest  historical  [)rcjudiccs  are  accepted 
and  exajj^reratcd,  to  illustrate  the  mischiefs  of  intel- 
lectual  culture  left  to  its  own  guidance. 

There  is  no  need  to  analyze  further  M.  Comtc's 
second  view  of  universal  history.  The  best  chapter  is 
that  on  the  Komans,  to  whom,  because  they  were 
greater  in  practice  than  in  theory,  and  for  centuries 
worked  together  in  obedience  to  a  social  sentiment 
(though  only  that  of  tiielr  country's  aggrandizement), 
jM.  Comte  is  as  favorably  affected,  as  he  is  inimical  to 
all  but  a  small  selection  of  eminent  thinkers  among 
the  Greeks.  The  greatest  blemish  in  tliis  cha[)ter  is  the 
idolatry  of  Julius  Caesar,  whom  M.  Comte  regards  as 
one  of  the  most  illustrious  characters  in  history,  and  of 
the  greatest  practical  benefactors  of  mankind.  Ocsar 
had  many  eminent  qualities,  but  what  he  did  to  deserve 
such  praise  we  are  at  a  loss  to  discover,  except  subvert- 
ing a  free  government :  that  merit,  however,  with  M. 
Comte  goes  a  great  way.  It  did  not,  in  his  former 
days,  suffice  to  rehabilitate  Napoleon,  whose  name  and 
memory  he  regarded  with  a  bitterness  highly  honorable 
to  hijnsclf,  and  whose  career  he  deemed  as  one  of  the 
greatest  calamities  in  modern  history.  But  in  his  later 
writings  these  sentiments  arc  considerably  mitigated  : 
he  regards  Xapoleon  as  a  more  estimable  "dictator" 
than  Louis  Philippe,  and  thinks  that  his  greatest  erx'or 
was  re-establishing  the  Academy  of  Sciences  I  That 
this  should  be  said  by  M.  Comte,  and  said  of  Napoleon, 


OF    AUGUSTE    COMTE.  173 

incasurea  tlic  depth  to  which  his  moral  standard  had 
fallen. 

The  last  volume  which  he  published,  that  on  the 
Philosophy  of  Mathematics,  is  in  some  respects  a  still 
!<ad<ler  [)icture  of  intellectual  degeneracy  than  those 
which  preceded  it.  After  the  admirable  rdsumo  of  the 
subject  in  the  first  \olume  of  his  first  great  work,  we 
expected  something  of  the  very  highest  order  when  he 
I'cturned  to  the  subject  for  a  more  thorough  treatment 
of  it.  But,  being  the  commencement  of  a  Synth(isc 
Subjective,  it  contains,  as  might  be  expected,  a  great 
deal  that  is  much  more  subjective  than  mathematical. 
Xor  of  this  do  wc  complain ;  but  we  little  imagined  of 
what  nature  this  subjective  matter  was  to  be.  iM. 
Comte  here  joins  together  the  two  ideas,  which,  of  all 
that  he  has  put  forth,  are  tlie  most  repugnant  to  the 
fundamental  principles  of  Positive  Philosophy.  One 
of  them  is  that  on  which  wc  have  just  commented,  the 
assimilation  between  Positivism  and  Fetishism.  The 
other,  of  which  we  took  notice  in  a  former  article,  was 
the  "  libcrte  facultative  "  of  shaping  our  scientific  con- 
ceptions to  gratify  the  demands  not  solely  of  objective 
truth,  but  of  intellectual  and  aisthetic  suitability.  It 
would  be  an  excellent  thing,  j\I.  Comte  thinks,  if 
science  could  l)e  deprived  of  its  sccheresse,  and  directly 
associated  with  sentiment.  Now  it  is  impossible  to 
prove  that  the  external  world,  and  the  bodies  com- 
posing it,  are  not  endowed  with  feeling,  and  voluntary 
aijencv.  It  is  tlierefore  hlirhlv  desirable  that  we  should 
educate  ourselves  into  imagining  that  they  are.  Intel- 
ligence it  will  not  do  to  invest  them  with,  for  some 
distinction  must  be  maintained  between  simple  activity 


174  LATEll   SPECULATIONS 

and  life.     But  wc  may  suppose  that  they  feel  what  is 
done  to  thcni,  and  desire  and  will  what  they  themselves 
do.     Even  intelHgence  whieh  we  must  deny  to  them  in 
tlte   i)i-oscut,    may    bo   attril)utcd   to   them  in  the  [»ast. 
Ik'fore  man  existed,  the  earth,  at  tliat  time  an  intclH^eiit 
being,  may  iiave  exerted  "its  physico-chemical  activity 
so  as  to  improve  the  astronomical  order  by  cliunging  its 
principal  co-eiiicients.     Our  pLanct  may  be  supposed  to 
have  rendered  its  orbit  less  eccentric,  and  thereby  more 
habitable,  by  planning  a  long  series  of  explosions,  anal- 
o;rous    to    those    from    which,    accordini;    to    the    best 
hypotheses,  comets   proceed.     Judiciously  rej)roduced, 
similar  shocks   may   have   rendered   the   inclination  of 
the  earth's  axis  better  ada[)ted  to  the  future  wants  of  the 
Grand  Etre.     A  fortiori  the  Eartli  may  have  modified 
its  own  figure,  wlsich  is  only  beyond  our  intervention 
because  our  spiritual  .ascendency  has  not  at  its  disj)osal 
a  sufficient  material  foi'cc."     The  like  may  be  conceived 
:is  having  been  done  by  each  of  the  other  planets,  in 
concert,  possibly,  with  the  Earth  and  with  one  another. 
''  In  proportion  as  each   planet  improved  its  own  con- 
dition, its  life  exhausted  itself  by  excess  of  innervation  ; 
but  with  (he  consolation  of  rendering  its  self-devotion 
more  efficacious,  when  the  extinction  of  its  special  fune- 
lions,  first  animal,  and  finally  vegetative,  reduced  it  to 
the  universal  attributes  of  feeling  and  activity."  *     This 
stuff,  though   he  aills  it  fiction,  he  soon  after  speaks  of 
as  belief  (croyance),  to  be  greatly  reconunended,  as  at 
once  satisfying  our  natural  curiosity,  and  "  perfecting 
our  unity"  (again  unity  1)   by  "snp[)lying  the  gaps  in 

•  Synthase  Subjective,  pp.  10,  11. 


OF  AUGUSTS   COMTE.  175 

our  scientific  notions  with  poetic  fictions,  and  develop- 
ing sympathetic  emotions  and  aesthetic  inspirations : 
the  world  being  conceived  as  aspiring  to  second  man- 
kind in  ameliorating  the  universal  order  under  the 
impulse  of  the  Grand  Etre."  And  he  obviously  intends 
that  we  should  be  trained  to  make  these  fantaslical 
inventions  permeate  all  our  associations,  until  we  are 
incapable  of  conceiving  the  world  and  nature  apart 
from  them,  and  they  become  equivalent  to,  and  are,  in 
fact  transfornjcd  into,  real  beliefs. 

Wretched  as  this  is,  it  is  singularly  characteristic  of 
M.  Comtc's  later  mode  of  thouirht.  A  writer  mi2,ht 
be  excused  for  introducing  into  an  avowed  work  of 
fancy  this  dance  of  the  planets,  and  conception  of  an 
animated  Earth.  If  finely  executed,  he  might  even  be 
admired  for  it.  No  one  blames  a  poet  for  ascribing 
feelings,  purposes,  and  human  2)ropensItie3  to  flowers. 
Because  a  conception  might  be  interesting,  and  perhaps 
edifying,  in  a  poem,  M.  Comtc  would  have  It  imprinted 
on  the  inmost  texture  of  every  human  mind  In  ordinary 
prose.  If  the  imagination  were  not  taught  Its  pre- 
scribed lesson  equally  with  the  reason,  where  would  be 
Unity?  "It  is  in)portant  that  the  domain  of  fiction 
should  become  as  s)js(cma(.ic  as  that  of  demonstration, 
in  order  that  their  mutual  harmony  may  be  conforma- 
ble to  their  respective  destinations,  both  equally  diiccted 
towards  the  continual  increase  of  unit)/,  personal  and 
social."  * 

Nor  is  it  enough  to  have  created  the  Grand  Fetiche 
(so  he  factually  proposes  to  call  the  Earth)  and  to  bo 

•  SyntUisc  Subjective,  pp.  11, 12. 


176  LATER   SPECULATIONS 

able  to  include  it  and  all  concrete  existence  in  our  ador- 
ation along  with  the  Grand  Etre.  It  is  necessary  also 
to  extend  Positivist  Fetishism  to  purely  abstract  exist- 
ence ;  to  "  animate  "  the  laws  as  well  as  the  facts  of 
nature.  It  is  not  suUicicnt  to  have  made  physics  sen- 
timental ;  mathematics  must  he  made  so  too.  This  does 
not  at  first  seem  easy  ;  l)ut  .M.  Comtc  finds  the  means 
of  accwmplishing  it.  His  i)lan  is,  to  make  space  also 
all  object  of  adoration,  under  the  name  of  the  Grand 
Milieu,  and  consider  it  as  the  rej>rcsentative  of  Fatality 
in  general.  "The  final  ?/«//^  disposes  us  to  cultivate 
sympathy  i)y  developing  our  gratitude  to  whatever  serves 
the  Grand  Etre.  It  must  dis[)ose  us  to  venerate  the 
Fatalitv  on  which  reposes  the  whole  a^jTrciirate  of  our 
existence.*'  Wc  should  conceive  this  Fatality  as  hav- 
ing a  fixed  seat,  and  that  seat  must  be  considered  to  be 
Space,  wliich  should  be  conceived  as  possessing  feeling, 
but  not  activity  or  intelligence.  And  in  our  abstract 
speculations  we  should  imagine  all  our  concejjtions  as 
located  in  free  space.  Our  images  of  all  sorts,  down 
to  our  geometrical  diagrams,  and  even  our  cyphers  and 
algebraic  symbols,  should  always  be  figured  to  our- 
gelves  as  written  in  space,  and  not  on  p.aper  or  any 
other  material  substance.  M.  Comic  adds  that  they 
should  be  conceived  as  green  on  a  white  ;rround. 

Wc  cannot  go  on  any  longer  with  this  trash.  In 
spite  of  it  all,  the  volume  on  mathematics  is  full  of 
profound  thoughts,  and  will  be  very  suggestive  to 
those  who  take  up  the  subject  after  M.  Comte.  What 
deep  meaning  there  is,  for  example,  in  the  idea  that 
the  infinitesimal  calculus  is  a  conce[)tion  analogous  to 
the  corpuscular  hypothesis  in  physics ;    which  last  M. 


OF   AUGUSTE   COMTEo  177 

Coaite  has  always  considered  as  a  logical  artifice,  not 
an  opinion  respecting  matters  of  fact.  The  assim- 
ilation, us  it  seems  to  us,  throws  a  flood  of  light  on 
both  conceptions  ;  on  the  physical  one  still  more  than 
the  mathematical.  We  might  extract  many  ideas  of 
similar,  though  none  perhaps  of  equal,  suggc-^tive- 
ness.  But  mixed  with  these,  what  pitiable  niaisciics ! 
One  of  his  great  points  is  the  importance  of  the  "  moral 
and  intellectual  properties  of  numbers."  lie  cultivates 
;i  superstitious  reverence  for  some  of  them.  The  first 
three  are  sacred,  Ics  nombrcs  sucrcs :  One  being  the  type 
of  all  Synthesis,  Two  of  all  Combination,  which  he 
now  says  is  always  binary  (in  his  first  treatise  he  only 
said  that  we  may  usefully  represent  it  to  ourselves  as 
being  so),  and  Three  of 'all  Progression,  which  not 
only  requires  three  terms,  but  as  he  now  maintains, 
never  ought  to  have  any  more.  To  these  sacred  num- 
bers all  our  mental  operations  must  be  made,  as  far  as 
possible,  to  adjust  themselves.  Next  to  them,  he  has  a 
great  partiality  for  the  number  seven  ;  for  these  whimsi- 
cal reasons  :  "  Composed  of  two  progressions  followed 
by  a  synthesis,  or  of  one  progression  between  two 
couples,  the  number  seven,  coming  next  after  the  sum 
of  the  three  sacred  numbers,  determines  the  largest 
group  which  we  can  distinctly  imagine.  Reciprocally, 
it  marks  the  limit  of  the  divisions  which  we  can  directly 
conceive  in  a  magnitude  of  any  kind."  The  number 
Beveu,  therefore,  must  be  foisted  in  wherever  possible, 
and  among  other  things,  is  to  be  made  the  basis  of 
numeration,  which  is  hereafter  to  be  scptimal  instead 
of  decimal :  producing  all  the  inconvenience  of  a  change 
of  system,  not  only  without  getting  rid  of,  but  greatly 

12 


178  liATEIi   SPECULATIONS 

asrsravatinff,   the    disadviinta'res    of   the    existing    one. 

CO  O'  o  o 

But  then,  he  says,  it  is  absolutely  necessary  that  the 
basis  of  niuncration  should  be  a  prime  number.  All 
other  people  think  it  absolutely  necessary  that  it  should 
not,  and  regard  the  present  basis  as  only  objectionable 
in  not  being  divisible  enough.  But  M.  Comtc's  puerile 
predilection  for  prime  numbers  almost  passes  belief. 
His  reason  is  that  they  are  the  type  of  irrcductibility  : 
each  of  them  is  a  kind  of  ultimate  arithmetical  fact. 
This,  to  any  one  who  knows  M.  Comtc  in  his  later 
aspects,  is  amply  sufficient.  Nothing  can  exceed  his 
delight  in  any  thing  which  says  to  the  human  mind, 
Thus  far  shalt  thou  go  and  no  fiirthcr.  If  prime  num- 
bers are  precious,  doubly  prime  numbers  arc  doubly  so  ; 
meaning  those  which  arc  not  only  themselves  prime 
numbers,  but  the  number  which  marks  their  place  in 
the  series  of  prime  numbers  is  a  prime  number.  Still 
greater  is  the  dignity  of  trebly  ^n'ime  numbers  ;  when 
the  number  mai-king  the  place  of  this  second  number  is 
also  prime.  The  number  thirteen  fulfils  these  condi- 
tions :  it  is  a  prime  number,  it  is  the  seventh  prime 
number,  and  seven  is  the  fifth  prime  number.  Accord- 
ingly he  has  an  outrageous  pai'tiality  to  the  number 
thirteen.  Though  one  of  the  most  inconvenient  of  all 
small  numbers,  he  insists  on  introducing  it  everywhere. 
These  strange  conceits  are  connected  with  a  highly 
characteristic  exam|)le  of  M.  Comtc's  frenzy  for  rcmda- 
tion.  lie  cannot  bear  that  any  thing  shoidd  be  Icfl 
unregulated  :  there  ought  to  be  no  such  thing  as  hesita- 
tion ;  nothing  should  remain  arbitrary,  for  Vai'hitvaire 
is  always  favorable  to  egoism.  Submission  to  artificial 
prescriptions  is  as  indispensable  as  to  natural  laws,  and 


OF   AUGUSTE    COMTE.  179 

lie  boasts  that  under  the  reign  of  sentiment,  human  life 
may  be  made  equally,  and  even  more,  regular  than  the 
courses  of  the  stars.  But  the  great  instrument  of 
exact  reguhition  for  the  details  of  life  is  numbers : 
fixed  numbers,  therefore,  should  be  introduced  into  all 
our  conduct.  ^[.  Comtc's  first  application  of  this  sys- 
tem was  to  the  correction  of  his  own  literary  style- 
Complaint  had  been  made,  not  undeservedly,  that  in 
his  first  great  work,  especially  in  the  latter  part  of  it, 
the  sentences  and  paragra[»hs  were  long,  clumsy,  and 
involved.  To  correct  this  fault,  of  which  he  was 
aware,  he  imposed  on  himself  the  following  rules.  No 
sentence  was  to  exceed  two  lines  of  his  manuscripts 
equivalent  to  five  of  print.  Xo  paragraph  was  to  con- 
sist of  more  than  seven  sentences.  He  further  applied 
to  his  prose  writing  the  rule  of  French  versification 
which  forbids  a  hiatus  (the  concourse  of  two  vowels), 
not  allowing  it  to  himself  even  at  the  break  between 
two  sentences  or  two  paragraphs  ;  nor  did  he  permit 
himself  ever  to  use  the  same  word  twice,  either  in  the 
same  sentence  or  in  two  consecutive  sentences,  though 
belonging  to  difierent  paragraphs  :  with  the  exception 
of.  the  monosyllabic  auxiliaries.*  All  this  is  well 
enough,  es[)ecially  the  first  two  precepts,  and  a  good 
way  of  breaking  through  a  bad  habit.  But  M.  Comte 
persuaded  himself  that  any  arbitrary  restriction,  though 
in  no  way  emanating  from,  and  therefore  necessarily 
disturbing  the  natural  order  and  proportion  of  tlio 
thoughts,  is  a  benefit  in  itself,  and  tends  to  improve 
style.     If  it  renders  composition  vastly  more  difficult, 

•  Preface  to  the  fourth  volume  of  the  "  SystSme  de  Politique  Positive." 


180  LATEi:   SPECULATIONS 

he  rejoices  at  it,  as  tending  to  confine  writing  to  supe- 
rior mind-s.  Accordingly,  in  the  Synthese  Subjective, 
he  institutes  the  following  "  plan  for  all  compositions  of 
importance."  "Every  volume  really  capable  of  form- 
ing a  dis^tinct  treatise"  should  consist  of  "seven  chap- 
ters, besides  the  introduction  and  the  conclusion  ;  and 
each  of  these  should  be  composed  of  three  parts." 
Each  third  part  of  a  chapter  should  be  divided  into 
^  seven  sections,  each  composed  of  seven  groups  of  sen- 
tences, separated  by  the  usual  i>rcak  of  line.  Normally 
formed,  the  section  offers  a  central  group  of  seven  sen- 
tences, preceded  and  followed  by  three  groups  of  five. 
The  first  section  of  each  part  reduces  to  three  sentences 
three  of  its  groups,  symmetrically  placed  ;  the  last  sec- 
tion gives  seven  sentences  to  each  of  its  extreme  groups. 
These  rules  of  composition  make  ])rosc  approach  to  the 
regularity  of  poetry,  when  combined  with  my  previous 
reduction  of  the  maximum  length  of  a  sentence  to  two 
manuscript  or  five  printed  lines,  that  is,  2i)0  letters." 
**  Normally  constructed,  great  poems  consist  of  thirteen 
cantos,  decomposed  into  parts,  sections,  and  groups  like 
iny  chapters,  saving  the  complete  equality  of  the  groups 
and  of  the  sections."  "This  difference  of  structure  I)c- 
tween  volumes  of  poetry  and  of  philosophy  is  more 
apparent  than  real ;  for  the  introduction  and  the  con- 
clusion of  a  poem  should  comprehend  six  of  its  thirteen 
cantos,"  leaving,  therefore,  the  cabalistic  number  seven 
for  the  body  of  the  poem.  And  all  this  regulation  not 
being  sufficiently  meaningless,  fantastic,  and  oi)pressivc, 
Jic  invents  an  elaborate  system  for  compelling  each  i>f 
his  sections  and  groups  to  begin  with  a  letter  of  the 
alphabet,  determined  Ijeforehand,  the  letters  being  se- 


OF   AUGUSTE    COMTE.  181 

Icctcd  so  as  to  compose  words  having  "  a  synthetic  or 
eyiupathctic  signification,"  and  as  close  a  relation  as 
possible  to  the  section  or  part  to  which  they  are  appro- 
priated. 

Others  may  laugh,  but  we  could  far  rather  weep  at 
this  melancholy  decadence  of  a  great  intellect.  M. 
Comte  used  to  reproach  his  early  English  admirers  with 
maintaining  the  "  conspiracy  of  silence  "  concerning  hia 
hUer  performances.  The  reader  can  now  judge  whether 
such  reticence  is  not  more  than  sufficiently  explained  by 
tenderness  for  his  fame,  and  a  conscientious  fear  of 
bi'inging  undeserved  discredit  on  the  noble  speculationa 
of  his  earlier  career. 

M.  Comte  was  accustomed  to  consider  Descartes  and 
Leibnitz  as  his  principal  pi'ccursors,  and  the  only  great 
phllosojihers  (among  many  thinkers  of  high  philosophic 
capacity)  in  modern  times-  It  was  to  their  minds  tiiat 
he  considered  his  own  to  bear  the  nearest  resemblance. 
Though  we  have  not  so  lofty  an  opinion  of  any  of  the 
three  as  M.. Comte  had,  we  think  the  assimilation  just : 
these  were,  of  all  recorded  thinkers,  the  two  who  bore 
most  resemblance  to  ]M.  Comte.  They  were  like  him 
in  earnestness,  like  lilm,  though  scarcely  equal  to  him, 
in  confidence  in  tiiemsclves ;  they  had  the  same  extra- 
ordinary power  of  concatenation  and  co-ordination;  they 
enriclied  human  knowlcdi^e  with  jji-cat  truths  and  fjrcat 
conception  of  method  ;  they  were,  of  all  great  scientific 
thinkers,  the  most  consistent,  and  for  that  reason  often 
the  most  absurd,  because  they  shrunk  from  no  conse- 
quences, however  contrary  to  common  sense,  to  wliich 
their  premises  appeared  to  lead.  Accordingly  their 
iiamcs  have  come  down  to  us  associated  with  in*aud 


182  LATER   SPECULATIONS   OF   COMTE. 

thoughts,  wltli  most  imjiortant  discoveries,  and  .also 
with  some  of  tlic  most  extravagantly  wild  and  ludi- 
iTously  absurd  conceptions  and  tlicorics  which  ever  were 
solemnly  proj)oinidcd  by  thoughtful  men.  Wc  think 
]M.  Comte  as  great  as  cither  of  these  philosophers,  and 
hardly  more  extravagant.  Were  we  to  speak  our  whole 
mind,  we  should  call  him  superior  to  them  :  not  intrin- 
sically, but  by  the  exertion  of  equal  intellectual  power 
in  a  more  advanced  state  of  human  preparation,  but 
also  in  an  age  less  tolerant  of  palpable  absurdities,  and 
to  which  those  he  has  committed,  if  not  in  themselves 
greater,  at  least  appear  more  ridiculous. 


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